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VICE PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY:
WHY IT MATTERS AND
WHAT TO DO WHEN IT OCCURS
Roy E. Brownell I*
"Have you heard the news?" he said with a grin
"The Vice President's gone mad"
"Where?" "Downtown." "when?" "Last night"
"Hmm, say, that's too bad"
"Well, there's nothing we can do about it," said the neighbor.
"It's just something we're gonna have to forget"
"Yes, I guess so" said Ma
Then she asked me if the clothes was still wet.
Bob Dylan
"Clothes Line Saga"**
I.

INTRODUCTION

United States public law has elaborate procedures in place governing
presidential inability. However, none exist regarding vice presidential
* Coauthor of The U.S. Senate and the Commonwealth (University Press of Kentucky 2019)
and coeditor of Magna Cartaand the Rule of Law (ABA Press 2015). See https://roybrownell.com.
The Author owes a major debt of gratitude to John Feerick, John Rogan, Joel Goldstein, and the
students of the Second Fordham University School of Law Clinic on Presidential Succession for
helping to refine his thinking on the subject of vice presidential incapacity. The Author would also
like to thank Professors Feerick, Rogan, Goldstein, Seth Barrett Tillman, Brian Kalt, Don Wallace,
Jr., and Dr. Louis Fisher for their incisive comments on this Article and Eric Peterson for an insightful
discussion on the subject. Finally, the Author expresses his deep appreciation to Ellie Bufkin, Cole
Eisenshtadt, Nancy Kervin, and Kathy Reinke for their invaluable assistance in the preparation of this
Article.
** Copyright @ 1969 by Dwarf Music; renewed 1997 by Dwarf Music. All rights reserved.
International copyright secured. Reprinted by permission.
1. For purposes of this Article, "inability" and "incapacity" will be used interchangeably. Cf.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (using both "inability" and "disability"); id. amend. XXV, § 4 (using
"inability"). Inability, as understood by the framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, encompasses
physical or mental inability or other circumstances sufficiently serious to prevent or greatly
compromise an officeholder's ability to arrive at decisions or to convey them. See, e.g.,111 CONG.
REC. 3282 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh); see also id. at 7941 (statement of Rep. Poff); id. at 15,381
(Bayh/Kennedy exchange); cf. JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE
HISTORY AND APPLICATIONS34 n.* (3d ed. 2014).
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incapacity, a situation when the President is able to fulfill his duties but
the Vice President is not .2 There is nothing in the text of the Constitution
or the U.S. Code that prescribes what should be done or by whom in these
circumstances. As Dean John Feerick-the preeminent authority on
executive succession and inability-aptly notes, "[i]f the Vice President
suffers an inability, current law offers no framework for determining that
he is disabled."' Hitherto, lawmakers have largely taken the same position

on potential vice presidential incapacity as the neighbor did in Bob
Dylan's song: "It's just something we're gonna have to forget."'
This legal lacuna poses a serious threat to American governance as
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution makes the Vice
President central to the continuity of the executive branch.6 Ideally, a
constitutional amendment would be adopted that would cover a number
of succession and inability gaps, including vice presidential incapacity.'
Failing that, an ex ante statute would be the next best option. But, absent
such unlikely steps, this Article examines what concrete options are
available to federal officials if a Vice President were to become
incapacitated right now-a real-world concern as Vice President Mike
Pence recently felt the need to be tested for the COVID-19 virus.9
2. The Author has elsewhere written about what policymakers should do if both the President
and Vice President are incapacitated at the same time. See Roy E. Brownell II, What to Do If
Simultaneous Presidentialand Vice PresidentialInability Struck Today, 86 FORDHAM L.REv. 1027

(2017).
3. See, e.g., JAMES M. RONAN, LIVING DANGEROUSLY: THE UNCERTAINTIES OF
PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND SUCCESSION 156, 164-65 (2015); Joel K. Goldstein, Takingfrom the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Lessons in Ensuring PresidentialContinuity, 79 FORDHAM L. REv. 959,

1033 (2010).
4. John D. Feerick, PresidentialSuccession and Inability: Before and After the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, 79 FORDHAM L. REv. 907, 935 (2010).
5. BOB DYLAN, CLOTHES LINE SAGA. Copyright @ 1969 by Dwarf Music; renewed 1997 by

Dwarf Music. All rights reserved. International copyright secured. Reprinted by permission.
6. See U.S. CONST. amend XXV.
7. See, e.g., Michael Nelson, Background Paper, in A HEARTBEAT AWAY: REPORT OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON THE VICE PRESIDENCY 19, 99-100 (1988). For
constructive suggestions on to how to solve problems in the executive branch succession and inability

regime, see John D. Feerick, PresidentialInability: Fillingin the Gaps, POL. & LIFE SCI., Fall 2014,
at 11, 18-25; Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law Clinic on Presidential Succession, Report, Ensuring the
Stability of PresidentialSuccession in the Modern Era, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 15-35 (2012)
[hereinafter First Fordham Report]; Second Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law Clinic on Presidential
Succession, Ffty Years After the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Recommendations for Improving the
PresidentialSuccession System, 86 FORDHAM L. REv. 917, 958-70 (2017) [hereinafter Second
FordhamReport].
8. See Second FordhamReport, supra note 7, at 964-70.
9. See Adam Shaw, Mike Pence Says He Will Be Testedfor CoronavirusAfter Staffer Tested
Positive, Fox NEWS, (Mar. 21, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/pence-test-coronavirusstaffer-positive. There have been numerous instances of vice presidential incapacity. See Roy E.

Brownell II, Vice Presidential Inability: Historical Episodes That Highlight a Significant
ConstitutionalProblem,46 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 434,440-47 (2016). There also have been several
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Much as there is no constitutional or statutory provision addressing
how to determine vice presidential inability there has been little
scholarship on the issue. The Reports of the First and Second Fordham
University School of Law Clinics on Presidential Succession represent
notable efforts in the vein, but given the broad scope of these
undertakings, they were not able to discuss vice presidential incapacity in
great detail. 10 Dean Feerick has written with his customary rigor on the
subject of vice presidential inability in the context of a broader
examination of presidential inability." However, the two Clinics and
Dean Feerick focused their attention on prospective legal arrangements.12
"near misses" where a Vice President could very easily have become incapacitated. See id. at 447-52.
For example, Vice President Aaron Burr faced the possibility of assassination after he killed
Alexander Hamilton in a duel. See RON CHERNO, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 717 (2004). Vice
President Martin Van Buren was threatened by Senator George Poindexter such that Van Buren took
to carrying pistols into the Senate chamber when he presided. See LOUIs CLINTON HATCH & EARL L.
SHOUP, A HISTORY OF THE VICE-PRESIDENCY OF THE UNITED STATES 76-77 (Greenwood Press

1970) (1934); Earl Leon Shoup, The Vice-Presidency of the United States 287 (Jan. 1, 1923)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with the Harvard College Library). In
November 1950, Puerto Rican terrorists tried to assassinate President Harry Truman at Blair House.
See Carl Schoettler, The Attempt to Assassinate Harry Truman, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 1, 2006),
https://www.chicagotribune.comnews/ct-xpm-2006-01-01-0512310263-story.html. Vice President
Alben Barkley later recalled that he too "was on the[ir] list" of targets though no overt attempt was

made on his life. See Interview by Sidney Shallet with Alben W. Barkley, Vice President of the United
States (Aug. 4, 1953), https://kentuckyoralhistory.org/ark:/16417/xt705q4rk486;

see also Interview

by Sidney Shallet with Alben W. Barkley, Vice President of the United States (June 25, 1953),
https://kentuckyoralhistory.org/ark:/16417/xt712j684361. In 1960, Vice President Nixon developed
a sepsis in his leg. See Raymond Scalettar, Commentary, PresidentialCandidateDisability, 251 J.

AM. MED. Ass'N 2811, 2811 (1984). He became sufficiently ill that he was hospitalized for several
days. See id. During the first presidential debate in 1960, Nixon was seen on television as wan and
pale as the effects of the infection had still not worn off. See id.; Petula Dvorak, Like Hillary Clinton,
Nixon Ignored His Doctor's Advice While Running for President. It Was a Disaster, WASH. POST
(Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/like-hillary-clinton-nixon-ignored-hisdoctors-advice-while-running-for-president-it-was-a-disaster/2016/09/17/fca27be4-7c41-11e6-beac57a4a4l2e93astory.html. That same year, a Secret Service agent stepped to the podium during a
Nixon speech to alert him that overhead lights and electrical cables from the ceiling threatened to land
on the Vice President and electrocute him. See Guard Pulls Nixon to Safety as OverheadLights Sag,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1960; see also Joel K. Goldstein, Presidential Succession and Inability:

America's Inadequate Provisions 147 n.8 (1975) (unpublished senior thesis, Princeton University)
(on file with Princeton University). In 1967, Vice President Hubert Humphrey represented the United
States at the swearing in of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu in Saigon. See PHILIP H.
MELANSON & PETER F. STEVENS, THE SECRET SERVICE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF AN ENIGMATIC

AGENCY

111(2002). At a reception afterwards, Viet Cong agents lobbed mortars at the facility,

causing Secret Service agents to close ranks around Humphrey. See id. In 1982, Vice President
George H.W. Bush was tackled by Secret Service agents in Idaho during a dinner in what turned out
to be a false alarm. See RONALD KESSLER, IN THE PRESIDENT'S SECRET SERVICE: BEHIND THE
SCENES WITH AGENTS IN THE LINE OF FIRE AND THE PRESIDENTS THEY PROTECT 131-32 (2009).
10. See FirstFordham Report, supra note 7, at 15-35; Second Fordham Report, supra note 7,

at 958-70.
11.
12.

See Feerick, supra note 7, at 18-23; Feerick, supra note 4, at 935-43.
See Feerick, supranote 7, at 19, 24; Feerick, supra note 4, at 935-43; FirstFordhamReport,
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They do not discuss what to do if the Vice President became incapacitated
at this very moment, before legal reform has been adopted. As such, this
work offers a different point of departure.
This Article addresses the here and now: No constitutional provision
addresses what to do in case of vice presidential inability; no legislation
has been enacted to determine when such an incapacity has occurred; and,
if letter arrangements" or contingency plans are currently in place, they
are confidential and it is unclear what they encompass. As Professor
James Ronan has written, "in the event of total [vice presidential]
disability . . . . what would . .. take[ ] place remains a mystery." 14 As
such, this Article reflects the first full-length attempt to consider what
should be done if the Vice President became incapacitated today. In so
supra note 7, at 15-35; Second Fordham Report, supra note 7, at 958-70; see also Goldstein, supra
note 3, at 1033. For other treatment of the subject, see RONAN, supra note 3, at 156-57, 164-67.
13. In this Article, the term "letter agreement" or "letter arrangement" refers to a subset of
executive branch contingency plans wherein a President and/or Vice President make an informal
arrangement as to how to handle questions of succession and incapacity. Other than the letter

arrangement that Vice President Dick Cheney crafted in 2001, see infra Part III.A.1, no other vice

&

presidential incapacity contingency plan has been made known to the public. See KATE ANDERSEN
BROWER, FIRST IN LINE: PRESIDENTS, VICE PRESIDENTS, AND THE PURSUIT OF POWER 21-22 (2018);
DICK CHENEY ET AL., HEART: AN AMERICAN MEDICAL ODYSSEY 153-55 (2013); DICK CHENEY
LIZ CHENEY, IN MY TIME: A PERSONAL AND POLITICAL MEMOIR 319-22 (2011) [hereinafter CHENEY
MEMOIR]. Cheney apparently was not aware of letter arrangements involving other vice presidents.
See Douglas W. Kmiec, Failure to Act and the Separationof Powers-The Vice Presidency and the
Need to Surmount Divided Power in Pursuitof a Workable Government, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 477, 489

n.74 (2017). The White House contingency plans that have been made public make no clear provision
for what to do in a vice presidential inability context as defined in this article. See, e.g., Office of the

Counsel to the President, Contingency Plans-Death or Disability of the President (Mar. 16, 1993),
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article- 1009&context=twentyfifth-amendmente
xecutive materials [hereinafter Clinton Contingency Plans]; Office of the Counsel to the President,
Contingency Plans-Death or Disability of the President (June 1, 1982) [hereinafter Reagan

Contingency Plans] (on file with the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library Center, C. Boyden Gray
Files, OA/ID No. CF01823, Folder ID No. 1823-005); infra notes 44,322 and 325; see also Lawrence
C. Mohr, Medical Consideration in the Determination of PresidentialDisability, in MANAGING
CRISIS: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 97, 104 (Robert E. Gilbert

ed., 2000). For more on contingency planning involving the vice presidency, see John D. Feerick,
PresidentialSuccession and Impeachment: HistoricalPrecedents, From Indianaand Beyond, 52 IND.

L. REV. 43 app. at 66-67 (2019); FirstFordhamReport, supra note 7, at 34-35, 62; Second Fordham
Report, supra note 7, at 964-70.
As to whether any classified executive branch contingency is currently in existence that
addresses vice presidential inability, this Article cannot improve upon the statement made by the First
Fordham Clinic on Presidential Succession: presidential and vice presidential inability contingency
planning "is . . . confidential, and while [this effort] identif[ies] gaps and suggest[s] responses to
them, [it is] well underst[oo]d that others in positions of responsibility have already engaged in
contingency planning.. .. [However, in the words of] the Federalist Papers . . . '[a] wise
nation ... does not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may become essential to its
safety."' First FordhamReport, supra note 7, at 26-27.
14. RONAN, supra note 3, at 156; see also Joel K. Goldstein, The New Constitutional Vice

Presidency,30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 505, 526 n.118 (1995).
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doing, this piece weighs the options available to policymakers and offers
recommendations on how to solve this "mystery."
To arrive at a solution to an immediate case of vice presidential
incapacity, a number of considerations must be analyzed, some of which
exist in tension with one another. First, any proposed solution must pass
constitutional muster. This requirement is important both as a matter of
legality and of political legitimacy. 15 The former point strongly reinforces
the latter. Solutions must also be practical under the circumstances.
Whatever procedure is utilized cannot be protracted and ideally should be
made public. 16 Similarly, the matter should not be drawn out in the courts,
leaving the American public and its government in a state of uncertainty.
These three themes-constitutionality, political legitimacy, and
practicality-are fundamental to resolving the dilemma of vice
presidential incapacity (and indeed to resolving executive succession and
inability gaps in general) and will be returned to repeatedly in
this discussion.
This Article will commence with a brief overview of the relevant
constitutional provisions. 17 It will then examine the overriding
constitutional need to ensure governmental continuity, which vice
presidential inability could potentially undermine." Next will follow
analysis of the four potential approaches to handling an immediate case
of vice presidential incapacity.19 Failing a constitutional amendment or an
ex ante statute, the options are, in descending order of desirability:
(1) enacting legislation after the Vice President's inability becomes
evident, (2) executing a letter arrangement or contingency plan (assuming
one exists), (3) implementing what has been called the "contingent grant
of power theory" ("CGOPT"), and (4) impeaching and removing the
incapacitated Vice President. Each option has both strengths and
weaknesses and each would be viable in a pinch.2 0 Short of a constitutional
15. See, e.g., YALE LAW SCHOOL RULE OF LAW CLINIC, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: A READER'S GUIDE 57 (2018) [hereinafter YALE GUIDE]; cf. In

re Grand Jury Investigation, 315 F. Supp. 3d 602, 650 (D.D.C. 2018) (emphasizing the importance of
legitimacy in a presidential inability setting).
16. See, e.g., BRIAN C. KALT, UNABLE: THE LAW, POLITICS, AND LIMITS OF SECTION 4 OF THE
TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 181 (2019).

17. See infra Part I.A.
18. See infra Part I.B.
19. See infra Parts II-Il.
20. A non-viable alternative to handling vice presidential incapacity would be to view de facto
vice presidential inability as a vacancy in the office. See Goldstein, supra note 9, at 61; cf. WILLIAM
MCKAY & CHARLES W. JOHNSON, PARLIAMENT AND CONGRESS: REPRESENTATION AND SCRUTINY
IN THE TWENTY-FIRSTCENTURY 122 (2010). If the position were deemed vacant, the argument could
be made that the President could simply nominate a new Vice President under Section 2 of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Such an argument is highly dubious for several reasons.
First, the word "vacant" clearly denotes that no one is in office. See, e.g., U.S. Airways v.
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amendment, however, no flawless legal option exists for federal
officials. 2 1 However, a post hoc statutory procedure would appear to be
the "least worst" option.
A.

ConstitutionalText and Why Addressing Vice PresidentialInability
Matters

The Twenty-Fifth Amendment provides two processes for
addressing presidential inability. 22 Section 3 provides a mechanism for
handling scenarios when the President recognizes or anticipates his own
incapacity and is willing to take appropriate action.2 3 In such a scenario,
the President acknowledges his own incapacity and sends notice to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of
the Senate; this notification converts the Vice President into the Acting
Barnett, 535 U.S. 391,409 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring). But, in an incapacity scenario, the Vice
President clearly is in office, he simply has an incapacity. The only way to create a vacancy would be
for the Vice President to be impeached and removed, to resign, to become President, or to die in
office. So, on its face, this is a virtual nonstarter.
Second, the vacancy argument was clearly repudiated during consideration of the TwentyFifth Amendment. See Presidential Inability: Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Relating to
PresidentialInability Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,89th Cong. 87, 246 (1965) [hereinafter
1965 House Hearings];see also FEERICK, supra note 1, at 109, 365.
Third, there are even more challenging operational questions involved with determining a
vice presidential vacancy than in determining vice presidential inability. Who decides? How? And
under what authority? Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment authorizes no vacancy process. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2. Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 addresses death, removal, resignation,
and inability but not vacancy. See id. art. H, § 1, cl. 6. A vacancy determination would have to be
made up completely out of whole cloth. These operational shortcomings would almost certainly result
in a time-consuming effort to create a process, one that could easily be vulnerable to litigation after
the fact.
Fourth, whatever process that would be created to declare the office vacant would have the
effect of removing the incapacitated Vice President from office. There is only one process under the
Constitution for removing a Vice President outright (other than his own resignation) and that is
through impeachment. Whatever novel vacancy determination process that would be created would
seem to run afoul of the Impeachment Clause of Article II. Cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,72627 (1986). Moreover, this process could result in terminating the incapacitated Vice President's salary
and benefits. Since, absent a statute, pay and benefits are only provided for one Vice President, this
could invite litigation as the Vice President and his family would be suffering a tangible harm.
Finally, there are serious practical concerns with such an approach. For example, suppose
the Vice President appears permanently incapacitated and a vacancy is declared through some means.
The President nominates and Congress confirms a replacement. Then the incapacitated Vice President
recovers his capacity. There would appear to be two vice presidents. Who would be the real Vice
President? Cf. YALE GUIDE, supra note 15, at 75 n.341.
For these reasons, the vacancy approach is fatally flawed.
21. See, e.g., Feerick, supra note 7, at 18-19. An ex ante statute could be a possible solution
although it is not altogether free of constitutional complications either. See First Fordham Report,
supra note 7, at 34-35, 62. For a helpful model statute, see Second Fordham Report, supra note 7, at
964-65.
22. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, §§ 3,4.
23. See id. § 3.
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President. 24 The Vice President acts in this capacity until the President
alerts the Speaker and President pro tempore that he is ready to resume
his powers and duties. 25
Section 4 provides for situations when the President is unable or
unwilling to make an acknowledgment of inability. 2 6 In such a scenario,
the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers of the executive
departments (the Cabinet as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 101)27 alert the Speaker
and the President pro tempore of the President's incapacity. 28 This causes
the Vice President to become Acting President.29 If the President disagrees
with the Vice President and the Cabinet's action, the matter is sent to
Congress to decide, with a two-thirds vote in each house needed to prevent
the President from resuming his powers and duties. The Amendment,
however, makes no mention of how situations involving vice presidential
incapacity should be handled. 3 Nor is the matter addressed elsewhere in

24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id. § 4.
27. See Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 886-87 (1991). The Cabinet can be replaced by
statute with an entity of Congress' choosing. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See Operation of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment Respecting Presidential Succession, 9 Op.
O.L.C. 65, 66 (1985); 111 CONG.REC. 3263 (1965) (statement of Sen. Scott); JODY C. BAUMGARTNER
& THOMAS F. CRUMBLIN, THE AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY: FROM THE SHADOW TO THE SPOTLIGHT
116 (2015); CONTINUITY OF Gov'TCOMM'N,PRESERVING OUR INSTITUTIONS: THE CONTINUITY OF
THE PRESIDENCY: THE SECOND REPORT OF THE CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT COMMISSION 41
(2009); FEERICK, supra note 1, at 245; SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA'S FIFTY-ONE
CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 221 (2012); Akhil Reed Amar, Applications and

Implications of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 47 HOuS. L. REV. 1, 20-22 (2010); Akhil Reed Amar
& Vikram David Amar, Is the PresidentialSuccession Law Constitutional?,48 STAN. L. REV. 113,
139 (1995); Kenneth R. Crispell & Carlos F. Gomez, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment's Provisionfor
Dealing with PresidentialIllness Is Inadequate, in AMENDMENT XXV: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILIfY
AND SUCCESSION 115,119 (Sylvia Engdahl ed., 2010); Feerick,supra note 7, at 21; Joel K. Goldstein,

Akhil ReedAmar and PresidentialContinuity, 47 HOUS.L.REV 67,71-72 (2010); Nelson, supra note
7, at 90, 99-100; First Fordham Report, supranote 7, at 25; CHENEY ET AL., supra note 13, at 15355; CHENEY MEMOIR, supra note 13, at 319-22; RONAN, supranote 3, at 156, 164-65; John Rogan,

Improving the White House Plans for PresidentialInability, LAWFARE (May 9, 2018, 7:00 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/improving-white-house-plans-presidential-inability.
For brief legislative history on vice presidential incapacity in the context of the TwentyFifth Amendment, see 1965 House Hearings, supra note 20, at 77-78 (Sen. Bayh-Rep. Poff
exchange); id. at 86-87 (statement of Rep. Poff);111 CONG. REC. 3253 (1965) (Sens. Bayh-Hruska
exchange); id. at 3263 (statement of Sen. Scott); id. at 3266 (statement of Sen. Dirksen); see also
FEERICK, supranote 1, at 87, 362 n.34; cf.1965 House Hearings,supra note 20, at 56-57 (Sen. BayhRep. Rodino exchange). For concerns expressed about vice presidential inability during the state
ratification process of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, see Rebecca C. Lubot, "A Dr. Strangelove

Situation":NuclearAnxiety, PresidentialFallibility,and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 86 FORDHAM
L.REV. 1175, 1194-95 (2017).
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the Constitution.32
Article II, Section 1, Clause 6-which will be called the Original
Inability Clause 3 3-authorizes Congress to take action in the area of joint
presidential and vice presidential inability. 34 It provides that "Congress
may by law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or
Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer
shall then act as President." 35 On its face, the provision would appear to
address only situations when both the President and Vice President are
unable to exercise their powers and duties, not when the Vice President
alone is incapacitated. 36 Congress has never adopted legislation to explain
how a vice presidential inability determination is to be made and by
whom, 3 7 and the Clause in question offers no guidance of its own. Further
compounding matters is that the President cannot simply remove an
incapacitated Vice President from office.31
Providing procedures to handle vice presidential inability is
important because the issue potentially affects the proper functioning of
the national government. If the Vice President cannot carry out his duties,
several serious problems could ensue.3 9 First, the Twenty-Fifth32. See Nelson, supra note 7, at 90.
33. The provision has been referred to in a number of different ways including "the original
vice presidential succession clause," Joel K. Goldstein, History and ConstitutionalInterpretation:
Some Lessons from the Vice Presidency, 69 ARK. L. REV. 647, 668 (2016), "[t]he original
Constitution's presidential-disability provision," KALT, supranote 16, at 29, "the Succession Clause,"
id. at 31, and the "Article II's succession clause." Feerick, supra note 7, at 20. In addition, it is
sometimes characterized as Clause 5, not 6. See KALT, supra note 16, at 29.

34. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
35. Id. (emphasis added). Congressional authority in the realm of vice presidential incapacity
is also likely provided by the constitutional continuity-of-government principle, see infra Part I.B,

and by the Necessary and Proper Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 8,

cl. 18; infraPart II.A.2.b. The

President Pro Tempore Clause, U.S. CONT. art. I, § 3, cl. 5, applies to vice presidential incapacity to
the extent the Vice President is carrying out his legislative branch duties. In the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, the President pro tempore took the gavel as Senate presiding officer when the
Vice President became ill. See HENRY H. GILFRY,PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE PRO TEMPORE, S.DOC.
NO. 104, at 10-12,14,17, 26,44 (1st Sess. 1911); MITCH MCCONNELL & ROY E. BROWNELL II, THE
U.S. SENATE AND THE COMMONWEALTH: KENTUCKY LAWMAKERS AND THE EVOLUTION OF
LEGISLATIVE LEADERSHIP 288-89 n.139 (2019); see also 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1864 (1791) (statement
of Rep. Sherman); John F. Manning, Not Proved: Some Lingering Questions About Legislative
Succession to the Presidency, 48 STAN. L. REv. 141, 149 n.46 (1995). These Senate tasks, of course,
amount to only a small amount of a modern Vice President's time.
36. See, e.g., First FordhamReport, supra note 7, at 29-30; infra note 125.
37. See, e.g., SUMMARY OF PRO AND CON ARGUMENTS FROM LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS:
PRESIDENTIAL DISABLITY AND VICE-PRESIDENTIAL VACANCIES, S. REP. No. 88-9, at 1 (1964)
(quoting House Judiciary Committee Chairman Emanuel Celler).

38.

See Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288,1295 (D.C. Cir. 1993); CHENEY ET AL., supra note 13,

at 154; Memorandum from Antonin Scalia, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Kenneth

Lazarus, Assoc. Counsel to the President, Applicability of 3 C.F.R. Part 100 to the President and Vice
President (Dec. 16, 1974), https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/121674.pdf.
39.

The question could also arise, what should be done under a situation when the Vice
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Amendment process for deciding presidentialincapacity under section 4
could break down since the Vice President is essential to such a decision.4 0
As Dean Feerick has noted, "[t]he Amendment is premised on there being
an able, functioning Vice President."' If the Vice President is de facto
incapacitated and the President is apparently unable to fulfill his own
duties, the former cannot help make the determination with the Cabinet as
to whether the President is truly and legally incapacitated. 4 2
Second, an incapacitated Vice President-as next in line to the White
House-could easily become an incapacitated President. In a situation
in which the Vice President cannot fulfill his duties and the chief
executive leaves office through death, resignation, or removal, the
incapacitated Vice President would then be elevated to the Oval Office
pursuant to section 1 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment." At this point,
there would be no Vice President, which means there would be no clear
means by which to formally decide that the now-incapacitated President
(the former Vice President) is unable to fulfill his duties.45
Third, problems could result even outside of a section 4 scenario. For
instance, a President is likely to be hesitant to temporarily assign authority
to an incapacitated Vice President pursuant to section 3 of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, potentially hamstringing effective operations

President is dealing with an anticipated incapacity as opposed to an unanticipated bout of inability?
The Second Fordham Clinic Report provides a useful statutory approach in this regard as well. See
Second FordhamReport, supra note 7, at 964-66; cf. Feerick, supra note 7, at 23-25.
40. See FEERICK,supra note 1, at 245-46; KALT,supra note 16, at 20; RONAN, supra note 3, at

156-57; Amar, supra note 31, at 20-22; Joel K.Goldstein, The Vice Presidencyand the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment: The Power of Reciprocal Relationships, in MANAGING CRISIS, supra note 13, at 165,
188; FirstFordham Report, supra note 7, at 26; Rogan, supra note 31; see also Feerick, supra note

4, at 935-36.
41. Feerick, supra note 7, at 18; see also Goldstein, supra note 14, at 527.
42. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4; see also JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE WHITE HOUSE VICE
PRESIDENCY: THE PATH TO SIGNIFICANCE, MONDALE TOBIDEN 263 (2016).
43. See Amar, supra note 31, at 22; Feerick, supra note 4, at 935; FirstFordham Report, supra
note 7, at 25-26; cf. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 42, at 263.
44. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1; see also Amar, supra note 31, at 22; Feerick, supra
note 4, at 935; FirstFordham Report, supra note 7, at 25-26; cf. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 42, at 263.
Under these circumstances, executive branch contingency plans during the Reagan-Bush-Clinton era
required the incapacitated Vice President to take the oath of office in order to demonstrate his
capacity. See Clinton Contingency Plans, supra note 13; Reagan Contingency Plans, supra note 13.
This seems a prudent ad hoc approach to resolving this aspect of vice presidential incapacity. Such a
situation, of course, is temporally distinct from the situation discussed in this Article in which the
Vice President is incapacitated but the President remains in good health. Obviously, if the President
died, was removed from office, or resigned, the scenario in this Article would become the one covered
by the aforementioned contingency plans. For additional scenarios addressed in the contingency plans
see infra note 325.
45. See GOLDSTEIN,supranote 42, at 263; Amar,supra note 31, at 22; Feerick, supra note 4,

at 935.
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in the executive branch during anticipated periods of de facto
presidential inability.46
Fourth, an incapacitated Vice President could disrupt the legislative
branch as a mentally-unbalanced President of the Senate could wreak
havoc on the Senate by insisting on presiding over the chamber and not
following Senate rules and practices. 4 7 One could well imagine a Vice
President, for example, refusing to accord prior recognition to the Senate
Majority Leader, which is one of the underpinnings of modem Senate
practice and governance. 48 The Vice President's authority to recognize
senators to speak is unreviewable by the Senate which could greatly
hamper Senate business. 49 This could be especially the case in a politically
polarized chamber.
Finally, the modem Vice President is a valued counselor and
troubleshooter for the President. o5 He brings to these tasks a unique
perspective as the only other nationally elected officeholder and the only
Cabinet member not tethered to an agency.51 If incapacitated, the
President would lose the benefit of such assistance.
Thus, an incapacitated Vice President has the potential to greatly
complicate the mechanics of both political branches of government. The
likelihood of these scenarios may seem somewhat remote but there is a
long history of vice presidential incapacity and "close shaves."52 As one
authority notes, only through "good fortune" has the nation avoided a
situation involving an enduring vice presidential inability in the years
since the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 5 3 Moreover, the risks involved with
vice presidential incapacity are enormous, 1 making the problem much in
need of close examination.

46. See RONAN, supra note 3, at 156; Feerick, supra note 7, at 19; Goldstein, supra note 3, at
1032-33; cf. First FordhamReport, supra note 7, at 26.
47. See Joel K. Goldstein, Can the Vice PresidentPresideat His Own Impeachment Trial?:A

Critique of Bare Textualism, 44 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 849, 861-62 (2000); Goldstein, supra note 3, at
1033 n.392.
48. See, e.g., MCCONNELL & BROWNELL, supra note 35, at 157, 162; MCKAY & JOHNSON,
supra note 20, at 161; CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A
REFERENCE, RESEARCH, AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 501 (1989); cf. Goldstein, supra note 47, at 849-

50,861-62.
49.
50.

See TIEFER, supra note 48, at 501; cf. Goldstein, supra note 47, at 861-62.
See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 42, at 3, 6-7, 305.

51. See id. at 4-5, 61, 63, 304-05.
52.
53.
54.

See supra note 9.
RONAN, supra note 3, at 164-65.
See, e.g., id. at 165; Feerick, supra note 7, at 24; cf. RUTH C. SLVA, PRESIDENTIAL

SUCCESSION 1, 73-77, 90 (Greenwood Press 1964) (1951).
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The ConstitutionalRequirement to Ensure Government Continuity

Under the Constitution, there exists a clear structural principle that
the federal government-including the executive branch-must be
permitted to operate." As has been seen, the Vice President is central to
the executive branch's continuity efforts through the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment. 5 6It follows that interpreting the Constitution to allow an
incapacitated Vice President to maintain his powers and duties conflicts
with this structural necessity.5 7
The need for continuity of the executive branch is reflected in several
other constitutional provisions. Article II states that "t]he executive
5
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."
The word "shall" conveys that it is mandatory that executive power
remain in place. 5 9 Article II further provides that the President "shall hold
his Office during the Term of four Years," again conveying the
expectation that an executive must be in office continuously until the end
of the four-year term barring death, resignation or removal.o Section I,
Clause 6 of Article H;61 the Recess Appointments Clause; 6 2 the Twelfth
Amendment; 6 3and sections 1, 3, and 4 of the Twentieth Amendment,
each underscore the constitutional principle of executive branch
continuity. As noted by the Supreme Court, "the Constitution ... is not a
suicide pact." 6 5 It was meant to function, not to flounder amidst sterile
55. See NLRB v. Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 529-30 (2014) (citing with approval Executive
Power-Recess Appointments, 33 Op. Atty. Gen. 20, 23 (1921)); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Constitution ofNecessity,79 NOTRE DAME L.REV. 1257, 1257-60 (2004); Second FordhamReport,
supra note 7, at 966-67; cf. Silva, supra note 54, at 1, 73-77, 90; Edgar Aldrich, The Power and Duty
oftheFederalGovernmenttoProtectItsAgents,173N.AM.REV.746,746-50,755(1901).

56. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV; see also Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 698 (1997) ("In
1967, the Twenty-fifth Amendment to the Constitution was adopted to ensure continuity in the
performance of the powers and duties of the [presidential] office."); Feerick, supra note 7, at 18;

Goldstein, supra note 14, at 527; Goldstein, supra note 3, at 981-83, 986-87.
57.

On the desirability of structural reasoning in constitutional exegesis, see generally CHARLES

L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).

58.

U.S. CONST. art. II,

§ 1, cl.

1 (emphasis added); see also SLVA, supra note 54, at 75-77,

170-71; Goldstein, supra note 3, at 981.
59.

See Joel K.Goldstein, ConstitutionalChange, Originalism,and the Vice Presidency, 16 U.

PA. J. CONST. L. 369, 390-91 (2013) (discussing the mandatory nature of the word "shall").
60.

U.S. CONT. art. H,

§ 1,

cl. 1 (emphasis added); see also SILVA, supra note 54, at 75-77,

170-71.
61. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
62.
63.

See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 3; see also Second FordhamReport, supra note 7, at 967.
See U.S. CONT. amend. XII; see also Daniel J.T. Schuker, Burden ofDecision: Judging

PresidentialDisability Under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 30 J.L. & POL. 97, 118 (2014).
64. See U.S. CONT. amend. XX, §§ 1, 3-4. For more on the Twentieth Amendment, see
generally Brian C. Kalt, OfDeath and Deadlocks: Section 4 ofthe Twentieth Amendment, 54 HARV.

J. ON LEGIs. 101 (2017).
65. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,160 (1963); see also Terminiello v. Chicago,
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abstractions.66 Charles Evans Hughes once commented that "the framers
of the Constitution did not contrive an imposing spectacle of
impotency... . Self-preservation is the first law of national life and the
Constitution itself provides the necessary powers in order to defend and
preserve the United States."67 The nation needs a President at all times in
order to ensure that the government continues to function, 68 and the Vice
President, as evidenced by provisions such as the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, is closely tied to satisfying this requirement.
To this end, a fundamental constitutional precept exists that
executive authority should not be permitted to expire. 69 In the vivid words
of William Davie of the North Carolina Ratifying Convention, "[i]s not
this government a nerveless mass, a dead carcase [sic], without the
executive power?"7 0
The presidency is the only one of the three branches that, as a
constitutional matter, is manifested in one person.7 In addition, certain
337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304,
326-27 (1816); Paulsen, supra note 55, at 1268.
66. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316,415,420-21 (1819); Goldstein, supra
note 3, at 2015.
67. JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 32 (rev. ed. 1964)
(quoting Hughes); see also THE FEDERALIST Nos. 31,36,59 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST

NOS. 40, 41 (James Madison).
68. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681,713 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Philip
Kurland with approval and stating the President has been called the "sole indispensable man in
government").

69. See, e.g., President's Power to Fill Vacancies in Recess of the Senate, 12 Op. Att'y Gen.
32,38 (1866); Power of President to Fill Vacancies, 3 Op. Att'y Gen. 673,675-76 (1841); 2 GEORGE

&

TICKNOR CURTIS, HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN, FORMATION, AND ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES; WITH NOTICES OF ITS PRINCIPAL FRAMERS 395 (1860); 4 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 58 (William S. Hein

Co. 1996) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891) (statement of William Davie at the North Carolina
Ratifying Convention); id. at 135 (statement of Archibald Maclaine at the North Carolina
Convention); SILVA, supra note 54, at 1, 73-77, 90; Herbert Brownell, Jr., PresidentialDisability:

The Needfor a ConstitutionalAmendment, 68 YALE L.J., 189, 195 (1958); Arthur M. Schlesinger,
Jr., On the PresidentialSuccession, 89 POL. SCI. Q. 475, 503 (1974) (quoting Martin Van Buren);
Alexander M. Bickel, The Constitutional Tangle, NEW REP., Oct. 6, 1973, at 14, 15; Letter from

Thomas Jefferson to George Hay (June 17,1807) (emphasis added) (on file with the Founders Online,
National Archives) ("[The e]xecutive branch, whose agency ... is understood to be so constantly
necessary, that it is the sole branch which the constitution requires to be always in function."),

https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-5769;

see also William Josephson,

Senate Election ofthe Vice President andHouse of Representatives Election ofthe President, 11 U.

PA. J. CONST. L. 597, 620 & n.63 (2009); cf. Paulsen, supra note 55, at 1266 & n.19; President
Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4 1861), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th-centuryl

incoln1.asp.
70. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION As RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, supra
note 69, at 58; see also SILVA, supra note 54, at 90.

71. See Rubin v. United States, 525 U.S. 990, 991 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The
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presidential duties are nondelegable.72 As a result, there must be a
functioning President for a number of high-level executive branch duties
to be fulfilled. Without an able President, there is no Commander in Chief
of the military," no direction to American diplomacy, no one to veto
unwise legislation, 74 no one to issue pardons, 7 and no one to nominate
judges or senior executive branch officials.76 The broad constitutional
principle that executive power may not be permitted to expire dictates that
relevant constitutional and statutory law must be read broadly and
pragmatically to ensure that the operations of the executive branch can
continue so that these nondelegable, presidential duties may be carried
out. 77 This overarching precept is vital to reaching a solution to vice
presidential inability since the constitutionally-assigned functions of the
executive branch could easily grind to a halt in a situation involving an
incapacitated Vice President and a President who subsequently dies,
leaves office, or is incapacitated.78
It could be argued that, just as the Constitution was not designed to
right every wrong, 79 perhaps it does not account for resolving matters of
Constitution vests the entire 'Power' of one branch of Government in that single human being, the
'President."'), denying cert. to 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Executive power has the advantage of
concentration in a single head . . . ."); Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 500 (1866)
("[T]he President is the executive department."); Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus, 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 74, 79 (1861) ("The President is a department of the government;
and ... the only department which consists of a single man . . . ."); DAVID A. MCKNIGHT, THE
ELECTORAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES: A CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL EXPOSITION OF ITS
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES IN THE CONSTITUTION, AND OF THE ACTS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONGRESS ENFORCING IT 346 (1878) ("[T]he President is ... one branch of 'the Government' . . . .");

see also Clinton, 520 U.S. at 698-99 (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982)) ("We
have, in short, long recognized the 'unique position in the constitutional scheme' that this
[presidential] office occupies."); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,751 (1982) (noting "the singular
importance of the President's [powers and] duties"); Schuker, supra note 63, at 137; Seth Barrett
Tillman, Citizens United and the Scope of ProfessorTeachout'sAnti-CorruptionPrinciple,107 Nw.
U. L. REV. 399,413 & nn.40-41 (2012).
72. See, e.g., Presidential Succession and Delegation in Case of Disability, 5 Op. OL.C. 91,
93-99 (1981) [hereinafter Olson Legal Opinion]; Presidential Inability, 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 69, 84
(1961) [hereinafter Kennedy Legal Opinion]; Clinton Contingency Plan, supra note 13; see also
SILVA, supra note 54, at 73-77.
73. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §2, cl. 1.
74. See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
75. See id. art. I1, § 2, cl. 1.
76. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Olson Legal Opinion, supra note 72, at 93-95.
77. Cf. SILVA, supra note 54, at 1, 73-77, 90.
78. See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 28 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Perhaps a
variant of the maxim fiat justitia ruatcaelum (let justice be done though the heavens fall) might be
seen to apply. See Crooker v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 323 F. Supp. 3d 148,157 (D. Mass. 2018) (quoting
Lord Mansfield in Somerset v. Stewart (1772) 98 Eng. Rep.499, 509 (KB)). It bears noting, however,
that the only federal appellate court to cite this principle made certain to qualify the notion with
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vice presidential inability absent a constitutional amendment. For such
advocates, the answer is, there is no answer. Yet, for the reasons stated
above, the Constitution must provide a means for resolving vice
presidential inability since, if it does not, it could easily result in a
breakdown in executive authority and a major disruption in overall
governmental operation.so Ensuring vigor and continuity in carrying out
executive functions is one of the problems the original Constitution was
designed to address 8 I and subsequent amendments have sought to
reaffirm. 82 Not only is the continuity-of-government norm embedded
within constitutional structure, practical considerations of the kind the
Supreme Court has long embraced reinforce the principle." That is to say,
it is simply inconceivable that the Constitution permits an entire branch
of government to stop functioning at its most senior level. The power to
fix the problem exists within the nation's charter. 8 4
With this overriding premise established, it is time to turn attention
to the various potential means of effectuating solutions to the problem of
vice presidential incapacity." As noted earlier, there are four potential
approaches to addressing vice presidential inability. In descending order
important practical considerations. See Starski v. Kirzhnev, 682 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2012) (former
Supreme Court Justice Souter sitting by designation).
80. Cf. Rubin v. United States, 525 U.S. 990, 990-91 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting), denying
cert. to 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998); infra note 84.
81.

See, e.g., THE FEDERALISTNO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton).

82. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, §§ 3-4; id. at amend. XXV; see also Clinton v. Jones, 520
U.S. 681, 698 (1997).
83. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 12 (1982)
("The Constitution does not preclude [a] practical and widely accepted means of addressing an
infrequent problem."); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160,172 (1948) (quoting Justice Iredell in Case
of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826, 836 (C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (No. 5126)) ("All systems of government suppose they
are to be administered by men of common sense . . . ."); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Massachusetts, 125
U.S. 530,550 (1888) (quoting R.R. Co. v. Peniston, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 5, 31 (1873)) ("[T]he federal
constitution must receive a practical construction. Its limitations and its implied prohibitions must not
be extended so far as to destroy the necessary powers of the states, or prevent their efficient
exercise."); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he Constitution ... contemplates ... a workable government."); Smith v. Turner,
48 U.S. (7 How.) 283,449 (1849) (Catron, J., concurring) ("The Constitution is a practical instrument,
made by practical men . . . ."); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 858 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The Founders meant the Constitution as a practical
document that would [be] ... workable over time.").
84. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121 (1866) ("[T]he Constitution, has all the
powers granted to it which are necessary to preserve its existence . . . ."); Lucius Wilmerding, Jr.,
PresidentialInability, 72 POL. SCI. Q. 161, 179 (1957) ("[T]here is no 'gap' in the Constitution. Its
provisions covering presidential inability are entire; they cover every possible contingency. All that
is needed, all that ever has been needed, is the will and the occasion to put them into effect."); see
also Paulsen, supra note 55, at 1257-59; cf. United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 279
(1888); THE FEDERALIST No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton).

85. The constitutional continuity-of-government principle outlined herein supports each of the
four approaches to vice presidential inability and does not favor one over the others.
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of desirability, they are: (1) adoption of legislation after the vice
presidential incapacity becomes apparent, (2) execution of a letter
agreement (assuming one exists), (3) implementation of the CGOPT, and
(4) use of the impeachment process. Each option has flaws but all would
have viability in a pinch. Of the four alternatives, a post hoc statute
emerges as the least objectionable option.
II.

THE LEAST OBJECTIONABLE OPTION

A. A Post Hoc Statute Transferringthe Vice President'sTwenty-Fifth
Amendment Powers and Duties to the Next in the Line of Succession
1. Proposed Solution
In the event of vice presidential incapacity,lawmakers would be well
advised to consult and use as a template the model statute crafted by the
Second Fordham Clinic on Presidential Succession.8 The Fordham Clinic
model statute would authorize the President to gain the approval of a
majority of the Cabinet as to the Vice President's wellbeing." If the
President and a majority of the Cabinet believe the Vice President to be
incapacitated, the President would notify congressional leaders
whereupon, until further notice, the Vice President's Twenty-Fifth
Amendment powers and duties would be reassigned." His powers and
duties in this regard would be transferred to the next in the line of
succession (the Speaker under current law),89 who would essentially
86. See Second Fordham Report, supra note 7, at 964-65. Dean Feerick has similarly argued
for a statute that permits the next in the line of succession to step into the shoes of the Vice President
for purposes of addressing presidential incapacity. See Feerick,supra note 7, at 20. Both the First and
Second Fordham Clinics and Feerick seem to have in mind a prospective application of their statute,
not a post hoc measure. For a more executive-branch-focused approach to resolving vice presidential
incapacity, see RONAN, supra note 3, at 166-67.
87. See Second FordhamReport, supra note 7, at 964-65.The requirement of Cabinet approval
and congressional appeal would help ensure that the President does not arbitrarily separate the Vice
President from his powers and duties. See id. at 965.
88. See id. at 964-65.
89. The abstract doctrinal question of whether legislative succession is constitutional is beyond
the scope of this Article and has been ably addressed by others. See, e.g., Amar & Amar, supra note
31, at 114, 118; Steven G. Calabresi, The PoliticalQuestion of PresidentialSuccession, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 155, 158-60, 163-66, 170, 172 (1995); Goldstein, supra note 31, at 83-95; Manning, supra note
35, at 141-42. See generally, e.g., BRIAN C. KALT, CONSTITUTIONAL CLIFFHANGERS: A LEGAL

GUIDE FOR PRESIDENTS AND THEIR ENEMIES 88-94 (2012); SILVA, supra note 54, at 131-42; Seth
Barrett Tillman, Interpreting Precise ConstitutionalText: The Argumentfor a "New" Interpretation
of the Incompatibility Clause, the Removal & Disqualification Clause, and the Religious Test
Clause-A Response to Professor Josh Chafetz's Impeachment & Assassination, 61 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 285, 338 n.81, 341 n.90 (2013). There are, however, important practicalreasons to believe that
the Speaker or the next in the line of succession would in fact be able to step into the shoes of the
Vice President. That is in part because the executive branch has regularly and publicly confirmed the
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become "Acting Vice President" for succession and inability purposes.9 0
If the Vice President contests the President and the Cabinet's
determination, Congress would resolve the matter and could uphold the
President and the Cabinet's decision with a two-thirds vote in each
house.91 This process could be replicated as needed.
Given the post hoc nature of its enactment, some modifications to the
Clinic's work would be advisable. First, the statute should include
language making clear that it includes the sitting, incapacitated Vice
President within its scope. This could be done with a retroactive date of
application. Second, the statute should make explicit that the legislation
transfers the incapacitated Vice President's powers and duties to the next
in line but leaves the Vice President with full pay and benefits and ensures
he keeps his title during his incapacity. By merely transferring the Vice
President's powers and duties and continuing to compensate him,
Congress would help ensure it was not effectuating impeachment through
a simple statute and that the Vice President and his family would not suffer
tangible harm.9 2 Finally, the proposed legislation should make clear that
the President pro tempore (or his designee) would preside over the Senate
while the Vice President was incapacitated.
Under the proposed statute, the Speaker (or next in line) would
undertake the presidential succession and inability-related powers and
duties of the Vice President." The Speaker would not assume the other
executive branch responsibilities of the Vice President in deference to
concerns over separation of powers. 94 Similarly, under the proposed
view that the Speaker is in fact the next in the line of succession. See Brownell, supra note 2, at 1065-

68; Roy E. Brownell II, The Executive Branch's Longstanding Embrace of Legislative Succession to
the Presidency (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).

90. The concept ofan "Acting Vice President" has been acknowledged in some political branch
practice and congressional debate even
MCCONNELL & BROWNELL, supra note
91. See Second Fordham Report,
First FordhamReport, supra note 7, at
timelines for action as the Twenty-Fifth

absent express constitutional or statutory authorization. See
35, at 55-58.
supra note 7, at 964-65; cf. Amar, supra note 31, at 21-23;
27-31. The Fordham Clinic model statute follows the same
Amendment. See Second Fordham Report, supra note 7, at

964-65. Adoption of a vice presidential inability statute might have the added advantage of norming
in the provisions of section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment which of late have been inaccurately

characterized in some circles as "coup" provisions. See, e.g., Reis Thebault & Meagan Flynn, Trump
SuggestsRothstein, McCabe Are "Treasonous," Citing FoxNews,WASH.POST (Feb. 19,2019,10:16
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/02/18/illegal-treasonous-trump-says-rosenstei
n-was-part-coup-attempt.

92. See Courts - Judges - Compensation - Failure to Retire for Disability, 44 Comp. Gen. 544
(1965) (citing an Office of Legal Counsel opinion with approval). Federal law governing judicial
inability permits incapacitated judges to continue to receive benefits during their incapacity. See 28

U.S.C. § 372(b) (2012); Porter v. Comm'r, 88 T.C.548, 551 (1987), overruledon other grounds, 856
F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1988).
93.
94.

See Second FordhamReport, supra note 7, at 964-65.
See id. at 965-66. For this same reason, the 1947 presidential succession statute requires
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statute, the Speaker would not be permitted to preside over the Senate.9 5
If the Speaker were unable or unwilling to undertake the succession and
inability-related powers and duties, the next eligible officer in the line of
succession would fill the role.
Essentially the statute parallels the section 4 procedure found in the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 9 6Moreover, by permitting the Vice President
to keep his title, pay, and benefits, it would reduce the possibility that the
Vice President or his family would be able to claim injury and mount a
compelling legal challenge to the statute. 97 By following the norms of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment (e.g., requiring joint presidential and Cabinet
approval within the executive branch and a bicameral supermajority
appeal in Congress), the statute would be defensible on the merits.98 And
by making clear the delegation of authority, a post hoc statute eliminates
much of the legal uncertainty that surrounds competing approaches to vice
presidentialincapacity.99
Such a statute would draw authority from the aforementioned
constitutional continuity-of-government principle, the Original Inability
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. It would also be reinforced
by political branch precedent, including legislation that: (1) addressed
Vice President-elect William King's incapacity in 1853, (2) authorizes
Secret Service protection for the President and Vice President,
(3) authorizes presidential and vice presidential resignation, and
(4) provides procedures for managing judicial incapacity.
that the Speaker resign were she to become Acting President. See 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1) (2018).
95. Cf. Second Fordham Report, supra note 7, at 965-66. Article I, Section 3, Clauses 4 and 5
provides that "[t]he Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate . . . [unless]
he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4-5. The
provision is clear that the Vice President can be President of the United States or President of the
Senate,but not both. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, A Few Thoughts on Constitutionalism,Textualism,

and Populism, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1657, 1660 (1997); Goldstein, supra note 47, at 862-63.
Presumably the same principle would apply to presiding over both houses of Congress at the same
time.
96. See FordhamReport, supra note 7, at 964-65; Goldstein, supra note 3, at 1033.

97. See Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 475 (1977) (quoting United States v.
Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970)) (noting, in the context of a bill of attainder challenge, the
importance of "put[ting an individual] in the same position monetarily as he would have occupied if
his property had not been taken"). The loss of prestige from temporary transfer of powers and duties
would not be sufficient to be deemed a punishment and hence a cognizable injury as the Vice President
would retain his formal title. See id. at 470 n.32 (quoting United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 324
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("The fact that harm is inflicted by governmental authority does
not make it punishment. Figuratively speaking all discomforting action may be deemed punishment
because it deprives of what otherwise would be enjoyed. But there may be reasons other than punitive
for such deprivation.")); see also id. at 470-71.

98. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XXV, § 4.
99. For example, the contingent grant power of authority ("CGOPT") involves only an implicit
delegation of authority to the next in the line of succession. See infra Part L.B.
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2. Textual Authority Under the Constitution
In addition to the constitutional continuity-of-government principle,
a statute purporting to resolve a situation involving an incapacitated Vice
President could draw textual authority from one of two constitutional
provisions (or both): the Original Inability Clause of Article II, Section 1,
Clause 6100 and the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article1.101 Neither
source of authority is entirely flawless, 10 2 but together they form a second
solid constitutional basis for congressional action.
a. The Original Inability Clause
As noted, the Original Inability Clause provides Congress with the
authority to legislate regarding the inability of "both" the President and
Vice President. 10 3There are three ways this language can be interpreted as
to vice presidential inability. The first makes the most sense. The Clause
is simply silent as to vice presidential inability and therefore has no
applicability.104The language speaks to dual incapacity but says nothing
whatsoever about situations when the Vice President alone is
incapacitated. This constitutional silence would place efforts to resolve
100. See Feerick, supra note 7, at 20; Goldstein, supra note 40, at 189; Goldstein, supranote 3,
at 1033; see also Amar, supra note 31, at 22-23; Second Fordham Report, supra note 7, at 966.
101. See FEERICK, supra note 1, at 246; Feerick, supra note 7, at 20; Feerick, supra note 4, at
939; Second FordhamReport, supra note 7, at 967-68; see also Peter Frelinghuysen, Jr., Presidential
Disability, 307 ANNALS AM. ACAD.POL. & SOC. SCI. 144,149 (1956); Lyman Trumbull, Thomas M.
Cooley, Benjamin F. Butler, & Theodore W. Dwight, PresidentialInability, 133 N. AM. REV. 422,
425-26 (1881) (Cooley); Wilmerding, supra note 84, at 171, 173, 177-78; cf. Trumbull, Cooley,
Butler, & Dwight, supra, at 440, 446 (Dwight).
102. See SILVA, supra note 54, at 91-92 n.23,105-07; Urban A. Lavery, Presidential"Inability",
8 A.B.A. J. 13,14-16 (1922); President'sDisabilityand Succession, 32 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 357,36061 (1958); Trumbull, Cooley, Butler, & Dwight, supra note 101, at 420-21 (Trumbull); id. at 432
(Butler); Statement by The Honorable William P. Rogers, Attorney General of the United States on
Presidential Inability, Testimony Before Subcomm. on Const. Amendments of the Senate Judiciary
Comm. 27 (Feb. 18, 1958) (on file with author).
103. It has been put forward that the Original Inability Clause authorizes the creation of a line of
succession and nothing more. See 13 CONG. REC. 139 (1881) (statement of Sen. Garland); SLVA,
supra note 54, at 91-92 n.23, 105-07; Ruth C. Silva, PresidentialInability, 35 U. DET. LJ. 139, 171
(1957). Butsee Feerick,supranote 7, at 20; Feerick,supranote 4, at 943. Yet, presidential succession
acts have addressed matters beyond merely creating a line of succession. See Feerick, supra note 7,
at 20 (noting that succession laws have included minutiae as to special elections if a presidential-vice
presidential vacancy occurred, procedures for extraordinary legislative sessions in succession-related
contexts and qualifications as to which official could act as President and when); see also Feerick,
supra note 4, at 943; John C. Fortier & Norman J. Orstein, Presidential Succession and
CongressionalLeaders, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 993, 995 (2004); Goldstein, supra note 3, at 1033;
Second Fordham Report, supra note 7, at 966, 968; infra Part IIA.2.c.iii. This supports the notion
that the Clause could be used to address vice presidential inability. See Feerick,supra note 7, at 19-21.
104. Cf. Feerick, supra note 7, at 20-21; Feerick, supra note 4, at 936,939; Goldstein, supra note
3, at 999 n.215; Goldstein, supra note 40, at 189; Second Fordham Report, supra note 7, at 968;
Wilmerding, supra note 84, at 172.
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vice presidential inability on the very same footing as a host of venerable
separation-of-powers principles-judicial review, presidential removal of
Cabinet secretaries, executive agreements with foreign nations,
presidential termination of treaties, congressional investigations, the
Senate conditioning its approval of treaties, and executive privilegenone of which is mentioned expressly in text. 0 In this respect, textual
silence plus the constitutional continuity-of-government principle would
lead the Original Inability Clause to be seen as offering no roadblock to
congressional action; regarding vice presidential incapacity, the Clause
simply does not apply.1 06
A second way to interpret the Original Inability Clause would be that
the Clause does indeed have applicability with respect to vice presidential
0
As Dean Feerick
inability, in fact, it authorizes Congress to take action.o'
has observed, the Original Inability Clause "gives Congress some freedom
to legislate."'os This is reflected in the 1792, 1886, and 1947 succession
acts, which were not limited to the mere recitation of presidential
successors.109 Given that Congress has long demonstrated flexibility in
legislating pursuant to the Original Inability Clause and given the grave
importance of ensuring continuity in the executive branch, the Clause
almost certainly could be read as permitting Congress to take action to
resolve situations when the Vice President alone is incapacitated: that is
to say when it is necessary to prevent potential dual incapacity."o
Constitutional framer Benjamin Franklin's axiom-"[a]n ounce of
prevention is worth a pound of cure"-reflects a longstanding
constitutional principle that almost certainly would apply in this
context."' In Cunningham v. Neagle, the Supreme Court considered the
lawfulness of preventive action taken by a U.S. marshal to save the life of
a Supreme Court Justice.12 In this setting, the marshal killed a potential

105.
106.

See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 47, at 864; Second FordhamReport, supra note 7, at 968.
See supra note 104.

107.

Cf. Feerick, supra note 4, at 941-43.

108. Feerick, supranote 7, at 20; see also Fortier & Ornstein, supra note 103, at 995 ("There are
few restrictions on [congressional] power" in Article II, Section 1, Clause 6); supra note 103; infra

note 131.
109. See Feerick, supranote 4, at 943; see also Feerick, supra note 7, at 20; supra note 103.
110. See Second Fordham Report, supra note 7, at 966; cf. Feerick, supra note 7, at 20; Feerick,
supra note 4, at 942-43. The author's views have benefitted from conversations with John Feerick,

Joel Goldstein, and John Rogan on this subject.
111. Ounce of Prevention, Pound of Cure, U. CAMBRIDGE RES., https://www.cam.ac.uk/researc
h/news/ounce-of-prevention-pound-of-cure (last visited Jan. 25, 2020) (quoting Benjamin Franklin);
cf. MELANSON & STEVENS, supra note 9, at 240-41 ("The old adage 'prevention is the best defense'
governs nearly as much of the [Secret] Service's attention as actual physical protection."). But cf.
KALT, supra note 89, at 174-75.

112. See 135 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1890).
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13
assailant, an action without a clear constitutional or statutory basis.
Nonetheless, the Court upheld the official's preventive actions.114 The
Court reasoned:

It has in modem times become apparent that the physical health of the
community is more efficiently promoted by hygienic and preventive
means, than by the skill which is applied to the cure of disease after it
has become fully developed. So also the law, which is intended to
prevent crime [which] is more efficient than punishment of crimes after
they have been committed."'
Thus, the Court believed that a preventive action taken to protect
both an officeholder and a key part of the national government-the
Supreme Court-was constitutional, even though it took place without
congressional authorization. The Neagle scenario is related to preventing
joint presidential-vice presidential incapacity in that both actions involve
the intertwined issues of the personal wellbeing of federal officeholders
and the continued operation of constitutional institutions.116 Themain
differences between the preventive efforts in Neagle and those of a post
hoc inability statute would be that the latter would be on much firmer legal
ground since it would entail an express statutory authorization and would
not involve the taking of the life of another. Interpreting the Original
Inability Clause through the lens of Neagle would help prevent a dual
incapacity situation from occurring. Using the Neagle reasoning in this
way would reflect using "preventive means . . . [rather than] cur[ing the]

disease after it has become fully developed.""'
Other Supreme Court case law further demonstrates that, when faced
with serious threats to the nation's stability and safety, the federal
government-absent clear textual constitutional or statutory authoritymay take action to prevent adverse occurrences from happening:
situations akin to preventing presidential-vice presidential inability."' In
113. Seeid.at58.
114. Seeid.at58-59.
115. Id. at59 (emphasis added); see also id. at65-68,74-76.
116. See Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 745 (2014) (noting "the overwhelming importance of
safeguarding the President . . . ."); Rubin v. United States, 525 U.S. 990, 990-91 (1998) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) ("The physical security of the President of the United States has a special legal role to
play in our constitutional system. The Constitution vests the entire 'Power' of one branch of
Government in that single human being, the 'President' . . . . Thus ... the law should take special
account of the obvious fact that serious physical harm to the President is a national calamity . . . ."),

denying cert. to 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969)
("The Nation undoubtedly has a valid, even an overwhelming, interest in protecting the safety of its
Chief Executive and in allowing him to perform his duties without interference from threats of
physical violence."); see also Schuker, supra note 63, at 102.

117.
118.

Neagle,135U.S.at59.
See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 283, 308-09 (1981) ("Restricting Agee's foreign travel,
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In re Debs, the Court upheld the efforts of the federal government to
enjoin labor leaders from disrupting postal delivery and interstate
commerce through work stoppages even though such governmental action
lacked an express statutory basis.119 The Court reasoned that:
[U]nder the Constitution, power over interstate commerce and the
transportation of the mails is vested in the national government, and
Congress, by virtue of such grant has assumed actual and direct control,
it [therefore] follows that the national government may prevent any
unlawful and forcible interference

therewith ....

[W]henever the

wrongs complained of are such as affect the public at large, and are in
respect of matters which by the Constitution are intrusted to the care of
the Nation, and concerning which the nation owes the duty to all the
citizens
of
securing ... them .. . the
government ... [is
not]
those
prevent[ed] from taking measures therein to fully discharge
constitutionalduties.120

although perhaps not certain to prevent all of Agee's harmful activities, is the only avenue open to
the Government to limit these activities.... [W]hen there is a substantial likelihood of 'serious
damage' to national security or foreign policy as a result of a passport holder's activities in foreign
countries, the Government may take action to ensure that the holder may not exploit the sponsorship
of his travels by the United States.") (emphasis added); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931)
("No one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting
service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.")
(emphasis added); see also United States v. Carrier, 672 F.2d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 1982) (quoting Rep.
Webb with approval, 53 CONG. RE. 9378 (1916)) ("[A]n ounce of prevention is worth a pound of
cure [and] we want to prevent the threats which often incite men to kill and murder [presidents].");
CONG. GLOBE,27th Cong., 2d Sess. app.541 (1842) (statement of Sen. Choate) ("[I1f you have power
to interpose after judgment, you have power to do so before. If you can reverse a judgment, you can
anticipateits rendition.") (emphasis added); cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.(1 Wheat.) 316,415
(1819) ("It must have been the intention of those who gave these [constitutional] powers, to insure,
so far as human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution."); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 363 (1816) (Johnson, J., concurring) ("[T]he general government must cease to
exist whenever it loses the power of protecting itself in the exercise of its constitutional powers.");
Paulsen, supra note 55, at 1275 ("[F]or any actor attempting to interpret and apply the Constitution
faithfully, the idea that provisions of the Constitution should be construed, where possible, to avoid
grave harm to the nation, is a useful and a valid principle for choosing between plausible readings of
ambiguous constitutional commands."); cf. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507,512-14,516 (1980).
119. See158U.S.564,570,577-79(1895).
120. Id. at 581, 586 (emphasis added). There may be another related justification for Congress
acting in this context. The Supreme Court in Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corp. stated that
"Congress has not only the power to create a corporation to facilitate the performance of governmental
functions, but has the power to protect the operations thus validly authorized. 'A power to
create implies a power to preserve."' 308 U.S. 21, 32-33 (1939) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316, 426 (1819)). As Congress has the acknowledged authority to create a line of
succession, under the Court's reasoning in Pittman, incidental to that power should be the power to
"protect" and "'preserve"' the line of succession. Since the line of succession would be placed in
jeopardy by vice presidential inability, it might well be argued that Congress could therefore legislate
to address the vice presidential inability situation.
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Thus, in Debs, the Court upheld preventive governmental action to ensure
that the broader purpose of a constitutional clause would not be frustrated.
Moreover, once again, the Court approved such preemptive action to avert
significant harm to the public, even though-unlike the proposed solution
in this Article-the steps had not been authorized by statute.1 2 1
A setting involving an incapacitated Vice President and a healthy
President offers the very real possibility of morphing into a much more
acute scenario such as an incapacitated President and Vice President or a
situation involving an incapacitated President and no Vice President.
Given the stakes involved-the effective functioning of the executive
branch-utilizing an interpretation of the OriginalInability Clause akin to
the Court's reasoning in Neagle and Debs simply "make[s] sense." 2 2 Such
an approach manifests the sage, Franklinesque principle about the
importance of an "ounce of prevention."1 2 3 Indeed, it seems utterly
illogical that Congress would have to wait until both the President and
Vice Presidentwere incapacitatedbefore it could take legislative action
to resolve the crisis.12 4 Thus, the second interpretative method with respect
to the Original Inability Clause also supports Congress adopting
legislation to address vice presidential inability.
The third approach to the Clause follows the canon expressio unius
est exclusio alterius,meaning that since the language authorizes Congress
to take legislative action when "both" the President and Vice President
are incapacitated and is silent on situations when only one of them is
unable to perform his duties, that silence should be read as a prohibition.
Under the expressio approach, the textual language should be seen as
applying only to situations involving dual presidential and vice
presidential incapacity and that the silence as to vice presidential inability
alone consequently prohibits legislative action in this field.1 25 Several
reasons dictate why this interpretation is unpersuasive. For one, as
121. See Debs, 158 U.S. at 586.
122. Cf. BLACK, supra note 57, at 7, 22.
123. Ounce of Prevention, Pound of Cure, supra note 111.
124. Cf Debs, 158 U.S. at 581, 586; LEVINSON, supranote 31, at 221.
125. See, e.g., Defining Article II, Section 1, Clause 5, ofthe Constitution,Relative to Disability,
Removalfrom Office, Etc., of the Presidentof the United States: HearingsBefore the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 66th Cong. 31-32 (1920) [hereinafter 1920 House Hearings] ("Mr. Igoe.... Do you
construe [the original Inability Clause] to mean that Congress may act in either case, or that they both
must be disabled before Congress may provide the succession? Mr. Rogers. I think the latter is the
view that is generally held and was apparently the view of Congress when it passed the presidential
succession act in the middle [18]80's. Mr. Igoe. That is what I thought, that the power of Congress to
provide for presidential succession related to cases of disability of both the President and Vice
President."); see also 111 CONG.REC. 3282 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh); SILVA, supra note 54,
at 91-92 n.23. For criticism of use of the expressio canon in the context of Article II, Section 1, Clause
6, see Goldstein, supra note 3, at 999 n.215.
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outlined below, it places far too much emphasis upon a mere canon of
interpretation. 12 6 There are other competing principles that would
contradict, and almost certainly override, the expressio canon (e.g., the
constitutional continuity-of-government principle). 12 7 In addition, even
were the Original Inability Clause to be read on its face as providing an
ostensible prohibition to its use to resolve a vice presidential incapacity
scenario, the Supreme Court has noted that otherwise clear constitutional
provisions should be interpreted in their proper context.1 28 Given the
circumstances, such restrictions may not always be applicable. In
Balzac v. Porto Rico, the Supreme Court observed that "[t]he
Constitution . .. contains grants of power, and limitations which in the
nature of things are not always and everywhere applicable."' 29 Given the
gravity of vice presidential incapacity, contextual factors would seem to
be paramount and would likely lead the Original Inability Clause to be
interpreted so as not to prevent a legislative fix .130
Moreover, the Clause has not been interpreted narrowly. On its face,
it uses the term "Officer" in the singular, not the plural; therefore, the
Clause would seem to permit Congress to name only a single successor,
not an entire line of succession.131 Yet, five years after the Constitution's
drafting, Congress legislated for a line of succession and a line of
succession has been in place (with certain modifications) ever since.
The broader intent behind the Original Inability Clause must also be
considered. The purpose is obvious and it supports the construction
recommended in this Article. The intent was to ensure that there is a

126.
127.

See infra notes 253-61 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 253-61 and accompanying text; supra Part I.B.

128. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.723,759 (2008) (quoting Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S.
298,312 (1922) ("[Nloting the inherent practical difficulties of enforcing all constitutional provisions
'always and everywhere' . . . .")); cf. Amar & Amar, supra note 31, at 118 ("Within the Constitution
inheres a structure, a set of themes and overarching principles that furnish backdrops against which
any single provision must be interpreted."). Examples in this regard abound. For instance, despite the
First Amendment's clear pronouncement that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added), numerous exceptions have
been carved out of both seemingly blanket prohibitions. See, e.g., KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV.,95-815, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS: EXCEPTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT

(2014).
129. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312.
130. See supra Part II; cf. NLRB v. Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 538 (2014) (noting that "a national
catastrophe" might change subsequent constitutional interpretation of the Recess Appointments

Clause).
131. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (emphasis added) ("Congress may by Law provide for the
Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring
what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be
removed, or a President shall be elected."); Goldstein, supra note 9, at 199-200; see also supra notes

103 and 108 and accompanying text.
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functioning President at all times. 132 If need be, this principle counsels
strongly in favor of drawing back the lens from the specific language of
the Original Inability Clause and focusing on effectuating the larger
purpose of the provision.1 33 And, finally, as noted earlier, the expressio
34
canon has often been ignored in constitutional interpretation.1
In sum, the two most plausible interpretations of the Original
Inability Clause are supportive of Congress passing post hoc legislation
to address vice presidential inability. Even the third approach, seen in
proper context, does not pose an insurmountable obstacle to
congressional action.
b. The Necessary and Proper Clause
Even if the Original Inability Clause were somehow to be seen as an
impediment to addressing vice presidential incapacity, the Necessary and
1 35
Proper Clause would likely provide the needed authority. It provides
authority for Congress "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States." 1 36 In essence, this Clause brings into execution the other powers
of the federal government. This gives Congress great leeway to prevent a
gap in executive authority since executive powers are, by definition,

132.

See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 698 (1997); SLVA, supra note 54, at 1-13, see also

JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 23,41-56
(1965); cf. YALE GUIDE, supra note 15, at 71.
133. See Trumbull, Cooley, Butler,& Dwight supra note 101, at 426 (Cooley) ("When Congress
finds the Union without a head, its first duty is to provide for one; and if an impossibility exists in
doing this, according to the very letter of the Constitution, no one need doubt that this is a case in
which the spirit of the instrument is more imperative than the letter."); cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 40
(James Madison) ("[W]here the several parts cannot be made to coincide, the less important should
give way to the more important part; the means should be sacrificed to the end, rather than the end to
the means."); Paulsen, supra note 55, at 1260 ("[W]hen push comes to shove, specific provisions of
the document sometimes may need to yield to preservation and defense of the Constitution as a
whole . . . ."),
134. See supra note 105 and accompanying text; infra notes 254-55 and accompanying text.
135. See FEERICK, supra note 1, at 246; Feerick, supra note 7, at 20; Second Fordham Report,

supra note 7, at 967-68; cf. Trumbull, Cooley, Butler, & Dwight, supra note 101, at 440 (Dwight).
But see SILVA, supra note 54, at 91-92 n.23, 106-07. It could be argued that reliance upon the
Necessary and Proper Clause might run afoul of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment's legislative history,
which called into question its use for a statutory fix to presidential inability. See 1965 House Hearings,
supra note 20, at 105 (quoting Attorney General Designate Nicholas deB. Katzenbach); 111 CONG.
REC. 3282 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh); id. at 3265-68 (statement of Sen. Dirksen); cf. id.
(statement of Sen. Holland); SILVA, supra note 54, at 91-92, 106-07. See infra Part H.A.3.a.ii for a
refutation of this argument.
136. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added). For more on this argument, see Feerick,
supra note 7, at 20; Feerick, supra note 4, at 915-16; FirstFordhamReport, supra note 7, at 28-30.
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among the "other Powers" vested by the Constitution. 1 3 7 Afterall,Article
I's Executive Power Clause provides that "[t]he executive Power shall
be vested in a President."' In this respect, the Necessary and Proper
Clause would be carrying out the mandatory command that "[t]he
executive Power shallbe vested in a President."1 39 It would also be helping
to ensure that the President can act as Commander in Chief, can nominate
officials, can sign or veto legislation, can negotiate treaties, can issue
pardons, and the like. 1 o In addition, the Clause would aid in effectuating
the presidential inability determination procedures under the TwentyFifth Amendment. At its broadest level, the Necessary and Proper Clause
helps ensure executive continuity by "carrying" the executive branch's
powers "into Execution." 14 1As to governmental operation, it is hard to see
what could be more "necessary" than ensuring the functioning of an entire
branch of government, especially the one branch that is designed to
always be in operation. To this end,legislating to resolve vice presidential
incapacity would help to ensure the continuity of the executive branch.
This interpretation is supported by the Court's traditionally broad
construction of the Necessary and Proper Clause, beginning in McCulloch
v. Maryland.14 2 In McCulloch, Chief Justice John Marshall reasoned for

&

137. Cf. SILVA, supra note 54, at 91-92 n.23; Aldrich, supra note 55, at 746-48; Feerick, supra
note 7, at 20. The Necessary and Proper Clause is often seen as the font of authority for congressional
powers that lack a clear textual basis, such as the legislative oversight function. See MCKAY
JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 350. The Clause is also regularly seen as a means by which Congress can
take action to meet a crisis. See Gary Lawson, Ordinary Powers in ExtraordinaryTimes: Common
Sense in Times of Crisis, 87 B.U. L. REV. 289, 309 (2007) ("The power granted to Congress by the
Sweeping Clause is larger in times of crisis than in times of normalcy because the set of 'necessary
and proper' laws expands and contracts with circumstances."); L. ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., 98-505,NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS 1 (2020) ("It may be argued ... that the
granting of emergency powers by Congress is implicit in ... [among other things] the 'necessary and
proper' clause."); Gerhard Casper, On Emergency Powers of the President: Every Inch a King?,
OCCASIONAL PAPERS FROM U. CH. L. SCHOOL, No. 6, at 7 (1973) ("Congress may, of course, in the
exercise of its power to make all necessary and proper laws for executing powers vested in the
Government of the United States, authorize the President to take certain measures in specified
emergencies."); RON CHERNOW, WASHINGTON: A LIFE 649 (2010) (Hamilton's "exegesis of the
'necessary and proper' clause [regarding establishment of the Bank of the United States] . .. would
enable the federal government to respond to emergencies throughout American history.").

138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
139. Id. (emphasis added); see id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
140.

See Trumbull, Cooley, Butler, & Dwight, supra note 101, at 426 (Cooley).

141. U.S. CONT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see also Feerick, supranote 7, at 20.
142. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,415 (1819) ("[A] constitution intended to endure for ages to come,
and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs" mandates a broad
interpretation of congressional powers); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison); Feerick,
supra note 7, at 20; Feerick, supra note 4, at 942-43; First Fordham Report, supra note 7, at 29;
Second Fordham Report, supra note 7, at 963, 967-68; Alexander Hamilton, Opinion as to the
Constitutionalityof the Bank ofthe United States: 1791, https://avalon.law.yale.edull8th-century/ba

nk-ah.asp.
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regarding

vice

[I]t may with great reason be contended, that a government, intrusted
with such ample powers, on the due execution of which the happiness
and prosperity of the nation so vitally depends, must also be intrusted
with ample means for their execution. The power being given, it is the
interest of the nation to facilitate its execution. It can never be their
interest, and cannot be presumed to have been their intention, to clog
and embarrass its execution by withholding the most appropriate
means .... Can we adopt [a] construction, (unless the words

imperiously require it,) which would impute to the framers of that
instrument, when granting these powers for the public good, the
intention of impeding their exercise by withholding a choice of means?
It is not denied, that the powers given to the government imply the
ordinary means of execution.... The government which has a right to

do an act, and has imposed on it the duty of performing that act, must,
according to the dictates of reason, be allowed to select the means; and
those who contend that it may not select any appropriatemeans, that
one particular mode of effecting the object is excepted, take upon
14 3
themselves the burden of establishing that exception.

*

Interpreting the Necessary and Proper Clause to provide a solution
to vice presidential incapacity would certainly be in "the interest of the
nation to facilitate" as it would help ensure continuity in the presidency.
In this vein, preventing dual incapacity would ensure that the "ample
powers" of the executive branch were "intrusted with ample means for
their execution." 1 4 5Todo otherwise would, in the words of Chief Justice
Marshall, "clog and embarrass" the "execution [of presidential power] by
withholding the most appropriate means" of effectuating such authority.146
Thus, interpreting the Necessary and Proper Clause to enable Congress to
resolve vice presidential inability is wholly consistent with the reasoning
of the Supreme Court in McCulloch.
Reliance on the Necessary and Proper Clause to help the nation head
off a potential presidential succession crisis would also not be
unprecedented. The statute that helped resolve the bitterly disputed

143. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at408-10 (emphasis added).
144. Id. at 408; Second Fordhar Report, supra note 7, at 967-68; see also Feerick, supra note
7, at 20.
145. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 408; Second Fordham Report, supra note 7, at 967-68;
see also Feerick, supra note 7, at 20.
146. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 408.
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presidential election of 1876 was based in significant part on the
Necessary and Proper Clause.147
c. Potential Precedents Supporting Congressional Action
In addition to theoretical legal arguments in favor of an after-the-fact
statute resolving a vice presidential incapacity scenario, such an approach
is supported by historical precedent and analogous actions taken over the
years by Congress. Courts have long held that venerable constitutional
interpretation by the political branches is entitled to significant weight
even if the exegesis began years after the Constitution's framing.1 4 8

i. Legislation Addressing Vice President-Elect William
King's Incapacity
In 1852, the Democratic Party chose Franklin Pierce and William
King as their presidential and vice presidential candidates respectively.
King, who was a U.S. Senator at the time of his election, was in ill health,
however. 149 Following the victory of the Pierce-King ticket, but prior to
their inauguration, King resigned from the Senate due to his infirmity. 5 o
The Vice President-elect decided to go to Cuba, believing that the climate
might improve his health.1 5 1 It did not.1 52 Accordingly, it soon became
apparent that King lacked the strength to make it back to the United States
for his swearing-in.1 5 3 Congress stepped in and in early 1853 adopted a
statute that authorized the administration of the oath of office to the
deathly ill Vice President-elect while he was in Cuba.15 4
147. See Act of Jan. 29, 1877, ch. 37, 19 Stat. 227, 229 (1877); 15 CONG. REC. 5461 (1884)
(statement of Rep. Springer); 5 CONG.REC. 881 (1877) (statement of Sen. Bayard); id. at 891 (1877)
(statement of Sen. Thurman); id at 939 (1877) (statement of Rep. Hunton); id. at 952 (1877) (statement
of Rep. Caulfield); see also Bruce Ackerman & David Fontana, Thomas Jefferson Counts Himself
into the Presidency,90 VA. L. REV. 551, 636 n.239 (2004); cf. 5 CONG. REc. 920-21 (statement of
Sen. Bright); Charles R. Buckalew, The Electoral Commission and Its Bearings, 124 N. AM. REV.
161, 165-66 (1877); supra note 137.
148. See, e.g., NLRB v. Canning, 573 U.S. 513,516,524 (2014); Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 400-01 (1989); Merriam v. Clinch, 17 F. Cas. 68, 70 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1867) (No. 9460); see
also Goldstein, supra note 33, at 656-57; cf. Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving
Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109, 128-34 (1984).
149. See MARK 0. HATFIELD, VICE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1789-1993, at 187
(1997); see also John Milton Martin, William Rufus King: Southern Moderate 355-60 (1955)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill) (on file with the
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill).
150. See HATFIELD, supra note 149, at 187.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See Act of Mar. 2, 1853, ch. 93, 10 Stat. 180; CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 787,824,
1010, 1020, 1033, 1035 (1853); see also SILVA, supra note 54, at 93 n.28; Henry Barrett Learned,
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This statute should be seen as an example of Congress taking
preventive action in the context of vice presidential inability since King
was incapacitated but was not yet Vice President. Indeed, the question
could well be asked: Why else would Congress have legislated in this
case?' Not only was the future Vice President incapacitated due to ill
health, he was also poised to be seen as politically incapacitated on
inauguration day since he was outside of the United States. This was
because, until the early twentieth century, it was widely thought that, if a
President or Vice President was overseas, the officeholder was in fact
incapacitated. 1 56 Modem communication and transportation have
obviously rendered this interpretation obsolete but this view endured in
many circles for over a century after the Constitution's drafting. 5 7
Congressional debate surrounding the King legislation is meager and
did not address questions of Congress's constitutional authority to act
under these circumstances. But by passing the bill prior to the Vice
President's inauguration Congress demonstrated its willingness-and by
extension its authority-to take preventive action when the Vice
President-elect alone was potentially incapacitated.
Since the bill's adoption took place before the Twentieth
Amendment, which authorizes Congress to take action to secure the line
of succession prior to inauguration day, Congress arguably had less
authority in King's day than it would have today in addressing vice
presidential incapacity, because King was not even Vice President at the
time.' 5 Moreover, the importance of the vice presidency then was far less
than in the modem era as the officeholder did not clearly play a role in
determining presidential incapacity. Thus, this statute should be seen as a
The Vice-President'sOath ofOffice, THE NATION, Mar. 1, 1917, at 248, 249-50.
155. Cf. Learned, supra note 154, at 249 ("King's is the single example of a Vice-President
sworn into office on foreign soil. The ceremony required for its authorization a special statute.")
(emphasis added). But see SILVA, supra note 54, at 93 n.28.
156. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984, 61, 392-93
(5th rev. ed. 1984); FEERICK, supra note 132, at 49; GARRETT M. GRAFF, RAVEN ROCK: THE STORY
OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S SECRET PLAN TO SAVE ITSELF-WHLE THE REST OF US DIE 164-65
(2017); Trumbull, Cooley, Butler, & Dwight, supra note 101, at 428 (Butler); see also Rion

McKissick, Our ConstitutionalFifth Wheel, 3 VA. L. REV. 181, 184 (1915); cf. SILVA, supra note 54,
at 92-98,172; WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 50-51 (1916); 3
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 625 (Max Farrand ed., 1937).
157. See, e.g., SILVA, supra note 54, at 92-98; TAFT, supra note 156, at 50. To this day,
presidents and vice presidents are rarely outside of the country simultaneously. See Brownell, supra
note 2, at 1029 n.6; cf. CarrierPlanes Swoop on Tokyo Area; B-29s Also Score, Some Go 3,960 Miles;

Truman at Sea on Way to Big 3 Parley, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1945, at1 (discussing how President
Truman and then-presidential successor Secretary of State Jimmy Byrnes took separate planes to
reduce the chance of both men dying in a crash).
158. By contrast, with respect to addressing incapacity with a sitting Vice President, Congress

has authority under the constitutional continuity-of-government principle, the Original Inability
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.
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potential precedent for Congress acting to address vice presidential
incapacity-an action that took place under legal conditions potentially
less favorable to Congress than today.
ii. Legislation Authorizing Secret Service Protection
A second federal law provides analogous support for the view that
Congress has the authority to address vice presidential incapacity. Section
3056(a) of Title 18 is part of the broader continuity of government legal
regime which includes the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and the Original
Inability Clause. The statute provides that "the United States Secret
Service is authorized to protect the following persons ... The President,
the Vice President (or other officer next in the order of succession to the
Office of President) ....
The legal regime authorizing secret service protection is closely
related to that involving succession and incapacity.160 A Secret Service
detail protects executive continuity by trying to prevent a lethal or
debilitating attack on the President, the Vice President or both. Failing
that, if either officeholder is injured or both of them, the Secret Service is
trained to take immediate steps to address the potential incapacity by
getting the incapacitated principal immediate medical attention or, if that
is impracticable, by addressing the medical issue themselves.' 6 1 At the
same time, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and Original Inability Clause
protect executive continuity by providing mechanisms for addressing
presidential and vice presidential death and incapacity, ensuring that
executive power continues without interruption.
It is unclear what the constitutional authorization is for 18 U.S.C.
§3056(a); it could be the continuity of government principle, the Original

159.

18 U.S.C. § 3056(a) (2012); see U.S. CONST. art. II,

§ 1, cl.

6; id. amend XXV.

160. See UE. Baughman, Chief, U.S. Secret Serv., Treasury Dep't, Statement before
Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee on the Judiciary 2 (May 10, 1961) [hereinafter
Baughman Testimony] (stating that the bill that ultimately became 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a) "mak[es] the
threat and protection provisions of law co-extensive with the possibilities of succession to the
Presidency."). Much as the Garfield and Kennedy assassinations helped trigger efforts to strengthen
executive continuity measures (e.g., the 1886 Presidential Succession Act, the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment), the McKinley assassination and the Truman assassination attempt prompted legislative
efforts to provide greater presidential security. See FEERICK, supra note 132, at 140-46; MELANSON
& STEVENS, supra note 9, at 32, 53-54; Feerick, supra note 4, at 922; Frederick M. Kaiser, Origins
of the Secret Service Protection of the President: Personal, Interagency, and Institutional Conflict,
18 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 101, 111-12, 114 (1988); Richard B. Sherman, PresidentialProtection
During the ProgressiveEra: The Aftermath of the McKinley Assassination, 46 THE HISTORIAN 1, 4-

20(1983).
161.

See KESSLER, supra note 9, at 82, 108-10; MELANSON & STEVENS, supra note 9, at 184,

228, 231, 237-41.
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Inability Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, or all three.162 Either
way, the constitutionality of protecting the President through the Secret
Service seems beyond dispute.1 6 3
It is also important to note that the history preceding 18 U.S.C.
§3056(a) reflects that Secret Service protection was not limited solely to
situations involving threats to both national officeholders as one might
think given a cramped interpretation of the Original Inability Clause.
Indeed, history reflects the separate treatment afforded the two
officeholders. The first clear authorization for the Secret Service to
provide protection for a national officeholder began in an appropriations
bill in 1906 and was extended annually for four and a half decades
thereafter. 16 4 This recurring measure provided protection only for the
President.6 5 When the first permanent legislative authorization for the
Secret Service protective function was adopted in 1948, it too addressed
only the President, his family, and those he selected. 16 6 Authorization for

162.

(Aug.

See Sebastian, Constitutionalityof PresidentialProtection, SHALL NOT BE QUESTIONED

20,

2009),

https://www.pagunblog.com/2009/08/20/constitutionality-of-presidential-

protection; cf. H R.REP.NO.57-433, at 1-2 (1902) (stating in the context of trying to deter presidential
assassination through the criminal code that "Congress ... has power to enact laws for the protection
of the officers of the Government.... It is not unreasonable to contend, a constitutional government
having been ordained and established (and it was intended to be permanent and to have the power of
self-preservation), that the [Necessary and Proper Clause] empowers Congress to make laws
protecting and preserving the lives and persons of the chosen officers of that government, the agencies
through which only it can operate or exist as a government, at all times .... The provision [granting
this authority] ... is [the Necessary and Proper Clause]."); Note, Threats to Take the Life ofthe
President, 32 HARV. L. REv. 724, 724 n.1 (1919). To the extent the Secret Service is protecting the
President and Vice President within Washington, D.C., congressional authority could also be based
on Article I, Section 8, Clause 17.
163. See supra note 116.

164. See Sundry Civil Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 59-383, 34 Stat. 696, 708 (1906); see
also WALTER S. BOWEN & HARRY EDWARDS NEAL, THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE 126-32,
131-32 (1960); KESSLER, supra note 9, at 8, 22, 255-56; MELANSON & STEVENS, supra note 9, at 27,

30-35, 39,43, 44, 53-54, 136-37; Kaiser, supra note 160, at 108, 112-116; Sherman, supra note 160,
at 16. There is no legislative history surrounding the 1906 legislation. See Kaiser, supra note 160, at
115-16. There appears to have been an implicit authorization for presidential protection during the
Spanish-American War but it lapsed after the conflict. See id. at 112.

165.

See Sundry Civil Appropriations Act, 34 Stat. at 708 (making an exception to a funding

prohibition to permit "the protection of the person of the President of the United States").

166.

See Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-771,

§

201, 62 Stat. 672, 680 (1948) ("The

protection of the person of the President and the members of his immediate family and of the person
chosen to be President of the United States is authorized."); see also H.R. REP. NO. 80-1898, at 17
(1948); Kaiser, supra note 160, at 118. Earlier unsuccessful efforts to protect the President by
deterring assassination through criminal penalties also treated the Vice President differently. See HR.
REP..No.57-433, at 2 (1902) (listing the President's ArticleII duties and stating that "[c]harged with
these and other duties which call for unremitting and constant attention, how can it be said that the
President is not always engaged in the performance .. . of his official duties? ... As to the VicePresident ... no such claim can be made. The Vice-President can not act until Congress meets. His
constitutional duty is to preside over the Senate."); see also id. at 12.
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protection of the Vice President was added separately three years later,'6 7
but it was only provided at the discretion of the Vice President.1 68 The
Vice President was not treated in the same way as the President-being
subject to a mandatory protective detail-until 1962.169 Thus, the
legislation which authorizes the Secret Service to perform its protective
function-a task that fundamentally entails promoting executive
continuity 7 0-has not been seen to be restricted to situations involving
"both" nationally elected officials as the Original Inability Clause might
be read to suggest.' 7 For nearly a half century,legislation authorized the
Secret Service to protect only the President, not both the President and
Vice President. Today, the President has his own Secret Service detail as
does the Vice President.1 7 2 They do not enjoy Secret Service protection
167. See Act of July 16, 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-79, § 4, 65 Stat. 121, 122 (1951) ("[T]he United
States Secret Service ...

is authorized to protect the person of the President ...

and the Vice President

at his request."); see also S.REP. No. 82-467, at 2-4 (1951); H.R. REP.No. 82-465, at 3, 5 (1951).
Not unlike the scenarios in Neagle and Debs, see supra notes 112-21 and accompanying
text, early Secret Service protective details for the President and Vice President lacked statutory
authorization. In the case of the President, the Secret Service began providing a protective detail for
Grover Cleveland and his family in 1894 and continued to protect the President on and off for several
years thereafter without statutory authority. See MELANSON & STEVENS, supra note 9, at 24, 26-36.
As noted, not until 1906 was express legislative authority given to the Secret Service to protect the
President, yet it had to be reenacted every year. See id. at 32, 35, 53-54.
Vice President Charles Curtis appears to have been the first Vice President to receive a
protective detail. See id. at 43. Curtis requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation-not the
Secret Service-grant him a detail and the agency complied. See id. Curtis's successor as Vice
President, John Nance Garner, declined a protective detail, believing "[t]here is not anybody crazy
enough to shoot a Vice-President." BASCOM N. TIMMONS,GARNER OF TEXAS: A PERSONAL HISTORY

208 (1948); see also John Nance Garner, This Job ofMine, AM. MAG., June 1934, at 23, 96. Vice
President Henry Wallace appears to have been the first Vice President to receive Secret Service
protection. See Records of the United States Secret Service: 1933-1945, at 9 (on file with author).

Vice President Harry Truman also enjoyed Secret Service protection before it was legislatively
authorized in 1951. See KENNETH R. CRISPELL & CARLOS F. GOMEZ, HIDDEN ILLNESS IN THE WHITE
HOUSE 148-49 (1988); MELANSON & STEVENS, supra note 9, at 298-99. For the episodic nature of

Vice Presidents Barkley's, Nixon's and Johnson's Secret Service details, see Baughman Testimony,
supra note 160, at 4-7; 1 THE PRESIDENTIAL RECORDINGS OF LYNDON B. JOHNSON 251-52 (Max

Holland et al. eds, 2005).
168. See S. REP. NO. 87-836, at 1-3 (1961); H.R. REP. No. 87-432, at 2 (1961); see also
MELANSON & STEVENS, supranote 9, at 43.

169. Act of Oct. 18, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-829, § 3, 76 Stat. 956, 956 (1962); see also S. REP.
No. 87-836, at 1-3; H.R. REP.No. 87-432, at 2.
170. See KESSLER, supra note 9, at 118,181, 244.
171. In the early twentieth century, lawmakers' views on how Congress might constitutionally
authorize the President's protective function varied depending on the approach considered. For

example, early proposed legislation would have had the President using the military to provide
protective services under Congress's authority to regulate the military and the President's
Commander-in-Chief authority. See MELANSON & STEVENS, supra note 9, at 30-31; cf. Kaiser, supra
note 160, at 105.
172. See The Protective Mission, SECRET SERV., https://www.secretservice.gov/protection (last
visited Jan. 25, 2020) ("Permanent protectees, such as the President and the Vice President, have
special agents permanently assigned to them."); see also KESSLER, supra note 9, at 65, 125, 130, 131,
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only when they are together or only when there are threats against both of
them simultaneously. Each officeholder is individually protected
against threats. 7 3

Title 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a) and its predecessors authorize the Secret
Service to react to threats against the President and Vice President when
they occur or are about to occur. The statute also authorizes the Secret
Service to prevent threats against the President and Vice President from
happening in the first place-threats that could result in them being killed
or incapacitated.1 7 4The Secret Service website states that "part of the
Secret Service's mission [is] preventing an incident before it occurs."17 5
Since, by statute, the Secret Service can and does take steps to prevent the
President and Vice President from becoming incapacitated (either
separately or at the same time), why would a vice presidential incapacity
statute-authorized almost certainly under the same constitutional
provisions and with exactly the same purpose of ensuring government
continuity-be any less constitutional?
For these reasons, the federal statute authorizing Secret Service
protection for the Vice President strongly reinforces the argument in favor
of Congress having the authority to enact a law after the fact to resolve a
vice presidential incapacity situation. That is because 18 U.S.C.
§3056(a): (1) addresses threats to the safety and capacity of the Vice
President alone-not merely in tandem with the President; and (2)
authorizes preventive action be taken to help ensure that, among other
things, dual incapacity does not occur. These are two of the same
rationales used to support use of the Original Inability Clause to authorize
Congress to address vice presidential incapacity. Indeed, to oppose the
constitutionality of a statutory solution to vice presidential incapacity
would seem to mean that the legality of the Vice President's (and indeed
the President's) Secret Service detail could also be called into question.
iii. Legislation Governing Presidential and Vice Presidential
Resignation
A 1792 statute governing presidential and vice presidential
resignation also lends support for the notion that Congress could adopt
legislation to address vice presidential inability alone.1 7 6 It will be recalled
that Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 provides that "Congress may by Law
148, 152,156,206-07,220,225; MELANSON &STEVENS, supra note 9, at 68,127,327.
173.
174.

See The Protective Mission, supra note 172.
This has been true from the beginning of Secret Service protection of the President. See

Kaiser, supranote 160, at 112-13, 119.
175. The Protective Mission, supra note 172 (emphasis added).
176.

Cf. SILVA, supra note 54, at 106.
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provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of
the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as
President." 1 7 7As such, it anticipates four general sets of contingencies:
removal, death, resignation, and inability.' 7 The original Constitution,
however, provided procedures for only two of these scenarios.1 79 The
process for how to handle presidential or vice presidential removal is
covered by the impeachment provisions of Articles I,II, and111.1 The
procedure for dealing with presidential or vice presidential death was
addressed by Article H, Section 1, Clause 6 and was later superseded by
Sections 1 and 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 8 Under the original
Constitution, however, there is no procedure mapped out that explains: (1)
how a President or Vice President can resign from office or decline to
serve, and how to determine whether such an event has occurred; and (2)
how to determine whether an officeholder is incapacitated.11 Presumably,
the framers decided to have Congress provide the procedures for
determining resignation and incapacity.'
The process regarding presidential and vice presidential resignation
was outlined in the very same 1792 statute that provided for presidential
succession. 1 84 It states that:
[T]he only evidence of a refusal to accept, or of a resignation of the
office of President or Vice President, shall be an instrument in writing
declaring the same, and subscribed by the person refusing to accept or
resigning, as the case may be, and delivered into the office of the
Secretary of State.'
Notably, this 1792 statute seems to address not only how a President or
Vice President can resign or decline office but also whether the President
or Vice President has resigned or declined office (i.e., "the only

&

177. U.S. CONST. art. H, § 1, cl. 6.
178. Cf. Trumbull, Cooley, Butler, & Dwight, supra note 101, at 420-21 (Trumbull); Fortier

Ornstein, supra note 103, at 1000. These four contingencies (i.e., removal, death, resignation, and
inability) are not hermetically sealed off from one another; a combination of events can overlap and
thereby trigger the line of succession. For instance, if the President resigns and the Vice President
dies immediately thereafter, the Speaker would become Acting President.

179. Cf. Feerick, supra note 7, at 20; Trumbull, Cooley, Butler, & Dwight, supra note 101, at
420-21 (Trumbull).
180. SeeU.S.CONST.art.I,§§2,3;id.art.I,§§2,4;id.art.mH,§2.
181. See id. art. n, § 1, cl. 6; id. amend. XXV, § 1; id. amend. XXV, § 2.
182.

The latter issue was subsequently addressed for the President by section 4 of the Twenty-

Fifth Amendment. See id. amend. XXV, § 4.
183.

See SILVA, supra note 54, at 106-07; Feerick,supra note 7,at 20; Goldstein, supra note 3,

at 999 n.215.
184.

Cf. Feerick, supra note 7, at 20; Trumbull, Cooley, Butler, & Dwight, supra note 101, at

420-21 (Trumbull).
185. Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 239,241 (1792) (emphasis added).
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evidence"). 1 8 6 That is to say, it establishes a means of determining if in
fact either officeholder has resigned or declined to serve.
Yet, even though the 1792 resignation statute is authorized (at least
in part) by Article II, Section 1, Clause 6, which uses the language
"both . .. the

President

and

Vice

President," 8 7

the

1792

statute

encompasses a resignation or refusal to assume office for the "President
or Vice President.""' Notably, the statute does not say both the President
and Vice President. It says "or."
This early statutory procedure for determining whether someone has
resigned or declined office further supports the notion that Congress can
legislate to determine whether vice presidential inability alone exists as
opposed to only being able to legislate regarding the incapacity of both
the President and Vice President.1 8 9 Since the 1792 statute essentially
permits "both" to be treated as "or" in the context of determining whether
an individual has resigned or refused office, it would certainly seem to
follow that a future statute under the very same constitutional authority
could do the same in the context of deciding vice presidential
incapacity. 19 This would be all the more likely since these twin provisions
of resignation and inability both get at determining a person's status in
relation to an office: Is the individual still in office and, if so, is he able to
exercise the powers and duties of the office? The fact that the resignation
statute was adopted in 1792-a mere five years after the Constitution's
drafting-would seem to give the statute's "President or Vice President"
formulation an added gloss of constitutionality and bolster the case even
further for a post hoc statute.' 9 1

186. Cf. Feerick, supra note 7, at 20; Trumbull, Cooley, Butler, & Dwight, supra note 101, at
420-21 (Trumbull); Wilmerding, supra note 84, at 173.
187. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 is the only reference to
executive resignation under the original Constitution and scholars have cited it as the constitutional
authority for the President taking such action. See Josh Chafetz, Leaving the House: The
Constitutional Status of Resignation from the House of Representatives, 58 DUKE LJ. 177, 179
(2008); Edwin Brown Firmage & R. Collin Mangrum, Removal ofthe President:Resignation and the
ProceduralLaw of Impeachment, 1974 DuKE LJ. 1023, 1089 & n.354 (1974); Fortier & Ornstein,
supra note 103, at 1000 n.46; cf. Feerick, supra note 7, at 20. The Necessary and Proper Clause could
be also cited as supporting this proposition.

188. Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 239, 241 (1792) (emphasis added).
189.
190.

Cf. SLVA, supra note 54, at 106-07; Feerick, supra note 7, at 20.
Indeed, interpreting "both" as "either" would not be unprecedented. See Gunn v. Reliance

Standard Life Ins., 399 F. Appx. 147,152 (9th Cir. 2010) ("[U]se of the word'both'in these [medical]
records could be interpreted as meaning .. . either ...

.);

cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723,

758-59 (2008); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922).
191. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 412 (1928); BurrowGiles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 (1884); see also Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 539, 621 (1842).
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iv. Legislation Addressing Judicial Inability
In considering whether Congress could legislate a solution to vice
presidential inability through the Necessary and Proper Clause, the
example of judicial incapacity is also useful to consider. 92 Indeed,
Congress has endeavored to address judicial incapacity even though there
is no judicial equivalent to the Original Inability Clause.1 93 The fact that
Congress has had a statute on the books for decades regarding judicial
incapacity further reflects by analogy the viability of the Necessary and
Proper Clause in the realm of vice presidential inability.1 94
In essence, section 372(b) of Title 28 provides that a judicial council
or the Chief Justice may make an initial determination about the capacity
of a judge of retirement age to carry out his duties; the President then
makes the final determination. 1 9 5 If it is decided that the judge is
incapacitated, another judge is appointed through the advice and consent
process to assume the incapacitated judge's docket.1 96 The workload of
the incapacitated judge is removed from him but the judge is not removed
from office and continues to receive salary and benefits.1 97 This measure
is an offshoot of legislation initially proposed by Chief Justice Charles
Evans Hughes in 1939.198 It achieved recognizable form in 1957.199 With
some minor modifications, it has remained on the books for more than
sixty years.200
The constitutionality of section 372(b) itself has never been
litigated, 20 1but its sister provision, section 372(c), which involved judicial
192. See Second Fordhar Report, supra note 7, at 968.
193. The argument could be put forward that the congressional role in judicial incapacity is not
wholly analogous to Congress taking action with respect to vice presidential incapacity because the
Constitution is silent on the former issue whereas the Original Inability Clause's "both" language
poses a potential hinderance to legislative attempts to fix the latter. However, properly understood,
the Original Inability Clause is either silent as to vice presidential inability just as the Constitution is
silent on judicial inability, see supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text, or it can be seen to
authorize prevention of dual incapacity. See supra notes 107-24 and accompanying text. Thus,
congressional efforts to resolve vice presidential incapacity-like judicial incapacity-would not be
hindered.
194. See supra note 148.
195. See 28 U.S.C. § 372(b) (2012).
196. See id.
197. See Courts - Judges - Compensation - Failure to Retire for Disability, 44 Comp. Gen. 54445 (1965) (citing favorably an OLC opinion reaching the same conclusion).
198. See Act of Aug. 5, 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-269, 53 Stat. 1204, 1204 (1939); Hastings v.
Judicial Conference of the U.S., 593 F. Supp. 1371, 1373 (D.D.C. 1984).
199. See Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-261,71 Stat. 586, 586 (1957); see also H.R. REP.
No. 84-985, at 4 (1955); 103 CONG. REc. 3968-69 (1957) (statement of Rep. Celler). For other
modifications prior to 1957, see Act of Feb. 10, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-294, 68 Stat. 8, 12-13 (1954);
Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869, 869 (1948).
200. Cf. Hastings, 593 F. Supp. at 1373.
201. There are a few opinions that mention section 372(b) and they do not question its

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

35

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 3

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

326

[Vol. 48:291

disciplinary proceedings, was challenged and essentially upheld in the
courts.

20 2

The authority Congress relied upon in enacting the sister

provision to section 372(b) was the Necessary and Proper Clause coupled
with the judicial power provided under Article I .203 A few years after the
statute's enactment, federal district court Judge Alcee Hastings was
accused of malfeasance in office and faced disciplinary proceedings under
the authority of section 372(c). He argued, among other things, that
impeachment was the sole means of disciplining a federal judge,
questioning the constitutionality of the statute. 2 04 A federal district court
brushed aside the constitutional challenge, expressly upholding the
disciplinary statute based on the Necessary and Proper Clause. 20 5
As two authorities noted, "[e]very court that has adjudicated cases
challenging the [judicial discipline] [a]ct has found that it passes
constitutional muster." 20 6 One district court reasoned that "Congress's
power to enact these and other limitations on the personal freedom of
individual federal judges [is] pursuant to its power to make all laws
'necessary and proper for carrying into Execution' the powers vested by
the Constitution." 20 7 The authority to legislate in this area "cannot any
longer be seriously doubted." 2 0 8 Though that specific decision was
constitutionality. See Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 109-10 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation, 783 F.2d 1488, 1504, 1508 (11th Cir.
1986); see also In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 575 F.3d 279, 291 (3d Cir. 2009); In re
Charges of Judicial Misconduct, 404 F.3d 688, 695 (2d Cir. 2005); Adams v. Comm'r, 841 F.2d 62,
64 (3d Cir. 1988); Porter v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 548, 551 (1987).
202. For a closely related discussion, see In re Certain Complaints, 783 F.2d at 1501-16. Section
372(c) was repealed in 2002. The current statute can be found at 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364 (2018).
203. See S.REP. No. 96-362, at 7 (1979) ("The 'necessary and proper' clause provides an ample
basis for congressional action to implement the inherent power of the courts. Just as the legislative
and executive branches have the means to discipline their respective officials, it is imperative that the
judiciary implement its own disciplinary procedure."); 126 CONG. REC. S 13,859 (daily ed. Sept. 30,
1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (stating in the context of legislating on judicial incapacity that
"Congress has been granted the power to enact appropriate legislation by the necessary and proper
clause of the Constitution."). The constitutional underpinnings of this statute have not escaped
criticism, however. See Lynn A. Baker, Note, Unnecessary and Improper: The Judicial Councils
Reform and Judicial Conduct and DisabilityAct of 1980, 94 YALE LJ. 1117, 1131-33 (1985).
204. See Hastings, 593 F. Supp. at 1373; see also id. at 1379-81.
205. The District Court noted that the 1980 measure "culminated nearly 50 years of
consideration by Congress and the federal judiciary of the best means to assure responsible judicial
conduct consistent with the constitutionally protected independence of the judicial branch." Id.; cf. In
re Certain Complaints, 783 F.2d at 1504, cert. denied, 477 U.S. 904 (1986) ("Chief judges, circuit
councils, court executives and clerks of court all hold, by law, specified management responsibilities,
the exercise of which are presumably believed by Congress to be 'necessary and proper,' Art. I, § 8,
in order to 'ordain and establish' those inferior courts sharing in the 'judicial power' under Article
III.").
206. Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, Judicial Discipline: A Legislative
Perspective, 76 KY. LJ. 763, 775 (1988).
207. Hastings, 593 F. Supp. at 1380; Baker, supra note 203, at 1141.
208. Hastings, 593 F. Supp. at 1380. The court cited Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-72
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vacated as having been reached prematurely, 2 09 it was essentially later
upheld in another related decision by the Eleventh Circuit. 2 10
The historical record indicates that Congress has long regulated
judicial incapacity. Though the current statute has never been litigated per
se, its sister provision involving judicial discipline was challenged and
was essentially upheld. Because Congress has taken action to legislate for
judicial incapacity, it is all the more likely that it could do so for vice
presidential incapacity. This conclusion would seem to follow, especially
given that the consequences of vice presidential incapacity greatly exceed
those of judicial inability. There is only one Vice President and his role is
pivotal to executive branch continuity; no federal judge is so situated.211
d. Legitimacy and Practicality
The post hoc statutory option supported in this Article not only has a
sound constitutional basis, it has the benefit of being politically legitimate.
First, the mechanism essentially follows the model by which incapacity is
determined if the President is thought to be unable to function in office:
section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which requires that the Vice
President secure the Cabinet's approval before the former can become
Acting President, and, if the President contests his incapacity, Congress
then decides the matter. 2 12 The approach outlined in this Article would do
largely the same thing: It would provide for the President and Cabinet's
approval to decide if the Vice President is incapacitated. If the President
and the Cabinet make this determination, Congress would be notified. If
the Vice President disputes this decision or later believes he is no longer
de facto incapacitated, he can appeal to Congress. Unless two-thirds of
both houses believe the Vice President to be incapacitated, his powers and
duties would be returned to him.2 1 3 Thus, the measure reflects the norms
of section 4: an internal executive branch decision, with the legislative

(1965), which affirmed the authority of Congress to promulgate civil procedure rules under the
Necessary and Proper Clause. See Hastings, 593 F. Supp. at 1380 n.21.
209. See Hastings v. Judicial Conference, 770 F.2d 1093, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Cty.
of LA. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 646 n.10 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Although a decision
vacating a judgment necessarily prevents the opinion of the lower court from being the law of the
case the expressions of the court below on the merits, if not reversed, will continue to have
precedential weight and, until contrary authority is decided, are likely to be viewed as persuasive
authority, if not the governing law of the ... Circuit.") (citations omitted).
210. See In re Certain Complaints, 783 F.2d at 1501-16, 1525.
211. See Schuker, supra note 63, at 137; RONAN, supra note 3, at 3.
212. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, §4; see also Clinton Contingency Plans, supra note 13;
Reagan Contingency Plans, supranote 13.
213. See Second FordhamReport, supra note 7, at 965.
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branch providing an appellate function, with a supermajority presumption
in favor of the officeholder in question. 2 14
Second, a post hoc statute would be legitimate because Congress
would be acting as a proxy for the American public. 2 1 5 This was one of
the principal rationales for including Congress in the section 4 process
under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.2 16 Not only does Congress represent
the American people in the process, the body is accountable to the public
as well. 2 1 7 Furthermore, congressional deliberation over a contested vice
presidential incapacity situation would add important transparency to the
process which in turn would likely bring greater legitimacy.
Third, a post hoc statute would be legitimate because of the
involvement of the Cabinet in the deliberations. 2 18 Cabinet secretaries
administer the major executive departments and, after the President and
Vice President, provide leadership for the executive branch. They also
must receive Senate advice and consent which provides them with a link
to the public through the upper chamber's review and approval of their
nomination.219
For these reasons, the Cabinet's participation would lend further
legitimacy to the process of determining vice presidential inability.
In addition, the approach would be practical. For one, the section 4
procedure would be (or should be) familiar to policymakers. The process
would also be practical in that, by requiring the President to secure
majority support in the Cabinet, it would provide a check on the President
to help prevent him from either acting rashly or out of animus toward the
Vice President. It would mean he would need the approval of accountable
public officials before he took any action to declare the Vice President
incapacitated.220 Indeed, the Cabinet could disagree with the chief
executive. 22 1 Moreover, by providing that the Vice President could go to
Congress to resolve the matter, the statute would provide the Vice
214. Cf. Goldstein, supra note 3, at 980, 1025, 1027, 1040; Clinton Contingency Plans, supra
note 13; Reagan Contingency Plans, supra note 13.
215. See Trumbull, Cooley, Butler, & Dwight, supra note 101, at 425-26 (Cooley) ("Congress,
more directly than any other department or officer, represents public opinion and the public will, and
is more likely . .. to give a decision which accords with the public judgment."); see also KALT, supra
note 16, at 62; Second FordhamReport, supra note 7, at 973.
216.

See BIRCH BAYH, ONE HEARTBEAT AWAY: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILTY AND SUCCESSION

150 (1968); Secord FordhamReport, supra note 7, at 973; cf. FEERICK,supra note 1, at 64, 66; KALT,
supra note 16, at 62.
217. See KALT, supra note 16, at 145.
218. See id. at 61-62; cf. Second FordhamReport, supra note 7, at 948.
219. See KALT, supra note 16, at 61-62; Second FordhamReport, supra note 7, at 948.
220. Cf. Feerick, supra note 7, at 21.
221. The President, of course, could sack the recalcitrant Cabinet members, cf. KALT, supranote
16, at 61-62, but doing so almost assuredly would entail major political costs for the President.
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President with a means of appeal outside of the executive branch
hierarchy-dominated as it is by the President.
A related hypothetical underscores the practical benefits of a post
hoc statute as outlined in this Article. It is worth remembering that many
presidents have not personally liked or trusted their vice presidents. It is
not inconceivable that a de facto incapacitated President might try to
preempt his Vice President from initiating proceedings under section 4
against him by claiming that the Vice President was himself incapacitated.
That way, the Vice President would be incapacitated and unable to trigger
the section 4 inability process against the President. Under the statute
supported by this Article, the Vice President would be declared
incapacitated by the President, but the President would not be immune
from the section 4 presidential inability process. The Speaker (or next in
the line of succession) would in essence become Acting Vice President
for succession and inability determination purposes and be able to carry
out the section 4 function unless and until the Vice President regained
his capacity.222
A final practical benefit involves the fact that the Speaker would not
have to be closely involved in the vice presidential determination process.
Indeed, the Speaker might recuse herself from consideration of the
underlying inability legislation as well any future vice presidential
inability appeal to Congress. This might help ensure that a Speaker from
the opposite party would not be put in the difficult spot of initiating (or
not initiating) the vice presidential incapacity process as will be seen with
the CGOPT approach. 22 3Particularly in today's partisan environment, this
is an immensely important practical benefit.
3. Potential Constitutional Defects
It is quite possible that, following adoption of a post hoc vice
presidential incapacity statute, a lawsuit could be filed challenging the
measure. Such litigation would face difficult obstacles even before
arriving at the merits of the case. Assuming the plaintiffs could overcome
the threshold challenges to their suit, there are several legal theories upon
which they might base their case. The first is that Congress lacks authority
to adopt such a statute. That question has been addressed earlier.2 2 4 There
are three additional legal theories, however, that could be pursued against
222. Under the proposed statutory solution, the Speaker would not need to step down from the
House as she would not be delegated the Vice President's Senate duties or executive responsibilities
outside of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. See Second FordhamReport, supra note 7, at 965-66. By
contrast, in becoming Acting President, the Speaker must resign from the House according to the

1947 presidential succession statute. See id.; 3 U.S.C.
223. See infra Part EI.B.2.
224. See supra Parts IB, II.A.2.

§
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a post hoc statute: (1) that the Twenty-Fifth Amendment prohibits
delegation of the Vice President's authority to the next in the line of
succession; (2) that a constitutional amendment was adopted in the area
of presidential inability which might counsel against a statutory option in
a vice presidential context; and (3) that there are potential defects based
on the nature of post hoc enactment (i.e., potential violations of the Bill
of Attainder, Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses). Each of these
issues (i.e., threshold matters and substantive legal theories) will be
discussed in turn.
a. Threshold Considerations: Obstacles to Reaching the Merits
of the Case
Legislation attempting to resolve an instance of vice presidential
incapacity might well face litigation.225 However, for a number of reasons,
such litigation would face major hurdles before even reaching the merits
226
of the case. First, it would be difficult for litigants to show standing. A
225. Cf. 111 CONG. REc. 3255 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh); id. at 3265 (statement of Sen.
Carlson); HERBERT BROWNELL & JOHN P. BuRKE, ADVISING IKE: THE MEMOIRS OF ATTORNEY
GENERAL HERBERT BROWNELL 278 (1993). But cf. Calabresi,supra note 89, at 156-57.

226. Cf. Barnett v. Obama,No. SACV 09-0082 DOC (ANx),2009 WL 3861788,at *2-3, *1920 (C.D. Cal. 2009). Indeed, litigation prior to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment involving presidential
succession reaffirms this notion. In 1964, an attorney, Leonard Jones, brought suit against President

Lyndon B. Johnson in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, claiming that he had not
lawfully succeeded to the presidency following the assassination of John F. Kennedy. See Petition for

Writ of Quo Warranto, United States (on relation of Leonard C. Jones) v. Johnson, Civil Action No.
2004-64 (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 1964); see also Motion to Intervene and Motion to Withhold Service of
Process, United States (on relation of Leonard C. Jones) v. Johnson, Civil Action No. 2004-64
(D.D.C. Aug. 25, 1964); Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Intervene
and Motion to Withhold Service of Process, United States (on relation of Leonard C. Jones) v.

Johnson, Civil Action No. 2004-64 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 1964); FEERICK, supra note 132, at 10 n.*;
Lawyer to Keep Up U.S. PresidentialSuccession Battle, ALBUQUERQUE J., Feb. 18, 1964, at A-11;
Doyle Akers, LBJ Illegally President, Espanola Lawyer Insists, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, June 10,
1964, at 1; US Attorney Answers Contention LBJ Not President, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Sept. 30,
1964, at 10; Letter from David C. Acheson, U.S. Att'y, Dep't of Justice, to Leonard C. Jones (Apr. 8,
1964) (on file with author); Letter from John W. Douglas, Assistant Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice, to
Leonard C. Jones (Aug. 14, 1964) (on file with author).
The U.S. Department of Justice argued that Jones did not have standing, that the court did
not have jurisdiction over the issue and that the filing did not state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. See Motion to Dismiss, United States (on relation of Leonard C. Jones) v. Johnson, Civil

Action No. 2004-64 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 1964); Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Motion to Dismiss, United States (on relation of Leonard C. Jones) v. Johnson, Civil Action No. 200464 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 1964). The court dismissed Johnson's petition though t did not specify the exact

grounds. See United States (on relation of Leonard C. Jones) v. Johnson, Civil Action No. 2004-64,
(D.D.C. Sept. 15, 1964); see also Letter from John W. Douglas, Assistant Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice
to Leonard C. Jones, supra. Subsequent efforts by Jones went nowhere. See Motion to Set Aside
Order of Dismissal, United States (on relation of Leonard C. Jones) v. Johnson, Civil Action No.

2004-64 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 1964) (bearing a mark stating "Motion Denied, Sept. 24, 1964"). The
takeaway was clear: The court would not involve itself in presidential succession matters.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol48/iss2/3

40

Brownell: Vice Presidential Inability: Why It Matters and What to Do When I

VICE PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

2019]1

331

key element in establishing standing is to demonstrate that the person or
persons bringing suit have suffered injury in fact. 2 27 The legislation
proposed by this Article would not remove the Vice President's title,
salary, or benefits, so it would seem difficult for the incapacitated Vice
President or his family or staff to show that they have been harmed by the
legislation. Moreover, the alleged injury might not be permanent. Upon
resolution of the incapacity (within the vice presidential term of office),
the powers and duties would return to the Vice President. Outside litigants
would have even greater challenges in showing harm. They would have
to demonstrate that transferring the powers and duties of an incapacitated
Vice President would directly injure them. Thus, establishing standing to
challenge the legislation would be a difficult climb.
Second, there would also be imposing justiciability and prudential
hurdles for litigants to overcome. In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court
laid out a multi-prong test for determining whether a matter constitutes a
Political Question and is therefore outside of the judiciary's mandate. 2 2 8
Of note is the Court's concern about whether the issue at hand involves
"an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made . . . ."229Resolving a case of vice presidential incapacity -a
situation with the potential to gravely disrupt executive branch
operations-would seem like a quintessential example of the need for the
courts to defer to the political branches. During the time elapsed in
litigation, the President could become de facto incapacitated or die, both
outcomes that could result in a non-functioning President and which could
place the nation in dire straits. Litigating the merits of a vice presidential
inability statute could add even greater turmoil to an already exceedingly
difficult situation.
Another prong of Baker that the judiciary has placed particular recent
emphasis upon 2 03 involves whether the matter in question entails "a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it . .. ."231 In the case of preventing
dual incapacity, Article II of the Constitution would seem to assign
responsibility to a coordinate political branch: Congress232 Similarly, the
227.
228.
229.

See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,210-17 (1962).
Id. at 217.

230.

See Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 195-97 (2012); see also YALE GUIDE, supra note

15, at 66.
231. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
232. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; cf. Barnett v. Obama, No. SACV 09-0082 DOC (ANx),
2009 WL 3861788, at *15 (C.D. Cal. 2009) ("[T]he Twenty-Fifth Amendment sets forth the line of
succession ...

in case of [the President's] death, resignation, or inability to serve. The Amendment
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responsibility for making laws ensuring the execution of the functions of
the federal government is assigned to Congress under the Necessary and
Proper Clause.
Moreover, there are no "judicially discoverable and manageable
standards" for determining inability. 2 3 3 The Constitution says nothing
about how inability is to be determined and it seems clear that in the
context of executive incapacity, this decision is to be made by those
accountable to the electorate.234
In addition, there are judicial dicta that support the view that matters
of presidential inability are nonjusticiable. 23 5 Numerous authorities on the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment concur. 23 6 It is difficult to see why vice
presidential inability would be any different since addressing vice
presidential inability is directly linked to ensuring presidentialcontinuity
and capacity. Given that resolving vice presidential inability is essential
to helping ensure the vitality of the presidential succession and inability
regime under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, it would seem that a post hoc
statute would also be outside of the scope of judicial review.
Furthermore, the judiciary's treatment of the analogous process of
impeachment 2 37 would also counsel against the courts passing judgment
on a post hoc vice presidential inability statute. 23 8 The courts have been
9
clear that impeachment proceedings are not reviewable by the judiciary. 32
The Supreme Court's rationale for rejecting a judicial appellate role
regarding impeachment is applicable to litigating a vice presidential
specifies a role for Congress in this process, but no role for the judiciary. The combination of Article
I and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment leads the Court to conclude that there is a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue of the removal of a sitting president to a coordinate political
department-the Legislative branch.") (internal quotation omitted); see also In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 315 F. Supp. 3d 602, 650 (D.D.C.2018); Rudy v. U.S.Patent & Trademark Office,No.
1:13cv000278 (LMB/TCB), 2013 WL 12097552, at *2 (E.D. Va. 2013); Grinols v. Electoral Coll.,
No. 12-cv-02997-MCE-DAD, 2013 WL 211135, at *34 (E.D. Cal. 2013).
233. See Calabresi,supra note 89, at 167-69.
234. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; id. amend. XXV, § 4; see also KALT, supra note 16, at
145; supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
235. See Rudy, 2013 WL 12097552, at *2; Grinols,2013 WL 211135 at *34; Barnett, 2009 WL
3861788, at *19.
236. See 111 CONG. REC. 15,588 (1965) (statement of Sen. Ervin); YALE GUIDE, supra note 15,
at 64-71; Second Fordham Report, supra note 7, at 985; Report of the Commission on Presidential
Disabilityand the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, MILLER CTR., http://webl.millercenter.org/commiss
ions/comm_1988.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2020) [hereinafter Miller Center Report]; cf. Silva, supra
note 103, at 159-60; KALT, supra note 16, at 25, 167.
237. See KALT, supra note 16, at 55.
238. Cf. id. at 25-26; Second FordhamReport, supra note 7, at 984-85; Calabresi, supra note 89,
at 157-58, 169-71.
239. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228-29, 233 (1993); Ritter v. United States, 84
Ct. Cl. 293,300 (1936); see also Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475,501 (1866); MICHAEL
J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCEss: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL

ANALYSIS 146 (2d ed. 2000).
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inability statute: "[O]pening the door of judicial review to the procedures
used by the Senate in trying impeachment would 'expose the political life
of the country to months, or perhaps years, of chaos."' 2 40 Impeachment,
of course, also entails a permanent removal from office, 2 4 1 a far more
severe burden on the officeholder than the transferal mechanism
supported in this Article. It would seem illogical for the milder burden of
transferring the Vice President's powers and duties-with its retention of
title, pay, and benefits-to be reviewed in court while the more severe
treatment imposed on officeholders by impeachment would involve no
judicial review whatsoever.
For these reasons, it appears unlikely that litigation challenging the
post hoc statute supported in this Article would ever reach the merits of
the case.
b. Substantive Legal Theories Against a Post Hoc Statute
i. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment Prohibits Delegations to
the Next in the Line of Succession
Assuming that litigation contesting the post hoc statute reached the
merits of the case, one potential challenge could be based on the TwentyFifth Amendment. Under the Constitution, only the Vice President is
expressly permitted to become Acting President under section 3 of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 2 24 and only the Vice President is explicitly
authorized to trigger the presidential inability process under section 4.243
Because of these potentially exclusive constitutional assignments to the
Vice President, it could be contended that a statute could not skip over
him to the next in the line of presidential succession. 244
While the language of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment might at first
appear like a daunting obstacle to adoption of legislation to transfer the
powers and duties of an incapacitated Vice President, it is crucial to
remember that the authority for addressing the situation derives from the
constitutional continuity-of-government principle, the Original Inability
Clause, and the Necessary and Proper Clause, not the Twenty-Fifth
240. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 236; see also supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.

241. See John D. Feerick, The Problem of PresidentialInability-Will Congress Ever Solve It?,
32 FORDHAML. RE. 73, 115 (1963); Paul A. Stephan m, History, Background and Outstanding
Problems of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, in PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE
TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 63, 68 (Kenneth W. Thompson ed., 1988); Goldstein, supra note 9, at

91.

§ 3; Goldstein, supra note

40, at 189.

242.

See U.S. CONT. amend. XXV,

243.
244.

See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4; see also Goldstein, supra note 9, at 98.
See RONAN, supra note 3, at 156; Goldstein, supra note 9, at 98; Goldstein, supra note 40,

at 189.
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Amendment. 24 5While the Twenty-Fifth Amendment informs notions of
how the vice presidential inability statute should be drafted, the
Amendment itself does not encompass dual incapacity. 24 6 By contrast, in
this Article, the proposed statutory fix to vice presidential incapacity is
framed, in part,2 4 7 under a dual incapacity theory pursuant to the Original
Inability Clause-that is, taking steps to prevent simultaneous presidential
and vice presidential inability.
Even if the Twenty-Fifth Amendment were somehow to be seen as
applying directly in this setting, it would still not preclude Congress from
adopting a post hoc statute. That is because the delegations to the Vice
President under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment are not necessarily
exclusive. In Supreme Court case law involving vital national concerns,
the absence of unambiguously exclusive delegations has often been
deemed to be an important consideration. In McCulloch v. Maryland,8 2 4
perhaps "the most central case in our constitutional canon," 24 9 Chief
Justice John Marshall wrote for the Court and placed great emphasis on
the lack of the word "expressly" in the Tenth Amendment as opposed to
the Articles of Confederation:
Among the enumerated powers ... [,]there is no phrase in the
instrument which, like the articles of confederation, excludes incidental
or implied powers; and which requires that every thing granted shall be
expressly and minutely described.... [T]he 10th Amendment ... omits
the word "expressly," and declares only that the powers "not delegated
to the United States, nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to the
States or to the people;" thus leaving the question, whether the particular
power which may become the subject of contest has been delegated to
the one government, or prohibited to the other, to depend on a fair
construction of the whole instrument.... A constitution, to contain an
accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will
admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution,
would partake of the prolixity of a legal code .... Its nature, therefore,
requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important

Cf. Goldstein,supra note 40, at 189; Feerick, supra note 7, at 20-21.
See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND: A GRAND TOUR OF OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC 189 n.* (2015); A Modern FatherofOur Constitution:An Interview with
Former Senator Birch Bayh, 79 FORDHAM L. REv. 781, 804 (2010) (quoting John Feerick); Second
FordhamReport, supra note 7, at 959 n.256; supra notes 86-99, 103-34 and accompanying text; cf.
245.

246.

FEERICK, supra note 1, at 115; Feerick, supra note 4, at 938. For analysis of how Twenty-Fifth
Amendment norms may inform evaluation of vice-presidential inability options, see, e.g., infra notes
400-06 and accompanying text.
247. It will be recalled that the legislation advocated in this Article is also fashioned under the
constitutional continuity-of-government principle and the Necessary and Proper Clause.
248. See 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
249. Akhil Reed Amar,Intratextualism, 112 HARV.L.REv. 747,749 (1999).
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objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those
objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.250
The Court's reliance in McCulloch on the absence of the word
"expressly" in the Tenth Amendment is analogous to the absence of
similar terms in sections 3 and 4 with respect to delegations to or from the
Vice President. For instance, the terms "solely" 251 and "exclusively" are
nowhere to be found.2 5 2 In light of McCulloch's reasoning, opponents of
a post hoc statutory option would be left once again to rely heavily on the
expressio canon.253 Reliance on this canon alone seems a woefully
insufficient basis upon which to prevent Congress from passing a vice
presidential inability statute and thereby attempt to ensure executive
branch continuity. The expressio canon is just that, a canon. It is not an
inviolate legal principle.254 Indeed, the courts have routinely discarded
it.2 5 5 As Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner have written, "[n]o

250. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 406-07 (1819) (emphasis added); see also id. at 408,41112,415.
251. The framers used the term "sole" in other contexts. It is applied with respect to the House
of Representatives' authority to impeach officials and the Senate's authority to try impeachments. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3; Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 230-31 (1993). Thus, in the
analogous situation of impeachment and removal, see KALT, supra note 16, at 55, the Constitution is
clear when only one institution is to be involved in the procedure.
252. Cf. Goldstein, supra note 40, at 189. The framers also used "exclusive" and other
comparable terms. For instance, the word "exclusive" appears in Article I, Section 8, Clauses 8 and
17. Similarly, the framers used restrictive terms elsewhere in the Constitution's text. See id. art. III,
§3 ("Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or, in adhering
to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on
the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.") (emphasis
added); see also Note, The Scope of the Power to Impeach, 84 YALE LJ. 1316,1318 n.4 (1975).
253. See President'sDisability and Succession, supra note 102, at 360-61; Trumbull, Cooley,
Butler, & Dwight, supra note 101, at 432 (Butler).
254. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84,94 (2001) (quoting Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001)) ("[C]anons are not mandatory rules. They are guides that
'need not be conclusive."'); CircuitCity Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 115 ("Canons of construction ... are
often countered, of course, by some maxim pointing in a different direction."). For skepticism of the
expressio canon, see Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 206-07 (1928); see also Goldstein,
supra note 47, at 864 (noting that application of the expressio canon would have precluded the
establishment of fundamental constitutional interpretations such as those confirming judicial review
and presidential authority to remove Cabinet secretaries); cf. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the
Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3
VAND. L. REv. 395, 401-06 (1950); Goldstein, supra note 47, at 864 n.58. The eminent scholar and
originalist Raoul Berger observed that "[m]anifestly, exclusio unius was no fetish for the Founders."
RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 145 (1974).

255. See, e.g., Herman& MacLean v. Huddleston,459 U.S. 375,387 n.23 (1983); Am. Trucking
Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 309-11 (1953); In re Am. Reserve Corp., 840 F.2d 487, 492
(7th Cir. 1988); Nat'lPetroleum Refiners Ass'n, Inc. v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 674-76 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHLIP P. FRCKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 638-39 (2d ed. 1995); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 282 (1985).
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canon of interpretation is absolute. Each may be overcome by the strength
of differing principles that point in other directions."256
In the context of vice presidential incapacity, the expressio canon
would collide with a number of "different principles that point in other
directions."257 Foremost among them is the norm ensuring continuity of
government, which is constitutional in nature thereby putting it on a
higher plane than a mere canon. Moreover, application of the expressio
canon would clash with common sense. Sections 3 and 4 of the TwentyFifth Amendment almost certainly presume the existence of a Vice
President who has capacity, one who can actually carry out his
responsibilities. 2 5 8As the Court in McCulloch observed, "[i]t is not denied
that the powers given to the government imply the ordinary means of
execution." 2 59The main point of the section 3 and 4 processes is to ensure
a functioning presidency, not to make certain the Vice President enjoys
pride of place under all succession and inability circumstances.260 It would
seem utterly ludicrous to read a constitutional provision whose overriding
objective is to ensure executive capacity 261in such a way that it could very
easily result in executive incapacity.
Nor is that all. The expressio canon would have to overcome not one
but two other interpretative canons. One is the canon reflecting the
"presumption against ineffectiveness."262 It means that "[a] textually
permissible interpretation that furthers rather than obstructs the
document's purpose should be favored." 2 6 3 As just noted, interpreting the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment to hinder presidential continuity rather than
effectuate it would clearly violate the "presumption against
ineffectiveness"canon.264
The second competing canon would be that the Constitution cannot
be read to reach absurd outcomes.265 To permit an incapacitated Vice
President to potentially jeopardize the functioning of the executive branch
at its highest levels, and with it, much of the national government, would
no doubt yield an absurd result. Thus, the expressio canon is a very
256. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 59 (2012); see also Llewellyn, supra note 254, at 401-06.
257. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 256, at 59.
258. See Feerick, supra note 7, at 18 ("The Amendment is premised on there being an able,
functioning Vice President."); see also Goldstein, supra note 3, at 1033.
259. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316,409 (1819).
260. See Goldstein, supra note 3, at 1033.
261. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 698 (1997).
262. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 256, at 63.
263. Id.
264. Cf. Clinton, 520 U.S. at 698; Goldstein, supra note 3, at 1033; Feerick, supra note 7, at 18.
265. See, e.g., United States v. Kirby,74 U.S.(7 Wall.) 482,486 (1868); see also BERGER, supra
note 254, at 192; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 256, at 234.
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thin reed upon which to rely for opponents of vice presidential
incapacity legislation.
At the end of the day, arguments against a post hoc statute based on
pinched interpretations of section 3 and 4's delegations to the Vice
President are likely to be overcome due to: (1) the statute being authorized
by the constitutional continuity-of-government principle, the Original
Inability Clause, and the Necessary and Proper Clause, and not the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment; (2) the courts interpreting legal authorities
governing other vital national concerns in an expansive fashion; and (3)
the availability of other competing interpretative principles including the
constitutional continuity-of-government norm and two canons of
legal interpretation.
ii. Previous Adoption of a Constitutional Amendment in
This Area Would Preclude a Statutory Fix
Another potential counterargument to a post hoc statutory fix could
be that if legislation is the answer to fix vice presidential incapacity today,
why was legislation not the answer in the mid-1960s with regard to
presidential incapacity? Why did Congress not simply pass a statute in
1965 and save everyone the time and effort involved with adopting the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment?
There are several reasons why that position is not persuasive. First,
it is important to remember that presidential incapacity was only one of
several problems Congress was trying to address with the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment. 266 One issue was making clear that vice presidents became
presidents in fact and not merely inheritors of the powers and duties of the
presidential office; another involved authorizing the President to nominate
a Vice President when there was a vacancy in the latter position.267 Neither
issue would have been satisfactorily resolved by statute.268
Second, a number of lawmakers did in fact believe that Congress
possessed sufficient legislative authority to provide a presidential inability
procedure. 26 9 The problem was that congressional opinion was split and
lawmakers wanted to minimize the possibility of a subsequent
266.
267.

See Goldstein, supra note 3, at 998-99.
See id.; see also 1965 House Hearings, supra note 20, at 105 (quoting Attorney General

Designate Nicholas deB. Katzenbach).
268. See 111 CONG. REC. 3253-54, 3257 (1965) (statement of Sen. Ellender); id. at 7944
(statement of Rep. Whitener); id. at 7945-46 (statement of Rep. Hutchinson); see also Goldstein,
supra note 3, at 998-99.
269. See 111 CONG. REC. 3253-54, 3257 (statement of Sen. Ellender); id. at 7944 (statement of
Rep. Whitener); id. at 7945-46 (statement of Rep. Hutchinson); see also 1965 House Hearings,supra
note 20, at 105 (quoting Attorney General Designate Nicholas deB. Katzenbach); Goldstein, supra

note 3, at 998-99.
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constitutional challenge to their handiwork.2 7 0 Professor Joel Goldstein,
one of the leading authorities on the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, has
observed that "[t]he framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment concluded
that divided opinion" on matters such as how to determine presidential
incapacity "counseled in favor of the more onerous course of amending
the Constitution." 27 1 One major difference between consideration of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment and future deliberations involving a sudden
case of vice presidential incapacity is that the framers of the Amendment
had the luxury of time. Lawmakers operating in the context of an
immediate case of vice presidential incapacity would lack such an
advantage. Statutes can obviously be adopted far more quickly than
constitutional amendments which require a two-thirds majority in each
house of Congress and approval by three-quarters of the
state legislatures.272
There is a third closely-related difference. As alluded to above, while
many lawmakers thought Congress could act by statute to resolve the
issue of presidential inability, many other authorities believed that the
Vice President enjoyed exclusive constitutional authority in this realm. 273
Therefore, it was thought in some circles that because the Vice President's
authority (such as it was) derived from constitutional text, it precluded
any effort to craft a statutory presidential inability process.274 Interpreted
in this light, the matter had to be fixed by a constitutional amendment.
This is unlike the Speaker's implicit authority today under the CGOPT to
make a vice presidential inability determination; the Speaker's authority
in this regard(such as it is) is based on a statute, the 1947 presidential
succession act.2 75 Thus, in the case of resolving vice presidential
incapacity, a statute can fix a statutory issue whereas, under the views of
many prior to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, a statute could not resolve a
constitutionalquestion.
In sum, during consideration of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, a
statutory solution was rejected for a number of reasons unrelated to
presidential incapacity and therefore the analogy with a possible vice
presidential inability situation is largely inapposite.
Finally, this Article does not maintain that a post hoc statutory
regime is the ideal solution, only that it would be the best solution in a
pinch; that is, if the nation were suddenly confronted with an incapacitated
270. See Goldstein, supra note 3, at 998-99.
271. Id.at999.
272. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
273. See, e.g., SILVA, supranote 54, at 100-02; Silva, supra note 103, at 172.
274. See Silva, supra note 103, at 172; Goldstein, supra note 3, at 999 n.215.
275. For a discussion of the Speaker's implicit authority to make a determination of vice
presidential inability under the CGOPT, see infra Part lI.B.
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Vice President. Had the nation never adopted the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment and later been confronted with a situation involving an
incapacitated President or an incapacitated Vice President on the brink of
becoming President, one strongly suspects that the constitutional norm
favoring continuity of government would have permitted Congress, if
called upon, to take appropriate action to legislate a solution.276 As the
eminent jurist and legal commentator Thomas Cooley wrote: "How much
wiser would such a notion be than that of [the British King] James II, who
thought that, when he had cast the Great Seal [of the Realm] into the
Thames, he had made the administration of government impossible?" 277
iii. Defects Due to the Nature of Post Hoc Enactment
The very nature of after-the-fact legislation brings with it some added
potential complications though they are far from insuperable. They
include potential challenges based on the Bill of Attainder, the Ex Post
Facto, and the Due Process Clauses.278
aa. The Bill of Attainder Clause
Were the Vice President, his family, or his staff to be disillusioned
by the post hoc inability statute, it is conceivable a suit could be brought
contending that the measure constitutes a bill of attainder. The
Constitution states plainly that "[n]o Bill of Attainder .. . shall be
276. See 62 CONG.RE. 740 (1921) (statement of Rep. Mann) ("If the case ever arises where the
Government would cease to function for lack of a President the gentleman will find that it will be
determined very quickly by the Congress."); see also 1920 House Hearings, supra note 125, at 32
("Mr. Rogers.... With that provision of Article I, section 8, staring us in the face, it does seem to me
that Congress has the right somehow, to pass on who shall succeed [to the presidency],... and
how ... and when . . . .") (emphasis added); Wilmerding, supranote 84, at 172 (arguing with respect
to presidential inability prior to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment "[o]n the question of mode the
Constitution is silent, but this silence cannot be pleaded in justification of nonaction when action is
called for"); Letter from Abraham Lincoln, President of the U.S., to Albert G. Hodges, U.S. Senator
(Apr. 4, 1864), http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/hodges.htm ("[Measures,
otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of
the constitution, through the preservation of the nation."); NLRB v. Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 538
(2014) (noting that "a national catastrophe" might change subsequent constitutional interpretation of
the Recess Appointments Clause); cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 758-59 (2008); Balzac v.
Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922); Shoup, supra note 9, at 72-73, 78.
277. Trumbull, Cooley, Butler, & Dwight, supra note 101, at 426 (Cooley). For additional
authorities prior to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment who believed that a statute was sufficient to address
presidential inability, see FEERICK, supra note 132, at 134-35, 238, 246-47; Wilmerding, supra note
84, at 178-79; cf. BAYH, supra note 216, at 61 (noting the views of former President Harry Truman);
11 COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 4652, 4840 (James D.
Richardson ed., 1897) (quoting President Chester A. Arthur).
278. A prospective statute would obviously be much less susceptible to legal challenge under
the Bill of Attainder, Due Process, and Ex Post Facto Clauses.
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passed." 2 79 Bills of attainder are typically defined as "[l]egislative acts, no

matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment
on them without a judicial trial . . ."280 Thus, a bill of attainder has four
elements: (1) legislation, (2) involving certain individuals or groups, (3)
that applies punishment, and does so (4) without a judicial proceeding.
For purposes of this Article, the key question is the third element:
Whether post hoc legislation regarding the transferal of an incapacitated
Vice President's Twenty-Fifth Amendment powers and duties would be
considered punishment. In Nixon v. Administration of General Services,
the High Court considered whether legislation instructing the federal
government to take custody of former President Richard Nixon's
presidential materials, despite his preexisting agreement with the National
81
2
Archives and Records Administration, constituted a bill of attainder.
The Court concluded the measure did not, but in so doing the Court
discussed and characterized earlier jurisprudence on the Bill of Attainder
Clause.2 82 The Nixon decision noted that "[m]andatory forfeiture of a job
or office [has] long [been] deemed to be punishment within the
contemplation of the Bill of Attainder Clause."283
Legislation removing an incapacitated Vice President from his
position outright could be seen as a "mandatory forfeiture" of his "job or
office." 2 84 Therefore, it might satisfy the key element of bill of attainder
analysis, that the action constitutes punishment. For this reason, dicta
counsel strongly in favor of a statutory transferal of the Vice President's
powers and duties, as promoted in this Article, rather than outright
removal from office. It is also consistent with the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment which provides that the President does not lose his office
when incapacitated; he simply has his powers and duties transferred from
him. With the transferal mechanism, the Vice President is not losing his
position, only being sidelined until he becomes able to carry out his
constitutional responsibilities again. The Speaker would not displace the
Vice President, she would only substitute for him regarding his
as to succession and inability
constitutional responsibilities
279. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 3.
280. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,448-49 (1965); see also United States v. Lovett, 328
U.S. 303, 315 (1946); Bill ofAttainder, BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
281. See 433 U.S. 425,431-32,468 (1977).
282. See id. at469-71,473-78.
283. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 469. The Supreme Court in Cummings v. Missouri sounded the same
themes as in Nixon, that being forced from one's job may be considered a punishment. See 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 277, 317, 320, 327 (1866).
284. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 469. It could also be seen to violate the Impeachment Clause of Article
II. Cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,726-27 (1986).
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determination. The President pro tempore would preside over the Senate
for him which is the norm in the modem era anyway. Upon regaining his
capacity, the Vice President would regain his powers and duties. And all
this time the Vice President would still retain his title and full pay
and benefits.
It also bears noting that, despite the concerns raised by the Court in
Nixon, it held againstthe former President in his challenge.2 8 5 The Court
placed greater emphasis on the needs of the public.286 Such a rationale
would have clear application in the case of an incapacitated Vice President
suing to reclaim his powers and duties as the continuity of the executive
branch would have been the animating reason for the legislation.287
In United States v. Lovett, the Supreme Court considered whether an
appropriations bill zeroing out salaries for a handful of federal workers
satisfied the punishment test and constituted a bill of attainder. 82 8 The
Court decided in the affirmative, pronouncing that the appropriations
provision "'operate[d] as a legislative decree of perpetual exclusion' from
a chosen vocation." 2 89 The Court had little trouble concluding that "[t]his
permanent proscription from any opportunity to serve the Government is
punishment." 2 9 Accordingly, the Court struck down the measure as an
unconstitutional bill of attainder. 2 9 1 Other Supreme Court decisions have
followed similar reasoning.292 This reflects yet again why the post hoc
legislation advocated in this Article addresses only the transfer of powers
and duties, ensuring the measure could not constitute removal and be
deemed a "permanent prescription." 2 93
Thus, while Supreme Court case law demonstrates that legislation
removing someone from office outright might constitute a punishment
285. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at484.
286. See id. at452-54,458-59,462,465,477-79.
287. In reaching its decision, the Court in Nixon also placed some importance on the "imminent
danger that" some of Nixon's materials could be destroyed. Id. at 472. This exigency factor would
obviously be a primary consideration in adoption of vice presidential inability legislation under the
circumstances envisioned in this Article. The Court in Nixon also put stock in the fact that the
committee reports accompanying the legislation at issue "cast no aspersions on [Nixon's] personal
conduct and contain[ed] no condemnation of his behavior as meriting the infliction of punishment."
Id. at 479. These passages could additionally be used to defend a post hoc vice presidential inability
statute because, as was the case in Nixon, Congress would not be condemning the officeholder's
behavior.
288. See 328 U.S. 303, 316 (1946).
289. Id. at 316.
290. Id.
291. See id. at 316-18.
292. See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841, 852 (1984)
("[T]he list of punishments forbidden by the Bill of Attainder Clause ... include[s] legislative bars to
participation by individuals or groups in specific employments or professions.").
293. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 316.
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amounting to an unconstitutional bill of attainder, post hoc legislation
transferring powers and duties would be highly unlikely to be seen as
punishment. Moreover, the needs of the public would loom heavily over
such a legal challenge and tend to support the statute's constitutionality.
bb. The Ex Post Facto Clause
A legal challenge could also possibly be undertaken arguing that a
post hoc statute regarding vice presidential incapacity constitutes an
impermissible ex post facto law. 2 94 This category of proscribed laws
involves the retroactive application of criminal penalties or other
punishments to individuals. 29 5 A post hoc vice presidential inability
statute, of course, would not include criminal sanctions against an
incapacitated Vice President.
In Ex parte Garland,the Court considered the constitutionality of a
prohibition against lawyers representing clients in federal court. 29 6
Pursuant to the statute, attorneys could only appear in federal court if they
swore an oath that they had not sided with the South in the Civil War.2 97
Though not a criminal sanction per se, the Court viewed this professional
prohibition based on past deeds to be a penalty and consequently an
unconstitutional ex post facto law.298
The Garlandprecedent could conceivably be analogized to a post
hoc vice presidential inability statute. In such a context, an individual
would lose his official powers and duties-in theory a punishmentbased on a consideration that preceded enactment of the statute (i.e., the
occurrence of the inability). However, a situation involving an
incapacitated Vice President would be far less harsh than the situation in
Garland. The attorneys in Garland were limited in the jurisdictions in
which they could practice law, no doubt restricting their ability to practice
their profession and maximize their income. Under the statute advocated
by this Article, however, the Vice President would be in an altogether
different situation. He would be unable to exercise his powers and duties
if incapacitated but could continue to draw his salary and benefits so that
he would not be placed at an economic disadvantage. Moreover, Garland
is an exception to the general rule that requires a criminal sanction before
294. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
295. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 386, 390-91 (1798); ERIKA K. LUNDER ETAL.,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42791, CONSTrruTIONALITY OF RETROACTIVE TAX LEGISLATION 6

(2012).
296. See 71 U.S. 333, 335, 337 (1866); see also Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 320, 327
(1866).
297. See Exparte Garland,71U.S. at 374-76.
298. See id. at 377-78.
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the Ex Post Facto Clause can be triggered.299 Since the inability statute in
no way applies punishment to the Vice President-it merely permits
someone to substitute for him in his powers and duties while he is
incapacitated-it is difficult to see how it could be construed as similar to
a criminal statute. Therefore, the Ex Post Facto Clause would almost
certainly not apply.
cc. The Due Process Clause
An additional potential challenge to an after-the-fact statute could be
made on due process grounds. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
provides that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." " The Vice President's powers and
duties could theoretically be seen as property-and their transfer could
possibly be seen as a taking without an opportunity to be heard. For
example, federal civil servants cannot be removed from their jobs without
due process.3 0 1
Mathews v. Eldridge302 is an important case in Due Process Clause
interpretation. It involved a recipient of social security disability payments
whose benefits had been discontinued. 30 3 In its decision, the Supreme
Court detailed three concerns to be weighed in determining whether a Due
Process Clause violation occurred in a civil setting.3 0 4 The Court
considered "[flirst, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional oi
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest,
including the function involved."305
In the case of the Vice President, the purported private interest would
almost certainly be the office's powers and duties since he would still
enjoy the vice presidential title and receive a salary and benefits. 30 6 It is
299.

See LUNDER ET AL., supra note 295, at 6.

300.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

301. See generallyU.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BD.,WHATIS DE PROCESS IN FEDERAL
CiviL SERvICE EMPLOYMENT (2015) [hereinafter DUE PROCESS].

302. See 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
303. See id. at 323.
304. See id. at 334-35; see also MICHAEL J. GARCIA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE
CONsTrrUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S.DOC.No.

112-9, at 1990-91 (2d Sess. 2017).
305. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
306. The Courtin Mathews noted that "a recipient whose benefits are terminated is awarded full
retroactive relief if he ultimately prevails, his sole interest is in the uninterrupted receipt of this source
of income . . . ." Id. at 340. Under the statute supported by this Article, the Vice President would be
receiving benefits in an uninterrupted fashion. The Court also stated that "[a]ll that is necessary is that
the procedures be tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to 'the capacities and circumstances of
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difficult to see how government powers and duties could be equated to a
private interest. 30 7 Further, the risk of erroneous deprivation would be apt
to be low. If Congress were to be sufficiently aroused to pass post hoc
vice presidential incapacity legislation and the executive branch were to
implement the measure, it would almost certainly be because the
officeholder would in fact be incapacitated. Moreover, Congress would
presumably deliberate in a public setting which would provide a check on
inappropriate action. Finally, the government's interests would be
profound, with the potential disruption to the operations of the presidency
as the reason for the measure.
With regard specifically to Due Process Clause claims for federal
government workers, the Supreme Court has concluded that if the federal
employee is employed "at will," then the worker has a "property right" in
his position and must be afforded due process protection.3 08 That is to say,
"the Constitution guarantees that if there must be cause to remove the
individual from his or her job, then there is automatically a due process
requirement to establish that the cause has been met."3 09 Due process in
this setting is typically regarded as notice and an opportunity to be
heard. 310 The Court added that "the significance of the private interest in
retaining employment cannot be gainsaid. We have frequently recognized
the severity of depriving a person of the means of livelihood." 3 1 1
Again, this set of circumstances manifestly would not apply to a Vice
President under a post hoc statute. Though the Vice President is obviously
an employee of the federal government, he would not be removed from
office, he would have only his powers and duties transferred from him.
Again, it bears repeating that he would retain his title, salary, and benefits
and not be "depriv[ed] ...

of the means of livelihood." Furthermore, the

Vice President is not a civil servant. He is a constitutional officer. As the
Supreme Court has noted, "[p]roperty interests are not created by
the Constitution."312

Finally, even if the Vice President's powers and duties were
somehow seen as constituting a property interest in his office, this
"property" would not be taken from him without due process of law. This
those who are to be heard."' Id. at 349 (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970)). In
the case of the Vice President, the process would be appropriately tailored in that Congress would
review his appeal from the decision of the President and the Cabinet.
307. See, e.g., Charles Rembar, How Much Due Process Is Due a President?,N.Y.TIMES, July

21, 1974, at 22.
308. See Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,538-39 (1985).
309.

DUE PROCESS, supra note 301, at 11.

310. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542, 546.
311. Id. at 543.
312.

Id. at 538; see also Rembar, supra note 307; Shoup, supra note 9, at 75.
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is because his "property" would only be removed following a formal
process provided by statute (i.e., a presidential/Cabinet decision followed
by a possible appeal to Congress with a two-thirds presumption in both
houses in favor of the Vice President). Moreover, the transfer of powers
and duties is not irrevocable as will be seen below in the case
ofimpeachment.3 1 3
For all these reasons, post hoc legislation purporting to transfer the
powers and duties of the vice presidential office would be unlikely to
violate the Due Process Clause, just as it would be unlikely to transgress
the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clauses.
III.

LESS DESIRABLE, YET STILL VIABLE, OPTIONS

While a post hoc statute is the preferred option, there are still three
other approaches to addressing an immediate instance of vice presidential
incapacity. All are viable and are in descending order of desirability: (1)
letter arrangements, (2) the CGOPT, and (3) the impeachment process.
A.

Letter Agreements

One possible alternative for handling vice presidential incapacity
would be to use a pre-executed letter procedure along the lines of what
was prepared by Vice President Dick Cheney.314 As a preliminary matter,
of course, this presupposes that there currently is a pre-signed letter. There
has been no public indication whether former Vice President Joe Biden or
Vice President Mike Pence have followed Cheney's lead3 1 and there are
no guarantees their successors will do so. 3 1 6 And, if there is no letter, it
leads back to the same question posed at the outset of this Article: What
if there is no mechanism in place? Putting that very real issue to one side
for a moment, there are a host of reasons why a letter agreement by itself
would nonetheless be viable and be the "least worst" solution that could
be carried out by the Vice President without Congress. Nonetheless, a

313.

See infta Part 1H.C.
See CHENEY EMOR,supra note 13, at 319-22. Distinguished scholars have endorsed use
of letter agreements and similar contingency plans. See Feerick, supra note 7, at 19, 23-25; Goldstein,
supra note 3, at 1033; see also FirstFordham Report, supra note 7, at 31-35, 62, 84. For discussion
of the CGOPT potentially being effectuated by letter arrangement, see infra Part 1.B.3.
315. Cheney apparently intimated he was unaware if Biden had executed a letter arrangement.
See Kmiec, supra note 13, at 489 n.74.
316. The Obama White House assured former Senator Birch Bayh that it had wide-ranging
contingency plans in place. Bayh relayed, "I had a ... conversation with Valerie Jarrett at the White
House ... who said I could announce ... that the Obama Administration has a very comprehensive
contingency plan." FEERICK, supra note 1, at 224 n.t.
314.
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unilateral vice presidential approach is not without a number of serious
3 17
flaws and is less desirable than a post hoc statute.
1. The Cheney Letter Model
In light of his previous health problems and experience with
continuity of government matters, Cheney took the issue of vice
presidential inability seriously, much more so than any of his
predecessors.31 As such, he took unilateral steps to try to address a
3 19
In his memoirs,
scenario in which he might become incapacitated.
Cheney recalled his preparation of a preemptive resignation letter:
I took the extraordinary step of writing a letter of resignation as vice
president shortly after I was sworn in. The resignation letter would be
effective, as provided by federal law, upon its delivery to the secretary
of state..

.

. [As part of that effort,] I took out a piece of my official

stationery with the words "The Vice President" written across the top. I
wrote the date-March 28, 2001-and then this:
Dave Addington[Counselto the Vice President]-You are to present
the attached document to President George W. Bush if the need ever
arises.
-Richard B. Cheney
"Okay, David," . . . "I won't give specific instructions about when
this letter should be triggered." . . . "But you need to understand

something. This is not your decision to make. This is not [the Second
Lady's] decision to make. The only thing you are to do, if I become
incapacitated, is get this letter out and give it to the president. It's his
decision, and his alone, whether he delivers it to the secretary of state."
"Yes, sir, Mr. Vice President," David said.
I did not want a situation where, should I become incapacitated and
there was an effort to remove me from office, my family or my staff
stood in the way. The only one who had the right to make that decision
was the president .... And he was the only person other than Addington
3 20
with whom I discussed the letter.

317. If there currently is a secret letter arrangement, it might be a useful step for the
administration to request that the arrangement be ratified by Congress, especially if it were to be fully
carried out. This step, made out of an abundance of caution, would help bolster the legality and the
legitimacy of the arrangement. Cf. Brownell, supra note 2, at 1059-63.
318.

See PETER BAKER, DAYS OF FIRE: BUSH AND CHENEY IN THE WHITE HOUSE 97-98 (2013);

BROWER, supra note 13, at 21; CHENEY ET AL., supra note 13, at 153-54; CHENEY MEMOIR, supra
note 13, at 319-22; Rogan, supra note 31.
319. See CHENEY MEMOIR, supra note 13, at 319-22.
320. Id. at 319-22; see CHENEY ET AL., supra note 13, at 153-55; see also BAKER, supra note
318, at 97-98; BROWER, supra note 13, at 21-22. Bush was initially startled by the plan, but ultimately
saw the wisdom of it. See BROWER, supra note 13, at 21.
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a. Advantages
Cheney deserves great credit for being farsighted regarding vice
presidential inability. 32 1 While post-Twenty-Fifth
Amendment
contingency plans seem to have been in place since early in the Reagan
administration, prior to Cheney none appears to have directly addressed
vice presidential incapacity. 32 2 There are several advantages to the Cheney
plan. First, it has the potential to be effectuated quickly, more quickly than
passing post hoc legislation or pursuing the impeachment process. Once
the Vice President's incapacity becomes manifest all that needs to be done
is for the staffer to hand the letter over to the President who can then relay
it to the Secretary of State. Upon receipt of the letter, the Vice President
has resigned, the office is vacant, and there is no longer an incapacitated
Vice President. In theory, the process could be executed swiftly. Thus, the
Cheney approach would solve the problem of an incapacitated Vice
President potentially becoming President. 32 3
Second, unlike the CGOPT,32 4 the Cheney model has the practical
benefit of not involving the Speaker in the inability-determination
process. This eliminates the potential for a partisan rival determining the
Vice President's capacity325
Finally, the Cheney approach may also have some advantages in
litigation. By drafting and pre-signing the letter of resignation himself, the
Vice President would make it more difficult for future litigants-be they
the Vice President himself, his family, or his staff-to claim injury. The
simple response to a former Vice President suing to get his job back would
be that he wrote and signed the letter himself. The Cheney-letter model,
therefore, offers a number of important points in its favor.

321. See, e.g., RONAN, supra note 3, at 157; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 42, at 263; Feerick,
supra note 7, at 24.
322. See Brownell, supra note 2, at 1043-45. The Reagan and Clinton contingency binders made
note of several contingency scenarios but not expressly the case of a healthy President and an
incapacitated Vice President. See Clinton Contingency Plan, supra note 13; Reagan Contingency
Plan, supra note 13. That is presumably why Cheney took the unilateral step of writing a resignation
letter. See supra note 44.
323. See Clinton Contingency Plan, supra note 13; Reagan Contingency Plan, supra note 13.
For other scenarios covered by the contingency plans, see infra note 325.

324.

See infra Part LI.B.2.

325. Under the Reagan and Clinton contingency plans, the Speaker was poised to take the Vice
President's place in helping the Cabinet determine presidential inability if: (1) both the President and
Vice President were de facto incapacitated; (2) the President was de facto incapacitated and the Vice
President died; (3) the President was de facto incapacitated and then the Acting President became de
facto incapacitated; and (4) the President was de facto incapacitated and then the Acting President
died. See Clinton Contingency Plan, supra note 13; Reagan Contingency Plan, supra note 13. These
scenarios are distinct from that discussed in this Article. See supra note 44; see also supra note 322.
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b. Disadvantages
At the same time, there are simply inherent limitations with vice
presidents taking unilateral steps to address their own incapacity much as
there were for presidents reaching agreements with vice presidents prior
to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 32 6
i. Constitutional Concerns with the Cheney Approach
First, without more, letter agreements are likely without legal force
or effect. 3 27 Prior to the ratification of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,
presidents and vice presidents executed letter agreements in case the
President became incapacitated.328 President Dwight D. Eisenhower was
the first to adopt such an approach when he signed a letter agreement with
Vice President Richard Nixon.3 2 9 Nixon, however, viewed his letter
agreement with Eisenhower as being morally but not legally binding on
the parties in question. 3 30 Nixon wrote that the "letter established historical
precedent" but reflected "mere expressions of a President's desires, [and
did] not have the force of law." 3 3 1 Speaker of the House John McCormack,
who had a comparable agreement with President Lyndon B. Johnson
following President John F. Kennedy's assassination, felt the same way:
Our "[written agreement was] outside the law. It [was] an agreement
between individuals."332Other authorities agree.333
In the case of the Cheney letter, the problems are essentially the
same: Under what legal authority did he act and are the vice presidential
staffer and President bound to do as the Vice President instructed? The
text of the Constitution is silent on such matters.334 While the absence of
express constitutional authorization is certainly not dispositive, it

326. See RONAN, supra note 3, at 156-57, 165; Second FordhamReport, supra note 7, at 969.
327. See Feerick, supra note 4, at 922; Second FordhamReport, supra note 7, at 969; cf. RONAN,
supra note 3, at 157.

328. See, e.g., Brownell, supra note 2, at 1039-43; Stephen W. Stathis, PresidentialDisability
Agreements Priorto the 25th Amendment, 12 PRESIDENTIAL STUD.
329. See, e.g., Brownell, supra note 2, at 1039.

Q. 208,

209-12 (1982).

330. See, e.g., id.
331.
332.
333.

RICHARD M. NIXON, SIX CRISES 179-80 (1962).
FEERICK, supra note 1, at 100 (quoting Speaker of the House John McCormack).
See PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND VACANCIES IN THE OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, S.

REP. NO. 89-66, at 7 (1965); 111 CONG. REC. 3285 (1965) (statement of Sen. Hruska); id. at 7937
(statement of Rep. Celler); Feerick, supra note 4, at 922; Robert E. Gilbert, Editor's Introduction,in
MANAGING CRISIS, supra note 13, at xi, xiv; Nelson, supra note 7, at 87; cf. RONAN, supra note 3, at
57, 156-57. For more on pre-Twenty-Fifth Amendment agreements, see Stathis, supra note 328, at

209-12.
334. See generally U.S. CONST. art. 1, II; id. amend. XXV.
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underscores the need for any future letters to at least cite their
legal basis.335
Still, an argument could be put forward that vice presidential letter
arrangements, prepared and made ready for use by multiple
3
administrations, might acquire a constitutional status over time. 36
Certainly, in the realm of separation of powers, there have been a number
of practices which began well after the formative years of the Constitution
that the courts later recognized as constitutional doctrine.3 3 However, if
vice presidential letter agreements currently exist, the secret nature of
these contingency arrangements complicates this argument.
Justice Felix Frankfurter, in his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet
Tube Co. v. Sawyer,33 8 famously observed that:
[A] systemic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by
Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as
it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our government,
may be treated as a gloss on "executive Power" vested in the President
by § 1 of Art.H.339
This formulation, which has been used as a guide for determining the
constitutionality of longstanding political custom,'340 would seem not to
apply to a secret vice presidential incapacity letter, however. This is
because such a procedure would not have been "long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned . . . ."341If such
an agreement is currently in place, it is confidential.3 4 2 Perhaps some in
Congress have been briefed on these plans (possibly the Speaker and the
President pro tempore) but certainly not Congress as a whole or, by
extension, the public.343 In the case of Vice President Cheney, he only
335. Cf. RONAN, supra note 3, at 157.
336. See Kennedy Legal Opinion, supra note 72, at 94; Goldstein, supra note 31, at 71-72;
Goldstein, supra note 40, at 189, 212 n.81; Bruce Ackerman, Take Your Paws off the Presidency!,
SLATE (July 15, 2008, 3:35 PM), http:www.slate.com/articles/news-andpolitics/jurisprudence/2008/
07/take_your-pawsoff~thepresidency.html; see also Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison,

HistoricalGloss and the Separation ofPowers, 126 HARV. L.REv. 412, 415, 445-46, 455, 460, 484
(2012). The Author has benefited greatly from conversations with Professor Joel Goldstein on this
subject.
337.

See supranote 148.

338. See 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
339.

Id. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

340. See, e.g., NLRB v. Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525 (2014); Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491,
530-31 (2008); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981); see also Bank Markazi v.
Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1337 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
341. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
342. See FirstFordharn Report, supranote 7, at 26-27.
343. See CHENEY MEMOIR, supra note 13, at 321-22. For more on the secret nature of
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informed his legal counsel and the President of his pre-signed resignation
letter. The fact that the existence and content of pre-Twenty-Fifth
Amendment letters were made public near the time of their execution
would seem to inform how the "pursued to the knowledge of Congress"
formulation should be interpreted in the context of executive inability.?"
How could Congress sanction or "never before question[]" something of
which it has no knowledge (or, at best, very little)?3 4 5
The Supreme Court has frequently emphasized the importance of
notice in political-branch disputes over the constitutionality of executive
branch practice. For instance, in Dames & Moore v. Regan,3 " the Court
reasoned that "[p]ast practice does not, by itself, create power, but 'longcontinued practice, known to and acquiescedin by Congress, would raise
a presumption that the [action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its
consent . . . ."'" Given the judiciary's reasoning in this decision and
others,3 48 a key plank in Justice Frankfurter's formulation in
&

contingency plans, see GRAFF, supra note 156, at 317, 371-72, 375-76,384-86; William M. Arkin
Robert Windrem, Secrets of 9/11: New Details of Chaos, Nukes Emerge, NBC NEWS (Sept. 11, 2016,
5:00 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/9-11-new-details-chaos-nukes-emerge-n645711; see
generally HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL CONTINUITY POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

(2007); Ackerman, supra note 336. The details of contingency plans for the Reagan, Bush, and
Clinton presidencies were not fully revealed until 2017. See Brownell, supra note 2, at 1043-45; see
generallyMemorandum from the Office of the Counsel to the President, Contingency Plans-Death
or Disability of the President (Mar. 16,1993), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?art
icle=1009&context=twentyfifth.amendment executivematerials (last accessed Jan. 25, 2020).
344. See, e.g., Stathis, supra note 328, at 209-12, 214 nn.16-27; Edwin L. Dale, Jr., Eisenhower
Disability Pact Calls for 'Acting President': Terms of the Agreement Made Public-Nixon Would
Take Over Duties Until PresidentHadRecovered, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 4, 1958, at 1; Disability Text,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1966, at 26; Johnson Provides for a Disability:Agrees with McCormack on
Temporary Succession, N.Y.TIMES, Dec. 6, 1963, at 1; Joseph A. Loftus, Kennedy Provides That
Johnson Will Act If He Is Incapacitated,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1961, at 1; Charles Mohr, Johnson
Reaches DisabilityAccord, N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 28, 1965, at 3; Text of the Kennedy-Johnson Accord on
Succession, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1963, at 19. The Kennedy-Johnson agreement noted that "[p]rior to
the Eisenhower-Nixon arrangement, there were no similar understandings of a public nature." Text of
the Kennedy-Johnson Accord on Succession, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1963, at 19; cf. PRESIDENTIAL
INABILITY AND VACANCIES IN THE OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, supra note 333, at 2 ("It is the

intention of the committee that for the best interests of the country to be served, notice by all parties
should be public notice. The committee feels that notice by transmittal to the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives guarantees notice to the entire country.").
345. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 112-13 (2008); Glennon,

supra note 148, at 135-37; see also Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office ofLegal Counsel,
110 COLUM. L. REv. 1448, 1499-1500 (2010) ("[S]pecial precedential force of prior opinions in th[e]
area [of executive power] also requires disclosure, especially to Congress.... Assertions of executive
power that are kept secret from Congress constitute evasions of [the] checking mechanism, and for
that reason cannot claim special precedential weight.... [The] theory of [congressional]
acquiescence obviously requires notice.").
346. See453U.S.654(1981).
347. Id. at 686 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. 459, 474
(1915)).
348. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 299 (1981); Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 474, 481;
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Youngstown-congressional knowledge-would seem inapplicable in the
case of vice presidential letter arrangements or contingency plans. Since
the congressional notice requirement is not satisfied, the case that a letter
or contingency plan would achieve the status of a constitutional gloss on
executive power due solely to past practice is made more difficult. This is
a problem that is easily solvable, however. Vice presidents could simply
make their letters known to the public when they pre-execute them as did
Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson or, at least, do so after they
leave office as did Cheney.349
Moreover, it is uncertain whether vice presidential letter
arrangements or contingency plans actually do constitute a "systematic,
unbroken executive practice." 3o The initial burst of letter arrangements
under Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson did not address vice
presidential incapacity. Further, the practice of public letter arrangements
ended abruptly with the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
Therefore, these precedents would not seem to qualify as being part of
longstanding practice regarding vice presidential incapacity plans. While
it is not entirely clear when confidential arrangements about succession
and inability began to be crafted after the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,351
the Reagan administration apparently was the first to implement such
plans.352 And it seems there had been no plan in place specifically
addressing vice presidential inability until Cheney's tenure. 35 3 Indeed, it
is uncertain if Cheney's model has been followed. Based on what has been
made public-going back only to the Clinton administration as plans of
the George W. Bush, Obama and Trump presidencies are still
confidential-there does not appear to be a constitutional practice that has
developed regarding vice presidential incapacity. Though not fatal, this
undercuts another potential prong of support for the constitutionality of
the letter approach.
Glennon, supra note 148, at 135-37; see also Morrison, supra note 345, at 1499-501.

349. Making the letter public might also deter the President from improperly threatening the
Vice President with execution of his pre-signed resignation letter.

350. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). Indeed, it has been maintained that "[t]he history of the [Twenty-Fifth] Amendment
indicates that its framers intended to create a mechanism that would supersede those prior [letter
arrangement] strategies." Miller Center Report, supra note 236.

351. See Memorandum from Bobbie Greene Kilberg, Assoc. Counsel, Office of White House
Counsel, to President Ford 4 (Aug. 21, 1975), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?art
icle=1000&context=twentyfifth-amendment-executivematerials (writing in 1975 that "[s]ince the
ratification of the 25th Amendment, there is no record of written agreements between a President and
a Vice President."); see also FEERICK, supra note 1, at 344.

352. See Brownell, supranote 2, at 1043-45.
353. See generally CHENEY ETAL., supra note 13, at 153-55; Clinton Contingency Plans, supra
note 13; Reagan Contingency Plans, supra note 13.
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Second, the pre-execution of a resignation letter could be seen to run
afoul of the constitutional principle that the President cannot remove the
Vice President from office. 35 4 The Vice President is chosen by the
American people through the Electoral College. 35 5 Because of the Vice
President's tie to the electorate, he can only be removed through the
impeachment process in Congress, which includes a two-thirds
supermajority threshold in the Senate.3 56 In the letter scenario outlined by
Cheney, the President was tasked with making the legally operative
decision about whether to remove the Vice President-that is, delivery of
the letter to the Secretary of State. Cheney was very clear on this point
to Addington. 3 5 He stated that "[the only one who had the right to make
that [vice presidential removal] decision [is] the president of the United
States" and that "it's [the President's] decision, and his alone, whether he
delivers it to the secretary of state." 35 9 Because the Constitution precludes
the President from removing the Vice President from office and because
the President is given the authority through the Cheney letter to make the
operative decision about whether to remove the Vice President-in
apparent contradiction to that legal principle-this delegation is
potentially problematic from a constitutional standpoint.3 6
Third, the Cheney procedure potentially conflicts with federal law,
which requires that the Vice President's resignation be submitted to the
Secretary of State. It will be recalled that federal law provides that:
The only evidence of a refusal to accept, or of a resignation of the office
of President or Vice President, shall be an instrument in writing,
declaring the same, and subscribed by the person refusing to accept or
354. See supra note 38; see also Roy E. BrownellII, The Independence of the Vice Presidency,

17 N.Y.U. J.LEGIS. & PUB.POL'Y 297, 305-11 (2014); cf. RONAN, supra note 3, at 166.
355. See U.S. CONST. art. XII.
356. See id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. No other constitutional officer may be unilaterally removed by
another. Removal of constitutional officers requires a two-thirds, supermajority vote in at least one
house of Congress. This is manifested in the two-thirds threshold for expulsion of lawmakers in their
respective chambers and the majority requirement in the House coupled with the two-thirds threshold
in the Senate for removal of executive branch officials and federal judges through the impeachment
process.
357. See CHENEY MEMOIR, supra note 13, at 321.

358. See id. at 321-22.
359. Id.
360. See supra note 38. It could be countered that the Vice President is acting voluntarily in
providing the letter. But, unlike Fifth Amendment rights which can be waived by individuals, the
constitutional prohibition against the President firing the Vice President is institutional and not
personal in nature. Such an action undoes the will of the electorate, reflecting that much more is at
stake than the personal fortunes of the immediate officeholder.
The question could also be looked at from a different separation-of-powers perspective:

Could the President lawfully remove the Senate's presiding officer? That would be the effect of the
President executing such a letter agreement.
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resigning, as the case may be, and delivered into the office of the
Secretary of State. 361
If the President is essentially given the authority to dismiss the Vice
President by submitting a vice presidential resignation letter at the chief
executive's discretion (as opposed to someone submitting a resignation
letter ministerially pursuant to the Vice President's immediate direction
as occurred with Spiro Agnew),362 that could contradict the spirit, if not
the letter, of the statute. 3 63 After all, a resignation is a voluntary act made
by the individual resigning. Being removed from office reflects a decision
made by another. Through the letter, the Vice President would be
transferring the actual decision-making authority from himself to the
President. As Cheney made clear to Addington, the President should have
the ultimate discretion over whether and when the letter should be given
to the Secretary." The effect of this option therefore is that the Vice
President is taking a decision that is his by statute and outsourcing it, at
least in part, to the President. 36 5
Fourth, there is the potential problem of a Vice President becoming
compromised in the performance of his section 4 duties with a President
holding or potentially holding his pre-signed resignation letter. The Vice
President's independence is central to the integrity of the section 4
process. 36 6If the President has the power to fire the Vice President, that
could undermine the independence of the Vice President to make a proper
decision as to the President's capacity. 3 67 The members of the President's
361.

3 U.S.C.

§ 20

(2018).

362. See RIcHARD M. COHEN& JULES WITCOVER,A HEARTBEAT AWAY: THE INVESTIGATION
AND RESIGNATION OF VICE PRESIDENT SPIRO T. AGNEW 341-42 (1974); see also Rogan, supranote

31.
363.
364.

See Second Fordham Report, supra note 7, at 969; see also Rogan, supra note 31.
See CHENEY MEMOIR, supranote 13, at 321; Second FordhamReport, supra note 7, at 969.

365. As noted, the Constitution provides only one explicit means of government actors removing
a Vice President: through the congressional impeachment process, a mechanism in which the
President plays no role. The President's significant role in the Vice President's resignation therefore
could be seen to be in some tension with the impeachment process as well.
366. See Brownell, supra note 354, at 308-10.
367. It could be contended that, were the Cheney model to be reinstituted, it would make this
scenario unlikely because the Cheney approach involved a vice presidential staffer being in
possession of the pre-signed resignation letter. See supra note 320 and accompanying text. In theory,
a vice presidential staffer could provide a check on presidential mischief in that the staffer would have
to make the initial decision as to whether to turn the letter over to the chief executive. Cf. infra notes
378-79 and accompanying text. However, Cheney's instructions to Addington were clear that Bush
was to be the decisionmaker, not Addington. See supra note 320 and accompanying text. If the
President had instructed Addington to hand over the letter and he refused, Addington would likely
have been violating Cheney's instructions. And, of course, all of this shines a light on the reality that
the Vice President's instructions may not be legally binding on the staffer and the President. Cf.
RONAN, supra note 3, at 157. Further complicating matters in the case of Addington was that he was
not only a vice presidential staffer, he later became dual-hatted as an Assistant to the President. That
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Cabinet who share in this section 4 power lack insulation from the
President's removal power, making the Vice President's independence all
the more important to maintaining the proper operation of that part of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. One could well imagine an objectively healthy
Vice President triggering the section 4 mechanism against a mentally
unstable President. The mentally ill President could respond by asserting
that the Vice President is the one who is deranged and then cashier the
Vice President by sending his pre-signed letter to the Secretary of State.
Until confirmation of a new Vice President, this could mean that no
inability proceedings could proceed against the President. 68 Thus, the
entire section 4 process could be compromised by such a letter.
ii. Legitimacy and Practicality Concerns
With respect to political legitimacy, confidential vice presidential
letter arrangements or contingency plans are on even shakier ground than
purely legal considerations.369 In past situations involving presidential
succession or inability, rumors and conspiracy theories swirled with great
would have made it even more difficult for him to resist presidential pressure to turn over the letter.
If future vice presidents follow the Cheney model, one could imagine other scenarios in

which the President could possibly use the letter to his advantage. For instance, the vice presidential
staffer might legitimately believe the Vice President to be incapacitated and give the letter to the

President. The President could hold the letter, perhaps initially out of an abundance of caution, and
then keep it after the Vice President's inability had been removed. In this manner, the President might
hold onto the letter as an insurance policy (e.g., to encourage loyalty). Another possibility might
present itself if a future Vice President decided to give the letter to more than one individual. See infra
note 378 (providing reasons why there should be more than one copy of the resignation letter).Perhaps
a White House staffer or the President himself would receive a copy. In such a scenario, the letter
might be available for the President to wield inappropriately. The Author would like to thank

Professor Joel Goldstein for his thoughts on this subject.
368. Such a step, of course, could prompt impeachment proceedings against the President for
many of the same pragmatic reasons that impeachment could be used against an incapacitated Vice

President. See infra Part III.C. In the absence of a Vice President, the Reagan and Clinton contingency
plans would have the Speaker stepping in for the Vice President to help determine the President's

inability. But, if the President took the drastic step of forcing the Vice President's resignation, he
might presumably feel free to disregard the contingency plans of his own White House Counsel's
office, especially if the Speaker hailed from the opposite party. See, e.g., Clinton Contingency Plan,
supra note 13; Reagan Contingency Plan, supra note 13.
369. Cf. PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND VACANCIES IN THE OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT,
supra note 333, at 2; STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, NIXON: THE EDUCATION OF A POLITICIAN, 1913-1962,

at 453-54 (1987) ("Eisenhower intended to keep his agreement with Nixon a secret.... But the
Presidency cannot be handed over in secret."); Memorandum from Frank Wiggins to Mike Berman,

Counsel to Vice President Walter Mondale 4-5 (on file with the George H.W. Bush Presidential
Library Center, C. Boyden Gray Files, OA/D No. CF01823, Folder ID No. 1823-005) (articulating
the importance of reassuring the American people in an inability scenario by making such agreements
public ahead of time); Memorandum from Robert Torricelli, Assoc. Counsel to the Vice President, to

Mike Berman, Counsel to the Vice President 4-5 (Mar. 21,1978) (on file with the George H.W. Bush
Presidential Library Center, C. Boyden Gray Files, OA/ID No. CF01823, Folder ID No. 1823-005)
(same).
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intensity. 3 7 0In the age of the internet, social media, "fake news," and
twenty-four-hour cable networks, a secret vice presidential resignation
letter could very easily cause legitimacy problems, especially if the next
person in the line of succession were from the opposite party (i.e., the
Speaker or President pro tempore). 3 7 As noted, this problem could be
easily solved by making the letter public (as well as the other executive
branch contingency plans for that matter). Though he did not announce
the letter during his time in office, Cheney did make it public two years
after leaving the vice presidency and ten years after its formulation.
A secret letter arrangement, such as Cheney's, carries with it a
number of other practical concerns. One is that Cheney's approach lacks
flexibility and is irrevocable. Assuming arguendo that the letter procedure
is legally binding, once it had been executed it would be final. The letter
process also does not take into account the possibility that the Vice
President's incapacity might prove temporary. For example, the Vice
President might recover his health, be released by kidnappers, or
reestablish communication with the government. In these instances, short
of being elected to office all over again or being nominated and confirmed
under section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment-both lengthy
undertakings with no guarantee of success-a Vice President who has
resigned from office (or been removed by the President) but regained his
capacity could not return to office. This is not the case with the statute
proposed in this Article in which the Vice President's powers and duties
are transferred to the next in the line of succession pending resumption of
his capacity.
An additional practical issue is that the Cheney letter was given to
and held by a vice presidential staffer.3 7 2 As such, the Vice President's
staffer was put in the "unenviable position" of possibly making the initial
inability determination regarding the Vice President.3 73 Despite Cheney's
instructions that the President would have to make the decision as to the
370.

See, e.g., Feerick, supra note 4, at 922; Joel K. Goldstein, Vice-PresidentialBehavior in a

Disability Crisis:The Case ofThomas R. Marshall,POL.& LIFE SCI., Fall 2014, at 37,43 (2014); cf.
William F. Baker & Beth A. FitzPatrick, PresidentialSuccession Scenarios in PopularCulture and
History and the Needfor Reform, 79 FORDHAM L. REv. 835, 841 (2010).
371. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 3, at 1028-29; cf. KALT, supra note 16, at 181. Indeed,
concern over the legitimacy of elected presidents has become an unfortunate trend in recent years.
See, e.g., David A. Graham, What Happens When a President is Declared Illegitimate?, THE
ATLANTIC (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/what-happenswhen-a-president-is-declared-illegitimate/513473; Andr6s Martinez, Americans Have Seen the Last

Four Presidents as Illegitimate. Here's Why, WASH.

POST (Jan. 20, 2017, 6:00 AM),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/01/20/americans-have-seen-the-lastfour-presidents-as-illegitimate-heres-why.
372. See RONAN, supra note 3, at 157.

373.

See id.
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Vice President's inability, the Vice President also instructed Addington to
take action "if the need ever arises."374 Unless the incapacity were
absolutely manifest, the "if' condition would likely have meant that
3 75
Addington would have had at least some discretion in the matter. It also
assumes that the staffer would even have been aware of the inability.376
That might not be the case.3 77 For example, the staffer could be away on
vacation when the de facto incapacity occurs.378
Furthermore, it is possible the staffer could refuse to hand over the
letter to the President, underscoring the question of whether the letter
procedure would be legally binding. A staffer who works solely for the
Vice President might defy the President or delay carrying out presidential
wishes (as he might not be subject to presidential removal). Given that the
vice presidential staffer's livelihood and that of his fellow vice
presidential employees may depend on the Vice President remaining in
office, turning over the resignation letter could be a difficult decision
to make.
More broadly, having a staffer-someone not elected nor subject to
Senate advice and consent-making an initial decision of this magnitude
37
By
all by himself is unsettling from the standpoint of democratic norms.
contrast, in the case of determining vice presidential inability under the
statute proposed in this Article, the democratically-elected President and
Senate-confirmed Cabinet secretaries would make the initial decision with
the democratically-elected members of Congress having the final say in
the case of a dispute, the latter part of the process in full public view.
Vice President Cheney should be commended for being the first Vice
President to take vice presidential incapacity seriously. If his approach has
been followed by his successors, future vice presidents should make such
letters public as has Cheney; this would help the cause they are trying to
advance by bolstering the legality of the letter practice and enhancing its
legitimacy. Either way, a letter arrangement reflects about the best that
can be done by the Vice President alone and as a result it constitutes a
viable, albeit imperfect, option.

374. Id. (emphasis added).
375. See id.
376. See Rogan, supra note 31.
377. See id.
378. See id. Another important question is what if the staffer became incapacitated
simultaneously with the President and Vice President? The Author would like to thank Louis Fisher
for noting this concern.
Addington's home burned down while he was in possession of the Cheney letter; it was one
of only a handful of objects he was able to salvage. See CHENEY MEMOIR, supra note 13, at 322.
379. See RONAN, supra note 3, at 157; Second FordhamReport, supra note 7, at 970.
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Nonetheless, a post hoc legislative approach reflects a preferable
option. First, it provides a less problematic legal basis. Unlike with a
letter, the statutory approach prompts no concerns about the President
firing the Vice President. Nor would it compromise the Vice President's
role in the section 4 procedure. And it would not involve the President and
Vice President possibly acting contrary to the spirit of the resignation
statute. In addition, the mechanics of a statutory approach would be
legally binding which is much less certain with a letter arrangement.
Second, as a public law, a statute offers greater legitimacy than a secret
letter agreement. A post hoc statute would be debated openly in Congress
and be adopted through the regular lawmaking process. Moreover, the
statute would ensure that the inability determination process is conducted
by publicly-accountable actors (i.e., the President, the Cabinet, and
Congress). This is in contrast to a letter arrangement which includes only
a staffer participating in the initial determination followed by a
presidential decision. This entire process could very easily take place
behind closed doors. Finally, a post hoc statute is a more flexible
approach. While the letter arrangement would result in the Vice
President's irrevocable resignation, the post hoc statute would provide a
means for the Vice President to regain his powers and duties.
B.

The Contingent Grant of Power Theory: Action Taken by the Next in
the Line of Succession

A third approach could be taken according to the CGOPT. "This
concept derives from pre-Twenty-Fifth Amendment debates over
presidential inability.381Itsmost compelling advocate was Professor Ruth
Silva, who argued that the individual receiving a grant of contingent
authority should be the one to determine when and under what
circumstances to exercise that authority.3 8 2 In the context of presidential
incapacity prior to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, it meant that the Vice
President ultimately was the official who had the authority to decide
whether the chief executive was unable to perform his duties since the

380. See Feerick, supranote 7, at 20-21; Feerick,supra note 4, at 938, 940-42.
381. See Feerick, supranote 7, at 913-14; Trumbull, Cooley, Butler,& Dwight, supra note 101,
at 433 (Butler).
382. See SLVA, supra note 54, at 55, 100-02; see also Brownell, supra note 69, at 204. The
primary judicial support for this argument derives from Martin v. Mott. See 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19,
31-32 (1827) ("Whenever a statute gives a discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by him
upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule of construction, that the statute constitutes
him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts.. . . It is no answer that such a power
may be abused, for there is no power which is not susceptible of abuse."); see also SILVA, supra note
54, at 101-02; Feerick, supra note 7, at 21.
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Vice President was implicitly assigned by the Constitution a contingent
grant of power as presidential successor."'
This theory could be applied in different ways in the context of vice
presidential incapacity. One would be for the next in the line of
presidential succession to simply take action on her own.3 8 4 Still another
would be through a letter arrangement or contingency plan, perhaps not
unlike President Johnson's letter agreement with Speaker McCormack.3
Under the CGOPT and existing law, the Speaker of the House would make
the decision regarding the Vice President's incapacity.3 8 6 The authority for
the Speaker taking action under the CGOPT would be implicitly derived
from the Original Inability Clause and the 1947 presidential succession

383. See SLLVA, supra note 54, at 55, 100-02.
384. The theory could also be effectuated pursuant to statute. See infra note 412; Part I.B.3. An
additional variation of the CGOPT could conceivably be applied with respect to the President pro
tempore. Under the original Constitution, the Vice President's only constitutional responsibility was
to preside over the Senate. The Vice President's failure to appear in the Senate meant for a century
that the Senate needed to elect a President pro tempore who would then take the Vice President's
place as presiding officer. See, e.g., MCCONNELL & BROWNELL, supra note 35, at 45.In this capacity,
the President pro tempore was the successor to the Vice President. Perhaps, given his role as
constitutional successor to the Vice President in his Senate capacity, the President pro tempore could
determine whether the Vice President is incapacitated. This argument could be bolstered by the
constitutional bond the Vice President enjoys with the Senate as well as the President pro tempore's
place immediately following the Speaker in the line of succession. For the Senate's tacit, if uneven,
treatment of the President pro tempore as "Acting Vice President," see id. at 55-58.
However, there are serious shortcomings to the argument. First, it would be based on an
obsolete model of the vice presidency. The President pro tempore is the successor to the vice
presidency only in his capacity as President of the Senate, while the modern Vice President is much
more of an executive branch personage. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 42, at 20-24; Roy E. Brownell
II, A Constitutional Chameleon: The Vice President's Place Within the American System of
Separationof Powers: PartII: PoliticalBranch Interpretationand Counterarguments,24 KAN. J.L.
& PUB. PoL'Y 294 (2015); Goldstein, supra note 14, at 530-33; Memorandum from William R.
Tansill, Gov't Div., Legislative Reference Serv., Library of Cong. (June 27, 1955) (on file with
author).
Second, this interpretation in a sense would require that federal officials informally rewrite
the 1947 Presidential Succession Act by skipping over the Speaker. By statute, if the President and
Vice President are out of office or incapacitated, it is the Speaker-not the President pro temporewho succeeds to the presidency. If the President pro tempore became in effect the Acting Vice
President, presumably he would become Acting President if the President died, resigned, was
removed, or became unable to fulfill his duties.
Finally, this concept leads to a legal conundrum. If the President pro tempore is seen as
having sole constitutional authority to determine vice presidential inability under a variation of the
CGOPT, that would mean a single member of Congress enjoys the same or perhaps greater power
than all of Congress. Cf. SILVA, supra note 54, at 23 n.46; Manning, supra note 35, at 148-49. For
these reasons, the view that the President pro tempore can decide vice presidential incapacity faces
serious obstacles. A fruitful discussion with Brian Kalt prompted this hypothetical.
385. See, e.g., Feerick, supra note 7, at 15-16, 23-25, 34; cf. First Fordham Report, supra note
7, at 30-34. For a model letter arrangement, see Feerick, supra note 7, at 34. For consideration of the
CGOPT combined with a letter arrangement see infra Part III.B.3.
386. For questions about the constitutionality of legislative succession, see supra note 89.
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statute, not the Twenty-Fifth Amendment."' Thus, the Speaker of the
House would have the discretion to determine if the Vice President is
incapacitated, and once that decision is made, the Speaker would simply
fill in for the Vice President in his succession and inability determination
functions."
1. Advantages
The primary advantage of applying the CGOPT to a vice presidential
incapacity scenario is that it theoretically has the potential to be
effectuated quickly, indeed possibly more quickly than a post hoc statute
and possibly as quickly as a resignation letter. The Speaker could
conceivably arrive at a determination in fairly short order. Thereafter the
Speaker's office might hold a public ceremony-presumably with the
President or with his blessing-announcing that she would be assuming
the succession and inability determination duties of the Vice President
until such time as the Vice President regained capacity. In this regard, the
CGOPT would appear to have an important practical benefit. Yet, as will
be seen, this practical advantage may prove more apparent than real.
2. Disadvantages
While it has the potential practical benefit of being executed quickly,
the CGOPT faces a number of daunting challenges. First, the theory has
never been applied despite past opportunities for its use. Prior to the
enactment of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, no Vice President adopted
the CGOPT to determine presidential inability. During the lengthy
incapacity of President James Garfield, Vice President Chester Arthur
could have applied some form of this theory. 38 9 Similarly, during the
extended incapacity of President Woodrow Wilson, Vice President
Thomas Marshall could have done the same. Tellingly, neither didso. 3 90
In fact, to the extent that steps were taken to try to manage these instances
of executive inability, they were taken by the Cabinet and by presidential
387. The framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment purposely chose to exclude the Speaker from
assuming a role in determining the Vice President's incapacity-a role akin to the Vice President's
role under section 4 with respect to the President. See 111 CONG. REc. 3253 (1965) (statements by
Sens. Bayh and Hruska); see also Letter from John D. Feerick, to Richard Poff, Representative, U.S.
House of Representatives 4 (Feb. 7, 1965), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article
cf. 111 CONG. REC. 7937 (1965)
=1031&context=twentyfifthamendmentscorrespondence;
(statement by Rep. Celler); 1965 House Hearings,supra note 20, at 78, 85-87; FEERICK, supra note

1, at 57-58, 74-75, 93; Feerick, supra note 4, at 909 n.1, 934 n.147.
388. Cf. Feerick, supra note 7, at 20-21; Feerick, supra note 4, at 938-39.
389. The CGOPT was articulated at the time of President James Garfield's inability. See Silva,
supra note 103, at 155.

390.

See FEERICK,supra note 100, at 117-39, 162-80; SLVA, supra note 54, at 52-82; Goldstein,

supra note 370, at 37-57. Vice President Nixon played no role in determining Eisenhower's inability.
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confidantes, not by the Vice President.3 9 1 Though not clearly confronted
with presidential inability during their time in office, former Vice
Presidents Henry Wallace and Alben Barkley both indicated that they
would not have presumed on their own to determine whether the President
was incapacitated.3 92 Clearly, to some degree, the CGOPT lacked
sufficient constitutional currency and legitimacy to be applied in a realworld setting.393
Moreover, while the CGOPT was embraced by three Attorneys
General, 39 4the validity of the theory was hotly disputed until the TwentyFifth Amendment was adopted. 3 9 5 Partly this was because there was no
clear constitutional delegation of such authority to the Vice President at
the time just as there is no clear delegation now with respect to the Speaker
or other presidential successor.3 96 Prior to the Amendment, some
authorities maintained that the President and Vice President should jointly
decide questions of presidential incapacity, some believed that Congress
alone or the Vice President and Cabinet in tandem should make the
determination. 39 7 Still, others argued that the courts should have the final
say. 39 8Nor were these the only options debated. 39 9 The bottom line is that
the CGOPT was far from universally recognized.

391. See SILVA,supra note 54, at 52-55, 60-62; Brownell, supra note 69, at 193-95.
392. See Frelinghuysen, supra note 101, at 148; see also NIXON, supra note 331, at 139 ("[The
Constitution] does not say who shall decide when a President is disabled . . . .").
393. Concern about appearing to be overly anxious to assume the presidency was a major reason
why Vice Presidents Arthur and Marshall did not try to determine presidential incapacity. See, e.g.,
RONAN, supra note 3, at 18; SILVA, supra note 54, at 102; Goldstein, supra note 370, at 45; cf.
Brownell, supra note 69, at 193-95. Constitutional questions over whether a Vice President had the
authority to decide the question of presidential inability in the first place-as well as concerns over

displacing the President for good-blended with a wariness of being seen to be usurping high office
to form a significant deterrent to vice presidents taking action. See Kennedy Legal Opinion, supra
note 72, at 86-87; FEERICK, supra note 132, at 135-38; FEERICK, supra note 1, at 8-10,14-16; RONAN,
supra note 3, at 18; SILVA, supra note 54, at 63-65; Brownell, supra note 69, at 193-95; Goldstein,
supra note 370, at 43-50, 52. Had the Vice President's authority been crystal clear, Arthur and
Marshall would still probably have been hesitant to take any action, but they certainly would have
been more likely to take such steps with clear authority than without it. See PresidentialInabilityand
Vacancies in the Office of Vice President: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 67-68 (1965) (statement of the American
Bar Association); Goldstein, supra note 370, at 46-47.

394.
395.
396.

See Kennedy Legal Opinion, supra note 72, at 88-89,94.
See id. at 89-90; FEERICK, supra note 1, at 49-50; Wilmerding, supra note 84, at 174-79.
See U.S. CONT. art. I, §1, cl. 6; 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1) (2018); see also Feerick, supra note

7, at 21; Feerick, supra note 4, at 941; First FordhamReport, supra note 7, at 34.
397. See FEERICK, supra note 1, at 49-50.
398. See id. at 50. For more on conflicting proposals to resolve presidential incapacity prior to
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, see id. at 49-50; SLVA, supra note 54, at 100-10; Silva, supra note
103, at 155.
399. See supra note 398.
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Second, having the Speaker make the decision all by herself as to
vice presidential incapacity does not sit easily alongside the structural
norms of section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.co It will be recalled
that section 4 provides that the Vice President is to determine the
President's incapacity with the Cabinet.401 Then, if the President disputes
the matter, the matter is referred to Congress to decide.2 Thus, important
checks and balances are built into section 4 to prevent precipitate action
by a power-hungry Vice President. 40 3
At the same time, Cabinet participation in the initial determination
provides the Vice President with political cover. 4 0 4 To this end, it permits
the Vice President to act in the public interest by doing what needs to be
done regarding presidential incapacity while protecting him against
charges of trying to usurp the highest office in the land. 4 05 In this respect,
the checks and balances serve two worthy purposes: (1) deterring the
overly ambitious, and (2) encouraging the overly reticent.1 6
These important formal checks and incentives would be largely
missing for a Speaker applying the CGOPT in a vice presidential
incapacity setting. Under the CGOPT, the Speaker would be making the
decision all by herself. The Speaker's position in this regard would be all
the more delicate if she hailed from a different political party from the
President and Vice President, which would result in the increased
likelihood of a change in partisan control of the White House.407 (As a
practical manner, it would be prudent for the Speaker to secure the
President's public assent and that of the Vice President's family).
Recent relations between vice presidents and speakers of the
opposite party have often been cool."* These practical drawbacks call into
question the supposed advantage that the CGOPT would provide:
expeditious action to address incapacity. These practical concerns would
400. See Feerick, supra note 7, at 21; FirstFordhamReport, supra note 7, at 30-31. Moreover,
the Speaker, by herself, would be exercising authority that Congress as a whole presumably could
not. See supra note 384 (discussing similar concerns if the President pro tempore were permitted to

act on his own to decide vice presidential inability).
401. See U.S. CONsT. amend XXV, § 4.
402. See id.
403. See Goldstein, supra note 40, at 190-95; cf. Feerick, supra note 7, at 21.
404. See Goldstein, supra note 40, at 194-95; Second Fordham Report, supra note 7, at 964; cf.
Feerick, supra note 7, at 21.
405. See Feerick, supra note 7, at 21; Goldstein, supra note 40, at 194-95; Second Fordham
Report, supra note 7, at 964.
406. See Goldstein, supra note 40, at 190-95; Second Fordham Report, supra note 7, at 964; cf.
KALT, supranote 16, at 64-66; Feerick, supra note 7, at 21.

407. Cf Goldstein, supra note 3, at 1028-29. Concerns over a potential partisan shift in White
House control if the President and Vice President cannot serve reflect one of the many serious
drawbacks of the 1947 presidential succession statute. See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 1, at 214, 287.

408. See infra note 422.
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likely make a Speaker-especially one from the opposite party-cautious
about taking what might be perceived as precipitate action. Certainly, vice
presidents have been hesitant to fill in for de facto incapacitated presidents
and they have been on the same national ticket with the President and
hailed from the same party.49 Thus, the CGOPT is less preferable than the
statutory approach or a letter arrangement in large part because it entails
someone from outside the executive branch and potentially outside the
Vice President's party making the inability determination.
A third shortcoming of the CGOPT relates to how the Vice President
could regain his powers and duties if he recovered his capacity. Prior to
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, three Attorneys General concluded that an
incapacitated President could return to office simply by asserting that he
had regained capacity. 4 10 Thus, under the CGOPT, the Vice President
would presumably make the decision to return to office all by himself.
Such a mechanism again lacks the formal checks and balances established
under section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment with respect to a
President attempting to regain his powers and duties. The Amendment
provides that, if the President believes he has regained his capacity, either
the Vice President or the Cabinet must agree with him or, if they do not,
Congress decides the issue. 4 1 1These checks help ensure that the President
has, in reality, regained his capacity. The CGOPT would include no such
assurances; a mentally deranged Vice President, for example, could
simply state he is ready to return to the job and that would be the end of it
(assuming the Speaker does not wind up contesting his capacity all over
again). 4 12Once again, the CGOPT falls short of section 4's norms.
Fourth, the CGOPT is freighted with legitimacy concerns. The
Speaker would ostensibly be determining vice presidential incapacity all
by herself. 4 1 3 The CGOPT counsels that, since the Speaker is next in line
to the presidency, she would have the sole responsibility for determining

409. See supra notes 389-93 and accompanying text.
410. See Kennedy Legal Opinion, supra note 72, at 89, 91.
411. See U.S. CONT. amend. XXV, §4; KALT,supra note 16, at 8-10; Feerick, supra note 7, at
17-18.
412. Cf. Feerick, supra note 7, at 20-21. Some have argued that the CGOPT could be
implemented by statute. See id. at 19-21; Feerick, supra note 4, at 938-39. But if a statute were to try
to resolve the issue of vice presidential inability it would make more sense simply to follow the
Fordhan Clinic approach and have the executive branch initiate matters on its own and thus avoid a
Speaker-especially one from the opposite party-becoming involved in the initial determination.
413. Cf. Feerick, supra note 7, at 20-21. A letter arrangement could be crafted which could
require or encourage the Speaker to work with the President and the Cabinet to determine vice
presidential incapacity. Cf. id.; First Fordham Report, supra note 7, at 31-35, 62, 84. Another
possibility would be a post hoc statute that retroactively confirms what the Speaker did and then
provides a formal process going forward. Cf. Brownell, supra note 2, at 1055-64.
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that the Vice President is incapacitated.4 1 4 She alone could then publicly
proclaim herself in effect Acting Vice President for succession and
inability determination purposes. The CGOPT would therefore give the
Speaker greater authority to determine incapacity than the Vice President
himself exercises in a presidential inability setting.415 And, unlike the
Speaker's actions, the Vice President's role is expressly provided in the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 4 16 Thus, having an individual-with an
interest in the outcome-making this important decision all by herself
with no means of appeal and no document to detail the process would pose
serious legitimacy challenges. The post hoc statutory solution suffers from
no such drawback in that it requires a presidential/Cabinet decision with
the possibility of an appeal to Congress.
Thus, past practice, Twenty-Fifth Amendment norms, and a host of
legitimacy and practical concerns all complicate the case for the next in
the line of succession taking action based on the CGOPT alone.4 1 7
3. Implementing the CGOPT by Letter Arrangement
The CGOPT could also be implemented by letter arrangement. This
would certainly be preferable to trying to implement the CGOPT "on the
fly." For one, committing the CGOPT to writing would provide an
important element of legitimacy that an ad hoc exercise of the CGOPT
would lack. Second, the CGOPT in letter form would likely ensure ex ante
vice presidential agreement with the notion of the Speaker determining
his incapacity (or helping to determ ine his incapacity).418 It could also
provide a process to ensure the Speaker would work with executive
branch officials such as the President and Cabinet secretaries before
rendering such a decision. 4 1 9 Moreover, a CGOPT letter could provide a
process by which the Vice President could regain his powers and duties,
414. See Feerick,supra note 7. at 14,19-21.
415. See id. at 17, 19-21; see also supra note 400.
416. See Feerick, supra note 4, at 949; see also id. at 938-39; FirstFordham Report, supra note
7, at 30-31. The Author has elsewhere argued for the Speaker to take an ostensibly similar action in a
case of simultaneous presidential and vice presidential incapacity. See Brownell, supra note 2, at
1055-64. However, in that scenario, the Author calls for the Speaker to gain the agreement of the
President pro tempore and the Cabinet before proclaiming herself Acting President. See id. Once she
makes this public declaration the Author argues that she should then request that Congress validate
her actions after the fact. See id.
417. This Article does not criticize the outcome reached by application of the CGOPT-the
Speaker assuming the Vice President's Twenty-Fifth Amendment responsibilities. This Article
criticizes the process. This Article maintains that such an approach should be clearly authorized by
Congress and grounded in the constitutional continuity-of-government principle, the Original
Inability Clause, and the Necessary and Proper Clause, not based on unilateral Speaker action under
authority implicitly granted by the 1947 presidential succession statute.

418.
419.

Cf. Feerick, supra note 7, at 20-21, 34.
Cf. id.; FirstFordhamReport, supra note 7, at 31-35,62, 84.
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ideally subject to some checks and balances akin to those found in section
4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 4 20
Nonetheless, the CGOPT in letter form still has significant practical
drawbacks. Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is predicated on
the modem notion that the President and Vice President are usually
politically allied with one another.4 21 That assumption is much more
dubious for a Vice President and Speaker, particularly if they are of the
opposite party. Indeed, the Vice President might decline to entrust the
Speaker with his political future in the first place. As noted, since World
War II, the relationship between vice presidents and speakers of the
opposite party have often been strained if not openly hostile.422 Indeed, in
at least one instance, presidential succession and inability efforts ground
423
to a halt precisely because of poor Vice President-Speaker relations. In
the 1950s, Democratic Speaker Sam Rayburn spurned the Republican
Eisenhower administration's efforts to try to adopt a constitutional
amendment regarding presidential succession and inability because, in the
words of the Attorney General at the time, Rayburn thought "the plan
might [have] enhance[d] the political stature of vice-president, Richard
M. Nixon."424 Thus, there are serious practical obstacles to the CGOPT
being agreed to by letter in the first place. In fact, there is no public record
of a Vice President and Speaker ever having doneso425

420. Cf. Feerick, supra note 7, at 21; First FordhamReport, supra note 7, at 31-35,62, 84.
421. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 40, at 181, 190.
422. See Quint Forgey, "An Attitude of Disrespect":Pence Flays PelosiforRipping up Trump's
Speech, POLITICO, (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/05/mike-pence-attackspelosi-ripping-trumps-speech-110804; Paul Kane, For All Their Political Differences, Biden and
Ryan Share Striking Similarities, WASH.POST (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/poli
6
2
tics/for-all-their-political-differences-biden-and-ryan-share-striking-similarities/ 01 /01/11/948e27
a6-b621-11e5-a8420feb51d1dl24_story.html?utmterm=.2a72a5017d8e ("Biden ... and Ryan ...
do not have a close relationship."); Rory Carroll, CIA Torture Report: Nancy Pelosi Blames Dick
Cheney, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 6,2014,1:47 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/06/c
ia-tortur-nancy-pelosi-blames-dick-cheney; Cheney Won't Back Down from Pelosi Criticism, NBC
NEWS (Feb. 23,2007),http://www.nbcnews.com/id/17295904/ns/politics/t/cheney-wont-back-downpelosi-criticism/#.XK55tZhKiUk ("Vice President Dick Cheney refused Friday to take back his
charge that House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's opposition to President Bush's Iraq war buildup is playing
.[Pelosi replied] 'I hope the president will repudiate
into the hands of the al-Qaida terrorist network ...
and distance himself from the vice president's remarks."'); John Heilemann, The Making of the
President 2000, WIRED (Dec. 1, 1995, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/1995/12/gorenewt
(discussing tension between Speaker Gingrich and Vice President Gore); see also D.B. HARDEMAN
& DONALD C. BACON, RAYBURN: A BIOGRAPHY 381-82, 423, 434, 442 (1987) (describing Speaker
Rayburn's loathing of Vice President Nixon); ALFRED STEINBERG, SAM RAYBURN: A BIOGRAPHY

279-80, 288, 310, 331 (1975) (same).
423. See BROWNELL,supra note 225, at 278.
424. Id.
425. President Johnson and Speaker McCormack entered into a letter arrangement with respect
to presidential inability but the two were of the same party. See supra note 332.
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Even were such an agreement to be made, there are further practical
obstacles. For example, it is uncertain how the Speaker would know if the
Vice President was incapacitated. 4 2 6 Even if the two officeholders got
along well, as a practical matter they may not necessarily work closely
together. 427 And even with a letter, the Speaker might still prove hesitant
to take action for fear of looking like a usurper.4 2 8
Assuming a CGOPT letter agreement exists, it would be viable but
still be less attractive than the type of statute advocated in this Article.
First, a statute would have the benefit of a clear authorization as opposed
to a CGOPT letter arrangement which at best has only an implicit statutory
basis42 9 and therefore a less certain legal status.430 Indeed, Speaker
McCormack made clear that he viewed his own letter agreement with
President Johnson as not legally binding.431
Second, a statute is a public document adopted after public debate by
the people's elected representatives. In short, it has built-in legitimacy. By
contrast, a delegation letter, if it exists today, is secret and would suffer
serious legitimacy and practical concerns as a result (especially if the
Speaker is of the opposite party).432 Moreover, its secret nature
undermines the case to be made that such letters have established (or could
establish) their constitutionality through past practice.4 33
Third, the post hoc statute keeps the decision making within the
executive branch. This dynamic likely improves the efficiency of the
process in that the President and the Cabinet-as the initial
decisionmakers-would likely be aware more quickly of a vice
presidential incapacity than a House Speaker, especially one from a
different political party. Furthermore, they would not be inhibited from
taking action out of concern about being seen as overly ambitious.

426. Cf. AmAR, supra note 246, at 191-92.
427.
428.

See supra note 422.
See supra notes 389-93, 400-09 and accompanying text.

429. See 3 U.S.C. § 19(a), (b) (2018) ("[T]o discharge the powers and duties of the office of
President ... the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall, upon his resignation as Speaker and
as Representative in Congress, act as President.... The same rule shall apply in the case of the death,
resignation, removal from office, or inability of an individual acting as President under this
subsection.... If, at the time when under subsection (a) of this section a Speaker is to begin the
discharge of the powers and duties of the office of President, there is no Speaker, or the Speaker fails
to qualify as Acting President, then the President pro tempore of the Senate shall, upon his resignation
as President pro tempore and as Senator, act as President.").
430. See supra notes 99, 275, 396,417,429, and accompanying text.
431.

See PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND VACANCIES IN THE OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT,

supra note 333, at 7.
432. See supra Part III.A.1.b.i; cf. Carroll, supra note 422; Kane, supra note 422; Heilemann,
supra note 422.
433. See supra notes 336-49 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the political precedent for a Vice President attempting on his
own to delegate his constitutional powers to another official is not
favorable. In the nineteenth century, when a Vice President was absent
from the Senate, a President pro tempore had to be named to replace him,
the President pro tempore not being a permanent position at the time.434
More than once, a Vice President attempted to name which Senator should
take his place in the presiding officer's chair. 4 3 5 With one apparent
exception, the Senate rebuffed these vice presidential efforts.436 To this
day, the President pro tempore can name his temporary replacement in the
chair, but the Vice President cannot. 4 3 7 A Vice President making a
delegation of his constitutional powers to another official is therefore not
supported by historical practice. 4 38
While implementation of the CGOPT through a letter arrangement is
preferable to an impromptu exercise of the CGOPT, there are still
challenges to the approach. It remains a viable option but is inferior to a
post hoc statute or a vice presidential resignation letter.4 39
434. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30960, THE PRESIDENT
PRO TEMPORE OF THE SENATE: HISTORY AND AUTHORITY OF THE OFFICE 3 (2015).
435. See Gerald Gamm &Steven S. Smith, Last Among Equals: The Senate's PresidingOfficer,
in ESTEEMED COLLEAGUES: CIVILITY AND DELIBERATION IN THE U.S. SENATE 105,108-10 (Burdett
A. Loomis ed., 2000).
436. See id. at 108-10; Shoup, supra note 9, at 370-78.
437. See U.S. Senate Rule I, §3, S.DOC.NO. 113-18, at 1 (1stSess. 2013) ("The President pro
tempore shall have the right to name in open Senate or, if absent, in writing, a Senator to perform the
duties of the Chair."); DAVIS, supra note 434, at 8 ("Historically, the powers and prerogatives of the
President pro tempore as a presiding officer have differed little from those of the Vice President. One
notable exception involves the privilege of appointing a substitute to perform the duties of the chair.");
see also Walter Kravitz, The United States Senate: A History 63-64 (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author); Shoup, supra note 9, at 370-78.
438.

See FLOYD M. RIDDICK &ALAN S. FRUMIN,RIDDICK'S SENATE PROCEDURE: PRECEDENTS

AND PRACICES, S. Doc.No. 101-28, at 1021-22 (2d Sess. Alan S. Frumin ed., rev. 1992).
439. A CGOPT letter arrangement would not only be preferable to an extemporaneous
application of the CGOPT but it would also offer two advantages over a pre-signed resignation letter
Ala Vice President Cheney. First, the CGOPT letter arrangement would not permanently remove the
Vice President from office, making it a more flexible tool than the pre-signed letter model. Second,
the former would appear not to pose some of the potential legal problems of a resignation letter (e.g.,
essentially granting the President the power to remove the Vice President, potentially violating the
spirit of the resignation statute by having the President make the key operative decision to deliver the
letter). Nonetheless, ultimately, the pre-signed resignation letter approach offers more advantages
than the CGOPT-by-letter arrangement. First, the Cheney-letter model has actually been executed
before and has been made public. These two factors give it greater familiarity and legitimacy. Second,
the Cheney approach also does not involve the Speaker in the inability determination process, which
almost certainly eliminates concerns over someone from another branch of government (to say
nothing of someone from the opposite party) playing a major role in such a weighty executive branch
decision. Third, the Cheney-letter approach would likely be executed more quickly as the Speaker
would almost assuredly be less knowledgeable of the Vice President's capacity than would the
President and a vice presidential staffer. Cf. AMAR, supra note 246, at 191-92. Moreover, a Speaker
from the opposite party would be particularly wary of being seen to be overly ambitious by taking
steps to place herself one step closer to the Oval Office. Finally, the CGOPT carries its own potential
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Use of the Impeachment Process

A final potential means of handling a situation involving vice
presidential incapacity could be through the impeachment process.'o Use
of the impeachment process to try to resolve a situation involving a federal
official's incapacity has only been discussed in passing by authorities." 1
Article II, Section 4, of the Constitution provides that "[t]he
President, Vice President and all Civil Officers of the United States, shall
be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."" 2 Arguments could be
legal shortcomings (e.g., lack of express statutory authorization to determine vice presidential
inability).
440. No Vice President has ever been impeached. See 3 DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS OF THE U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HR. Doc. No. 94-661, at 1939-2273 (2d Sess. 1994); 6 CLARENCE
CANNON,CANNON'S PRECEDENTS OFTHE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES OFTHE UNITED STATES 743-

95 (1935); 3 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
UNITED STATES 307-1034 (1907); List of Individuals Impeached by the House of Representatives,
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES, https://history.house.gov/Institution
/Iment/Imentmpeachment-List (last visited Jan. 25, 2020) [hereinafter List of Individuals].
However, impeachment resolutions have been introduced against a handful of vice presidents in the
House, though none has ever been brought before the full chamber. See, e.g., HR. RES. 799, 110th
Cong. (2007) (Rep. Kucinich) (offering articles of impeachment against Vice President Dick Cheney);
H.R. RES. 333, 110th Cong. (2007) (Rep. Kucinich) (same); 119 CONG. REC. 31,368 (1973) (Speaker
Albert) (providing a letter from Vice President Agnew requesting his own investigation); id. at 31,506
(Rep. Findley) (offering a resolution to begin an impeachment investigation into the actions of Vice
President Agnew); id. at 31,761 (Rep. Hutchinson) (offering a resolution calling for an investigation
of Vice President Agnew); id. at 32,457 (Rep. McCloskey) (offering a resolution calling for an
investigation of Vice President Agnew); CONG. GLOBE,42d Cong., 3d Sess. 1544-45 (1873) (Rep.
Wood) (offering a resolution that impeachment proceedings be undertaken by the Judiciary
Committee against Vice President Schuyler Colfax).
441. See, e.g., RONAN, supra note 3, at 156, 165; 2 JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A DISCUSSION OF ITS GENESIS, DEVELOPMENT, AND
INTERPRETATION 712 (Henry St. George Tucker ed., 1899); William F. Brown & Americo R.
Cinquegrana, The Realities of PresidentialSuccession: "The Emperor Has No Clones",75 GEO. LJ.
1389, 1444 n.184 (1987); William Lasser, A Heartbeat Away, HOUGHTON MIFFLIN,
http://college.cengage.com/polisci/resources/first_100_days/articles/heartbeat.html (last visited Jan.
25, 2020); infra notes 450-62 and accompanying text. Many authorities are skeptical of using
impeachment for inability purposes. See PresidentialInability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice
President: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 88th Cong. 45 (1964) (statement of Professor James Kirby); CHARLES E. MORGANSTON,
THE APPOINTING AND REMOVAL POWER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, S. DOC.NO.70-

172, at 99 (2d Sess. 1929); Robert E. Gilbert, The Genius of theTwenty-Fifth Amendment: Guarding
Against PresidentialDisability but Safeguarding the Presidency, in MANAGING CRISIS,supra note
13, at 25, 33; Stephan, supra note 241, at 67-68; see also FEERICK, supra note 132, at 241; FEERICK,
supra note 1, at 51; FirstFordham Report, supra note 7, at 35; Second Fordham Report, supra note
7, at 969-70.
442. U.S. CONST. art. , §4. There is some support from the Founding Era for the notion that
impeachment could be interpreted broadly to include addressing incapacity. See Feerick, supra note
241, at 127. At the Constitutional Convention, during early consideration of how to define
impeachment, James Madison thought impeachment to be "indispensable ... for defending the
Community agst the incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the chief Magistrate .... He might lose his
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made that impeachment is a sufficiently supple mechanism to encompass
matters such as vice presidential incapacity. These arguments could be
based on the Vice President violating his oath of office, pragmatic
interpretations of the impeachment power throughout American history,
political branch precedent, judicial precedent emphasizing the finality of
impeachment, and practical factors. In the end, however, daunting textual
and structural hurdles, and the stigma attached to the procedure would
make it exceedingly difficult-though not impossible-to implement in a
vice presidential inability scenario. These factors make a post hoc statute
as well as letter arrangements and the CGOPT preferable alternatives.
1. Arguments in Favor of the Impeachment Process
a. Violation of the Vice Presidential Oath
An argument could be made in favor of using the impeachment
process to address a scenario involving a healthy President and an
incapacitated Vice President. Such a position would be that, by being
incapacitated and neglecting his duties, the Vice President would be

capacity after his appointment." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 65 (Max
Farrand ed., 1966) (emphasis added). Also during the Convention, Gouverneur Morris maintained
that "incapacity [was a] cause[] of impeachment." Id. at 69. The constitutional impeachment language

was modified following the Madison/Morris remarks, however. See, e.g., id.at 550-52. For those who
disagreed with the Madison/Morris view, see 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 68-69 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) (Bedford); see also BERGER, supra note 254, at 194. But cf.
FRANK 0. BOWMAN III, HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS: A HISTORY OF IMPEACHMENT FOR THE

AGE OF TRUMP 107-09 (2019).
Writing about the American experience with impeachment prior to 1787, Professors Peter
Charles Hoffer and N.E.H. Hull observed that "no one was impeached without evidence of intentional
neglect or total incapacity to perform official duties." PETER CHARLES HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL,
IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635-1805, at 85 (1984); cf. BERGER, supra note 254, at 73-74, 346;
BOWMAN, supra, at 107-09. Professors Hoffer and Hull conclude that "the common understanding of
'high crimes and misdemeanors' [at the dawn of the nineteenth century] (includ[ed] blatant
incapacity, neglect, or indifference to duty)." HOFFER & HULL, supra, at 199; see also Feerick, supra
note 241, at 127; cf. BOWMAN, supra, at 140. Such a position could draw some support from
Alexander Hamilton. In The FederalistNo. 65, Hamilton opined that the impeachment process must
be flexible in order to address the unforeseen. See THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
The mechanism "can never be tied down by such strict rules, either in the delineation of the offense
by the prosecutors, or in the construction of it by the judges, as in common cases [which] serve to
limit the discretion of the courts . . . ." Id. To Hamilton, impeachable acts were "political . . . [and]
relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself." Id. For reasons noted above, see supra

Part I.A., vice presidential incapacity could conceivably be seen to be a grave injury to society. In The
FederalistNo. 79, which included discussion of impeachment, Hamilton wrote further that insanity
"without any formal or express provision, may be safely pronounced to be a virtual disqualification."
THE FEDERALIST NO. 79 (Alexander Hamilton); see also1 ANNALS OF CONG.508 (1789) (statement
of Rep. Smith); BERGER, supra note 254, at 145. But cf. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 375 (statement of Rep.
Boudinot).
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violating his oath of office. By statute, the Vice President must attest
the following:
I ... do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and
domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take
this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the
office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.4 3
If the Vice President were incapacitated, it might be contended he is
not "support[ing] and defend[ing] the Constitution.""' The language
could be seen as an imposing affirmative obligation-"support[ing] and
defend[ing]""-the opposite of doing nothing due to inability. Moreover,
vice presidential incapacity is worse than doing nothing; for the reasons
outlined earlier, the situation threatens the very operation of "the
presidency [which] embodie[s] the continuity and indestructibility of the
state."44 6 This would have the very opposite effect of defending the
Constitution; it would be undermining it, albeit unintentionally.
Furthermore, the Vice President would not be "faithfully discharging the
duties of the office" if he were incapacitated . 7 The word "faithfully"
conveys a mental state that the Vice President is aware and affirmatively
and conscientiously discharging his duties. A comatose Vice President,
for instance, would lack such a commitment. While laboring under an
incapacity, the Vice President would not be willfully violating his oath,
but it could be argued that his oath would be violated just the same. And
violating one's pledge has routinely been cited as a cause
for impeachment." 8
443. 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2018).
444. Id.
445. Id.; see infra note 471 and accompanying text.
446. Bickel, supra note 69, at 15.
447. See 5 U.S.C. § 3331.
448. See H.R.REs. 611, 105th Cong. (1998) (providing the articles of impeachment that passed
the House with respect to President Bill Clinton); CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1616-18 (1868)
(providing the articles of impeachment that passed the House with respect to President Andrew
Johnson); CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 379, 383 (Supp. 1868) (closing argument of
Representative John Bingham, chair of the House managers for President Andrew Johnson's
impeachment); see also
CONSTrrUTIONAL OATH:
(1999); EMILY FIELD
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY

MArTHEW A.
ITS MEANING
VAN TASSEL
FROM 1787 TO

PAULEY, I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR: THE PRESIDENT'S
AND IMPORTANCE IN THE HISTORY OF OATHS 121 n.54
& PAUL FINKELMAN, IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES: A
THE PRESENT 228-38,245,252 (1999); Frank 0. Bowman

III & Stephen L. Sepinuck, "High Crimes & Misdemeanors": Defining the ConstitutionalLimits on
PresidentialImpeachment, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1517, 1563 (1999); Nelson Lund, Lawyers and the
Defense of the Presidency, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REV. 17, 27 n.25 (1995); cf. Bruce Peabody, Imperfect
Oaths, the Primed President, and an Abundance of Constitutional Caution, 104 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 12, 21 (2009).
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Thus, an incapacitated Vice President could be violating his oath of
office, which might make him subject to impeachment.
b. Pragmatic Interpretations of Impeachment
In addition to the Vice President possibly violating his oath, there are
pragmatic reasons to interpret impeachment broadly that might justify
removing an incapacitated officeholder. In fact, a number of authorities
have interpreted the "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors" formulation as sufficiently broad to encompass
incapacity (vice presidential or otherwise)."4 In his insightful book on the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, Professor Ronan briefly discusses the options
for addressing vice presidential incapacity. 4 50 He writes that "if [Vice
President Richard] Cheney [had become] incapacitated, the only recourse
for removal would [have] be[en] impeachment or resignation." 45 1 At
another juncture, Ronan opines that "if the [Israeli Prime Minister Ariel]
Sharon [inability] example [involving a debilitating stroke] had befallen
as vice
remained
would have
Cheney
Dick Cheney ....
45 2
impeached."
president ... unless he resigned or was
It will be recalled that, prior to the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, the presidency was in some ways in the same position as the
vice presidency is today: lacking a clear way for determining incapacity.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, due to his own health troubles in office,
studied presidential inability options closely.453 He was an early supporter
of the adoption of a constitutional amendment on executive inability. 45 4 In
1957, Eisenhower stated with respect to presidential incapacity:
[B]ehind this whole thing is the ability and the power in the Congress to
impeach a President. Presumably, if a President got in such shape that
he was just acting wildly and unconstitutionally, that would happen.
That is the final protection of the people against a President who is
absolutely unable to discharge the functions of his office but doesn't
55
know it. 4

449. See supra notes 441 and 442; infra notes 450-62 and accompanying text.
450. See RONAN, supra note 3, at 156-57.
451. Id. at 156.
452. Id. at 165. Professor William Lasser has written similarly that, "[i]n the worst-case
scenario . .. a disabled vice president would remain in office until he resigned or was impeached and
removed from office by Congress." Lasser, supra note 441.
453. See FEERICK, supra note 1, at 23.
454. See id. at 23-24.
455. The President's News Conference of April 3, 1957, 1 PB. PAPERS 245 (1957); see also
Feerick, supra note 241, at 127 n.284.
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One of the fathers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, Attorney
General Herbert Brownell, when testifying before the House Judiciary
Committee on presidential inability that same year, made a comparable
point. 4 56 He hypothesized about an
extreme situation [in which] a President, obviously unable to act, still
determined to do so, and in a reckless situation of that kind, or one where
he really was not able to make a rational decision, if the time of crisis
was such that action was needed, you could bring in your
impeachmentproceeding.4'
Also writing prior to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, John Feerick opined
that "impeachment[] ... is the remedy for presidential insanity.. . . Given
the case of an insane President, with the attendant danger to the Nation's
security, it is submitted that Congress could act to meet the crisis."458
The House managers for the impeachment trial of President Andrew
Johnson adopted a similar argument in a brief submitted by
Representative William Lawrence, a former judge.4 59 Lawrence reasoned
that "by no means [is] the power of impeachment ... limited to technical
crimes or misdemeanors only. It may reach officers who, from incapacity
or other cause, are absolutely unfit for the performance of their duties,
when no other remedy exists, and where the public interests imperatively
demand it."6 In effect, these interpretations based explicitly or otherwise
on national interest are premised on the same constitutional continuity-ofgovernment principle as discussed earlier.4 6 1
456.

See PresidentialInability: HearingBefore the Special Subcomm. on Study of Presidential

Inability of the Comm. on the Judiciary,85th Cong. 29-30 (1957).
457. Id. at 30; see also FEERICK, supra note 1, at 99, 364; infra note 524. Brownell's successor
as Attorney General concurred. See Rogers, supra note 102, at 14-15 ("[T]he sole remedy is
impeachment where there is a wrongful assertion of authority to exercise the powers and duties of the
[presidential] Office. The attempt of a President to perform his duties when he was in fact clearly

unable to perform might be classed as a wrongful assertion of authority.").
458. Feerick, supra note 241, at 127. Others have concurred. See The Scope of the Power to
Impeach, supra note 252, at 1324-25; cf. 1 ROGER FOSTER, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES: HISTORICAL AND JUDICIAL 599 (1895). The Miller Commission's Report
was ambivalent on use of impeachment regarding presidential incapacity prior to the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment. It stated that "[b]efore the 25th Amendment, there was no mechanism other than
impeachment for dealing with an unfit president who would not resign, or who was not mentally
capable of resigning his office. Impeachment, however, was designed to deal with high crimes and
misdemeanors, not health problems." Miller Center Report, supra note 236, at 11.
459. See 1 TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, BEFORE THE
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ON IMPEACHMENT BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR HIGH

.

CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 123, 147 (1868).
460. Id.; cf. 2 GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES858 (1960 ed.) (quoting
Senator Benjamin Butler during the Andrew Johnson trial: "[A]n impeachable [offense is] in its nature
or consequence subversive of some fundamental or essential principle of government or highly
prejudicial to the public interest; and this may consist of ... an act committed or omitted . .
461. See supra PartI.B.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

81

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 3

372

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:291

Key lawmakers during the Twenty-Fifth Amendment debate
concluded that impeachment could be interpreted to encompass a Vice
President's failure to properly execute his duties under what would
46 2
ultimately become section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
Longtime Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Congressman
Emanuel Celler, stated:
We have the power of impeachment. We can impeach for high crimes
and misdemeanors, and these high crimes and misdemeanors, can mean
anything that this Congress wants it to mean.... We are in power and
we can make the words 'high crimes and misdemeanors' mean anything
we wish and apply it to some roguish, usurping Vice President.4 6 3

462. The idea that the Vice President may be subject to impeachment for any improper Section
4 actions is consistent with the opinions of a number of authorities who generally take a broad view
of the impeachment power, including its use to address inability. For more on impeachment for
presidential incapacity, see, e.g., RONAN, supra note 3, at 29-31; TUCKER, supra note 441, at 712;
Trumbull, Cooley, Butler, & Dwight, supra note 101, at 432 (Butler); C.M. Ellis, The Causes for
1867),
(Jan.
ATLANTIC
THE
Impeached,
Be
Can
President
a
Which
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1867/01/the-causes-for-which-a-president-can
-be-impeached/548144; cf. A.B. Winter, The Problem of Determining Presidential Disability: A
Solution, 33 Soc. SCI. 98, 99 (1958).
Former President William Howard Taft, during his tenure at Yale Law School, took an
expansive view of "high crimes and misdemeanors," at least as the formulation involved the judiciary.
See BERGER, supra note 254, at 61 n.16 (quoting Taft). Taft's perception of the congressional
impeachment power regarding "a judge"-that it would render him impeachable "for any reason that
shows him unfit"-if applied to the Vice President would obviously encompass incapacity. See id.;
but cf. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 472 (1991) ("Voluntary [judicial] retirement will not
always be sufficient [as a mechanism for judicial inability]. Nor may impeachment-with its public
humiliation and elaborate procedural machinery-serve acceptably the goal of a fully functioning
judiciary.").
In the context of judicial impeachment, House Minority Leader and future President Gerald
Ford famously stated:
[A]n impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives
considers to be at a given moment in history; conviction results from whatever offense or
offenses two-thirds of the other body considers to be sufficiently serious to require
removal of the accused from office..... [T]he historical context and political climate are
important; there are few fixed principles among the handful of precedents.
116 CONG. REC. 11,913 (1970); see also BERGER, supra note 254, at 56 n.1; THOMAS M. COOLEY,
THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 205 (4th

ed. 1931); GERHARDT, supra note 239, at 103.
Arguing that incapacity does not fall within the strict definition of "Treason, Bribery, high
Crimes and Misdemeanors" could possibly be misplaced for other reasons. Such an interpretation
assumes that the expressio canon applies to the Impeachment Clause of Article II. Some have argued
that the framers may not have embraced this canon in the context of impeachment. See, e.g., The
Scope of the Power to Impeach, supra note 252, at 1317-22; cf. David Y. Thomas, The Law of
Impeachment in the United States, 2 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 376,384 (1908).
463. 111 CONG. REC. 7965 (1965); see also 1965 House Hearings, supra note 20, at 62
(statement of Rep. Celler); FEERICK, supra note 1, at 99, 121, 364; cf. KALT,supra note 89, at 31-32;
Feerick, supra note 7, at 21.
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Senator Birch Bayh seemed to concur with Celler that vice presidential
misbehavior in the realm of a presidential inability determination could
subject the Vice President to impeachment.4 64
In 1974, the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of
Representatives issued a staff report on impeachment in anticipation of
proceedings against President Richard Nixon465 The Committee reasoned
that: "The framers did not write a fixed standard.. . . [T]hey adopted ... a
standard sufficiently general and flexible to meet future circumstances
and events, the nature and character of which they could not foresee." 4 6 6
In that same vein, the Committee wrote that "[t]he purpose of
impeachment ... is primarily to maintain constitutional government....
Impeachment is a constitutional safety valve; to fulfill its function, it must
be flexible enough to cope with exigencies not now foreseeable."4 6 7 More
specifically,
the
Committee
concluded
that
"[i]mpeachable
conduct . .. may include the serious failure to discharge the affirmative
duties imposed ... by the Constitution." 8 Impeachment could "reach
conduct that might adversely affect the system of government." 4 6 9 Such a
formulation could be broad enough to include vice presidential incapacity
since an incapacitated Vice President might require use of "a
constitutional safety valve" since an officeholder's inability could
jeopardize the functioning of the executive branch. 4 7 0 Furthermore, an
incapacitated Vice President would, by definition, not be "discharg[ing]
the affirmative duties imposed [on him] ... by the Constitution."7
In sum, there is a body of opinion that could be marshaled to support
the notion that, in a pinch, the Constitution's impeachment power could
be interpreted pragmatically to address vice presidential incapacity.

464. See 1965 House Hearings,supra note 20, at 80-81. But cf. id. at 89; 1920 House Hearings,
supra note 125, at 31.
465.

See STAFF OF THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY, H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG.,

CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 1-2 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter
1974 JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT].

466. Id. at 2.
467. Id. at 24-25.
468. Id. at 24.
469. Id. One noted authority on impeachment, Professor Charles Black, defined grounds for
impeachment to include offenses "which so seriously threaten the order of political society as to make
pestilent and dangerous the continuance in power of the perpetrator." CHARLES L. BLACK, JR.,
IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 39-40 (1974). As Professor Eleanore Bushell has written, "the public
trust is as effectively betrayed by a disabled officer as it is by a crooked one." ELEANORE BUSHNELL,
CRIMES, FOLLIES, AND MISFORTUNES: THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT TRIALS 54 (1992). But see id. at

53-55.
470.

See 1974 JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 465, at 25.

471.

Id. at 24.
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c. Precedents
There is also some relevant political precedent that could be brought
to bear on the question of using the impeachment process to resolve vice
presidential inability. It bears noting that Congress-the sole interpreter
of the impeachment power-has construed high crimes and
misdemeanors broadly.472 The very first successful impeachment under
the Constitution involved an incapacitated officeholder. 4 7 3 In 1803, Judge
John Pickering was impeached and removed because he had shown
himself to be mentally unbalanced and an alcoholic, which led to erratic
behavior on the bench. 4 7 4 This led to a debate over whether mental
incapacity was in fact an impeachable offense. 4 75
Partisanship played a role in the impeachment effort as the
Jeffersonians were looking to remove Federalist judges such as Pickering;
476
Indeed,it was
nonetheless, the judge's incapacity was undeniable.
47 7
Pro-Pickering Federalists actually pressed
confirmed by his own son.
the insanity point, arguing that, because he was mentally unbalanced he
lacked the scienter required to commit impeachable acts.478 Ultimately the
Senate avoided the awkward specifics of what Pickering's impeachable
offenses actually constituted and simply voted Pickering "guilty as
charged" and removed him from office. 47 9 Factors such as this reflect why
the impeachment trial of Pickering has faced heavy criticism. 48 0
472.
473.

See supra Partl1.C.1.b.
See GERHARDT, supra note 239, at 55, 183; HOFFER& HULL, supra note 442, at 289,255,

262.

&

474. See WILLIAM PLUMER'S MEMORANDUM OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE
1803-1807, at 100 (Everett Somerville Brown ed., 1923); see also HOFFER & HULL, supra note 442,
at 212. For more on the reasons for Pickering's removal, see BOWMAN, supra note 442, at 137-40;
GERHARDT, supra note 239, at 55, 183; HOFFER & HULL, supra note 442, at 218; VAN TASSEL
FINKELMAN, supranote 448, at 85-86; Lynn W. Turner, The Impeachment ofJohn Pickering,54 AM.

HIST.REv.485,487-88 (1949).
475. For criticism of the impeachment effort, see, for example, BUSHNELL, supra note 469, at
46-52. The charges against Pickering were not explicitly that of incapacity. See HOFFER & HULL,
supra note 442, at 208; cf. The Scope ofthe Power to Impeach, supra note 252, at 1334 & n.92.
476. See BOWMAN, supra note 442, at 137-40; HOFFER & HULL, supra note 442, at 189, 209;
see also VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 448, at 10. Three doctors attested to Pickering's
insanity. See Turner, supra note 474, at 501.

477.

See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 328-29 (1804) (quoting Jacob Pickering, son of the judge).

478.

See, e.g., BOWMAN, supra note 442, at 138-39.

479. The full grounds were whether Pickering was "guilty, as charged in the article of
impeachment.... against him by the House of Representatives?" 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 364-67
(1803) (statement of Sen. Anderson); see also VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 448, at 92,96100; Turner, supra note 474, at 504.

480. See, e.g., Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 293, 299 (1936); H. LOWELL BROWN, HIGH
CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS IN PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 41 (2010); Turner, supra note 474, at
487, 505, 507. Other authorities have been somewhat ambivalent about the precedent. See HENRY
ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF THOMAS
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Yet, for all of its imperfections and untidiness, the Pickering
impeachment and removal took place a mere fourteen years after initial
implementation of the Constitution. 4 8 'As such, it reflects "the first
impeachment to run its full course under the federal Constitution . . . ."482
Indeed, more than seven decades later, when considering the
impeachment of Vice President Schuyler Colfax, the House Committee
on
the
Judiciary
concluded
the
following
about
the
Pickering impeachment:
[I]n the case of Judge Pickering . . . impeached for habitual intoxication,
the officer was condemned because he became incapacitatedfor the
performance of the duties of his office, and wefind that impeachment is
the only means known to our Constitutionby which a civil officer of the
United States, elected by the people, or a judge appointed by the
Executive, can be removed from office. And certainly habitual
intoxication, while it may not be a crime at common law or by statute,
in a private person, may readily enough seem to be a very high crime
and misdemeanor in a high civil officer, wholly incapacitatinghim from
performing all his duties ... .4
Thus, the House Committee on the Judiciary concluded that the Pickering
precedent was a legitimate means of addressing incapacity at a time when
it was weighing impeachment of a Vice President. 4 84
In 1873, an effort was undertaken to impeach Judge Mark Delahay
for alcoholism. 4 8 5The grounds for his impeachment were in keeping with
the Pickering precedent: that considerations of mental lucidity and
stability are fair game in the exercise of Congress's impeachment power,
at least regarding judges. The Chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee noted that the preparation of an impeachment resolution
against
Delahay
was
based
on
"[t]he
most
grievous

JEFFERSON406-08 (1986); BERGER, supra note 254, at 192-94; BUSHNELL, supra note 469, at 53-55.
481. See Ritter, 84 Ct. Cl. at 299; Turner, supra note 474, at 486; see also IRVING BRANT,
IMPEACHMENT: TRIALS AND ERRORS 46-57 (1972); HOFFER & HULL, supra note 442, at 208, 214,
218-19. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase was impeached the year after Pickering. See Turner,
supra note 474, at 486. His defense counsel discussed the Pickering impeachment and took it very
seriously. See 3 HINDS, supra note 440, at 767. In trying to distinguish his client's situation from
Pickering's, he argued that "by finding the defendant guilty, [the Senate] gave their sanction to the
charge that his insanity proceeded from habitual drunkenness. This case therefore proves nothing
further than that habitual drunkenness is an impeachable offense." Id.
482. Turner, supra note 474, at 486; see also BOWMAN, supra note 442, at 137; BUSHNELL,
supra note 469, at 53.

483.

3 HINDS, supranote 440, at 1018 (emphases added).

484. Other authorities have also concluded that incapacity is a legitimate means of impeaching
officials "at least in the case ofjudges." See BOWMAN, supra note 442, at 140; supra note 462.
485. See BOWMAN, supra note 442, at 138; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 448, at

119-23.
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charge ... which ... was that his personal habits unfitted him for the
judicial office, that he was intoxicated off the bench as well as on the
bench." 4 8 6 While on the bench, Delahay was at times essentially
incapacitated. 487 The Committee received testimony that revealed as
much. 4 88 Relying expressly on the Pickering precedent,4 89 the House voted
to impeach Delahay, who stepped down from the bench before he could
be tried in the Senate.4 90
Other impeachment efforts have also involved charges of chronic
alcoholism. In 1808, a judge, Peter B. Bruin, of the Mississippi Territory
was accused by the territorial legislature of "neglect of duty and
drunkenness on the bench." 4 9 1 The territorial legislature referred these
charges to the House of Representatives.492 A committee was created to
investigate, but Congress adjourned soon thereafter without taking action;
Bruin left the bench not long afterwards.493 In 1873, a House committee
was charged with investigating Judge E.H. Durell of Louisiana.494 The
allegations against Durell included "drunkenness." 4 95 The panel
considered evidence as to this charge but dismissed the allegations as
unsupported. 4 9 6 The committee did not, however, dismiss the drunkenness
49 7
charge as failing to meet the constitutional threshold for impeachment.
In 1912, Representative Victor Berger accused federal Judge Cornelius
49 8
Hanford of a number of charges and called for his impeachment.
Among them was being "an habitual drunkard." 49 9 The House Judiciary

Committee investigated these charges but essentially concluded its efforts
after Hanford resigned from the bench." Again, drunkenness was
apparently not treated as out of bounds for impeachment purposes.

486. CONG. GLOBE, 42dCong., 3d Sess. 1900 (1873) (statement of Rep. Butler); see also CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 1808 (1872). For more on the Delahay impeachment effort, see 1974
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 465, at 49; BOWMAN, supra note 442, at 138; VAN
TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 448, at 119-23.
487. See BOWMAN, supra note 442, at 138.
488. See id.
489. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 1900.
490. See 1974 JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 465, at 49; List of Individuals, supra
note 440.
491. 3 HINDS, supra note 440, at 983.
492. See id.
493. See id. at 984.
494. See id. at 1012.
495. See id.
496. See id.
497. See id.
498. See 6 CANNON, supra note 440, at 745-46.
499. Id. at 746.
500. See id. at 746-48.
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These episodes reflect that chronic alcoholism has been seen as a
viable reason for judicial impeachment though only one such effort ended
in formal Senate removal. 5 0 1 Being regularly inebriated on the job goes
directly to questions of mental lucidity and competence, not too far
removed from questions of mental incapacity.
That the Pickering and Delahay precedents and their progeny have
been seen as viable approaches was reflected yet again in 1926. That year,
the House of Representatives, in considering the impeachment of Judge
George English, approved a report, which concluded that:
[I]mpeachment in the Constitution applies not only to high crimes and
misdemeanors as those words were understood at common law but
also ...

to those which affect the public welfare. Thus an official may

be impeached for offenses of a political character . . .for inexcusable
negligence of duty,. . . [and] "conduct such as drunkenness when
habitual, or in the performance of official duties, gross indecency,
profanity, obscenity, or other language used in the discharge of an
official function, which tends to bring the office into disrepute ... ."502
Again, the House went on record as interpreting the scope of the
impeachment power to include alcoholism as legitimate grounds for
removal. 5 03 Ultimately, English stepped down from the bench and the
Senate did not pursue the impeachment.5 04
If removing insane or alcoholic lower federal court judges was
considered important enough to the proper functioning of the judiciary to
warrant their impeachment, the importance of removing an incapacitated
Vice President would be greater still. The logic and pressing need for
impeaching an incapacitated Vice President is much more pronounced
than for judicial impeachment for the simple reason that the federal
judiciary is made up of scores of federal judges.sos There is only one Vice

501.

SeeBOWMAN, supra note 442, at 137-40.

502.

67 CONG.REc. 6283 (1926) (citing to H.R. REP.No.69-653 (1925)); see also VAN TASSEL
& FINKELMAN, supra note 448, at 158-59; The Scope of the Power to Impeach, supra note 252, at
1322 n.20.
503. See 67 CONG. REc. 6283 (citing to H.R. REP.No. 69-653).
504. See VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 448, at 159.
505. Cf. Rubin v. United States, 525 U.S. 990, 991 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[The
President] is responsible for the actions of the Executive Branch in much the same way that the entire
Congress is responsible for the actions of the Legislative Branch or the entire Judiciary for those of
the Judicial Branch."), denying cert. to 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (emphasis added); Schuker,
supra note 63, at 137; RONAN, supra note 3, at 3 ("Unlike the incapacitation or death of a member of
Congress or the Supreme Court, instability in the presidency presents an immediate danger given the
occupant's responsibilities when it comes to national security."); but cf. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452,472 (1991).
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President and he has unique responsibilities that are essential to ensuring
the continuity of the executive branch.50 6
Moreover, since both the Vice President and federal judges are
subject to impeachment, the precedents demonstrate at least the
theoretical availability of the mechanism as an option for an incapacitated
Vice President. Nonetheless, applying a precedent from judicial
impeachment to one involving the Vice President is not seamless. After
all, judges enjoy life tenure and "hold their Offices" as long as they
which some have argued holds judges to a
display "good Behaviour,
higher standard of conduct than elected officeholders, in effect making
0
judges somewhat less difficult to impeach and remove.5 o
All in all, there is political precedent involving judges that lends
some support for the potential use of the impeachment process to remove
an incapacitated Vice President.
d. Judicial Authority for Deferring to the Political Branches in
an Impeachment Setting
A legislative branch decision to impeach and remove an
incapacitated Vice President would almost assuredly be left to stand by
the courts. 509 Were the House to decide that a Vice President should be
removed for inability, there is considerable legal authority to support its
judgment as being a judicially unreviewable constitutional determination,
subject only to the Senate's disposition of the impeachment."'o
In Nixon v. United States, the Supreme Court considered whether the
judiciary had the authority to review the manner in which the Senate
carried out the impeachment trial of Judge Walter Nixon."' In the case,
506. See U.S. CONST. amend XXV; cf. RONAN, supra note 3, at 3.
507. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
508. See VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 448, at 132, 158; Mark R. Slusar, Comment,
The Confusion Defined: Questions and Problems of Process in the Aftermath of the Clinton
Impeachment, 49 CASE WESTERN RES.L. REv. 869, 882-84 (1999). But see The Scope of the Power
to Impeach, supra note 252, at 1322 n.20. The view that "good behavior" requires a higher level of
conduct for judges and reciprocally makes judicial impeachment less difficult is a fairly recent one.
See, e.g., 1974 JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 465, at 17; GERHARDT, supra note 239,
at 183; Slusar, supra, at 882-84.
509. The impeachment process does not raise concerns with respect to the Bill of Attainder
Clause. This is because impeachment was specifically designed by the framers to remove officials
from office; it exists alongside the Bill of Attainder Clause in the Constitution's text. Moreover, the
Due Process Clause would not appear to have application with regard to impeachment proceedings
either. See GERHARDT, supra note 239, at 139-41; ALEX SIMPSON, JR., A TREATISE ON FEDERAL

IMPEACHMENTS 66 (1916). The Ex Post Facto Clause would not apply regarding impeachment since
impeachment in the United States does not carry criminal penalties.
510. See GERHARDT, supra note 239, at xi, 132, 146; VAN TASSEL& FINKELMAN, supra note
448, at 9.
511. See506U.S.224,226(1993).
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the full Senate had delegated to a committee the fact-finding
responsibilities of the trial.12The Supreme Court determined that the way
the Senate conducted the trial was up to the Senate alone.' The Nixon
decision was consistent with prior judicial pronouncements on the
subject.5 14 The Court in Nixon placed great stock in the Constitution's
reference to the Senate enjoying "sole Power to try all Impeachments.""'
The Court pronounced that this "sentence is a grant of authority to the
Senate, and the word 'sole' indicates that this authority is reposed in the
Senate and nowhere else." 5 16 As will be recalled, the Court was concerned
that "opening the door of judicial review to the procedures used by the
Senate in trying impeachments would 'expose the political life of the
country to months, or perhaps years, of chaos.'5 1 7
There is every reason to think the Court would be equally deferential
to the House's impeachment prerogatives. 5 1 After all, the House is
similarly granted the "sole" power of initiating impeachment
proceedings. 5 19 As the Court in Nixon observed, "the word 'sole' is of
considerable significance. Indeed, the word 'sole' appears only one other
time in the Constitution- with respect to the House of Representatives'
'sole' Power of Impeachment."5 2 0
Given the Supreme Court's linkage of the two provisions, it would
be difficult to contend that the term "sole" should be interpreted one way
in a Senate context but another way in a Housese etting.521 Thus, an
512. See id. at 226-27.
513. Seeid.at231,238.
514. See Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 293, 300 (1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 668 (1937);
cf. Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 501 (1866). Interestingly, the court in Ritter
expressly raised the Pickering impeachment:
The action of the Senate [in the Pickering impeachment] was characterized by the historian
[John Bach] McMaster as "arbitrary", "illegal", and "infamous." [sic] We need not
consider whether this language was justified. It is sufficient to say that notwithstanding
the peculiar circumstances of the case no one at the time or since has suggested that the
conviction of Judge Pickering might have been reviewed by the courts.
Ritter, 84 Ct. Cl. at 299. Thus, the court in Ritter essentially indicated that the judiciary would not
interfere in a situation involving a federal judge being impeached for mental incapacity. Cf. The Scope
of the Power to Impeach, supra note 252, at 1322 n.20 (noting that the impeachment provision in the
Constitution "applies not only to high crimes and misdemeanors" but also misbehavior and acts that
may "affect the public welfare.").
515. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 230 (emphasis added).
516. Id. at 229.
517. Id. at 236.
518. See, e.g., KALT, supra note 89, at 130.
519. U.S. CONST. art.I, §2, cl. 5.
520. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 230-31.
521. Cf. United States v. At. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 135 (2007) (noting that parts of a
statute that "are adjacent and have remarkably similar structures" therefore "can be understood only
with reference to" one another); Amar, supra note 249, at 791-92 (arguing in favor of using
constitutional text as a dictionary to define constitutional terms).
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argument based on the House and Senate enjoying unreviewable
constitutional authority in how they pursue impeachment supports use of
the mechanism in a vice presidential inability context. This is all the more
the case since finality in a vice presidential incapacity setting is vitally
important. It is closely related to the Supreme Court's concerns about the
unedifying prospect of presidential impeachment being reviewed by
the judiciary.
e. Practical Benefits
Finally, impeachment offers three practical benefits. First, unlike
secret letter arrangements, impeachment is a public process. Congress
undertakes the procedure openly which adds an element of legitimacy to
resolving the question. Second, unlike secret letter arrangements or the
CGOPT, impeachment is a process with which public officials and the
American people are familiar. Again, this helps bolster the case for
impeachment. Finally, the Speaker's involvement in the impeachment
decision could be much less than under the CGOPT. Indeed, one could
imagine a Speaker recusing herself from the impeachment proceedings
given her role in the line of succession, something that could not be done
under the CGOPT.
2. Downsides to Use of the Impeachment Process
There are several reasons, however, to be skeptical of the
impeachment approach. Impeachment carries with it daunting textual,
structural, and practical challenges to its use in an incapacity setting.
a. Inability Is Not a High Crime or Misdemeanor
The most compelling problem with the impeachment approach is
that, on its face, incapacity does not fall within the scope of "Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." 52 2 The framers took
specific steps to cabin the authority of Congress in the impeachment
context since they were troubled by the expansive use of the process by
522. U.S. CONT., art. II, § 4; see also SILVA, supra note 54, at 105 n.79; Stephan, supra note
241, at 67-68; First Fordham Report, supra note 7, at 35; cf. BOWMAN, supra note 442, at 287;
FEERICK, supra note 132, at 241; KALT, supra note 16, at 156. For the contention that the treason,
bribery, and high crimes and misdemeanors formulation may not be exhaustive, see The Scope of the
Power to Impeach, supra note 252, at 1317-22.
Impeaching a mentally incapacitated Vice President could bring with it the added
complication that the officeholder might attempt to preside at his own impeachment trial in the Senate.
The constitutionality of such an approach is an open question. See Goldstein, supra note 47, at 85965; Michael Stokes Paulsen, Someone Should Have Told Spiro Agnew, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 245,
245(1997).
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the British Parliament. 52 3The result was that the framers limited the
impeachment process in several ways. The mechanism can only be used
to remove individuals from office, and it cannot otherwise punish them
(e.g., imprison, fine, or execute them). The impeachment process involves
procedural safeguards such as a majority vote in the House and a twothirds vote in the Senate. It requires the Chief Justice to preside when the
President is on trial in the Senate. It mandates that senators take a specific
oath when weighing a potential removal. And it limits the offenses for
which one can be impeached to "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes
and Misdemeanors."524
High crimes and misdemeanors are generally thought to be limited
to criminal offenses or closely related malfeasance with a harmful impact
on the country as a whole. 52 5 Because incapacity is not a crime and
because it does not fall within the outer orbit of what would be considered
a crime or abuse of power, it can be argued with much force that it is not
not an
and therefore
a "high crime"
or "misdemeanor"
impeachable offense.526
In short, the impeachment approach faces a significant textual
hurdle. This is much less the case than with the post hoc statutory option.
Even assuming that the Original Inability Clause's "both" language is as
big an obstacle to addressing vice presidential inability as the "high crimes
and misdemeanors" wording of Article II (and there are several reasons to
believe that that is not the case),5 27 the statutory method can always fall
523. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 254, at 7; GERHARDT, supra note 239, at 10-11.
524. On the other hand, one could imagine a situation involving a de facto mentally incapacitated
President who is declared incapacitated under section 4 early in his presidency but continues to
challenge the determination again and again under section 4 with intermittent success. Under this
scenario, the nation is put through great uncertainty and trauma over a long period of time as the Vice
President (the now and again Acting President), the Cabinet and Congress go through the section 4
process repeatedly. Meanwhile, public business languishes during this power struggle. It is hard to
believe that Congress could not at some point end matters once and for all by impeaching and
removing the recalcitrant and de facto deranged President. Cf. GERHARDT, supra note 239, at 194. If
Congress could not do this, the country would be left with no means of ridding itself permanently of
a deranged chief executive for years on end. See supra notes 455-60 and accompanying text and note
462.
525.

See, e.g., VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 448, at 293-302 (President Clinton's

Memorandum Regarding Standards for Impeachment, Oct. 3, 1998).
526. See FirstFordharnReport, supra note 7, at 35; Second FordharnReport, supra note 7, at
969-70. Given that impeachment rhetoric and efforts to undertake impeachment have become an
increasingly regular part of political discourse in recent decades, see generally DAVID E.KYVIG, THE
AGE OF IMPEACHMENT (2008), expanding the permissible bounds of impeachable offenses by using
it for incapacity could lead to negative ramifications down the road, raising the possibility of the
mechanism becoming dangerously dislodged from its constitutional foundations. In this regard,
promiscuous public discourse could be wedded to broad legal interpretation to permit impeachment
to be wielded recklessly. Cf. FirstFordham Report, supra note 7, at 35.
527. See supra Part I.A.2.a.
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back on the Necessary and Proper Clause for support. The impeachment
approach can draw upon no such textual reinforcement.
b. Impeachment Was Designed for One Purpose, the Original
Inability Clause for Another
Putting the Necessary and Proper Clause to one side for a moment,
it could be argued that there is one express textual authorization for
addressing vice presidential incapacity and it is when Congress takes
action under Article II, Section 1, Clause 6.528 Impeachment, on the other
hand, goes specifically to issues of treason, bribery, high crimes and
misdemeanors.529 Each constitutional provision was meant to address an
entirely separate matter: one for inability and the other for bad behavior. 35 0
These clauses, the argument would go, were never intended to overlap and
they should not be blurred together in the modem era.
c. Practical Drawbacks
Not only are there serious constitutional drawbacks to using
impeachment for incapacity purposes, practical concerns exist that are
equally formidable. One potential drawback with impeaching and
removing an incapacitated Vice President while the President remains
healthy is that such an action would likely remove the individual from
office. 5 3 As examined in the context of the pre-signed resignation letter
option, with impeachment and removal, if the Vice President later
recovered his health or was freed from kidnappers, he would be unable to
return to his position without a tremendous exertion of time and resources
and a healthy dose of good fortune; the effect would be to cost the
American public the officeholder they chose. This is unlike the statutory
mechanism whereby, if the Vice President recovers his capacity, he can
regain his powers and duties. In this respect, the impeachment mechanism
is much less flexible and much harsher than the post hoc statute advocated
in this Article.
Moreover, impeaching an incapacitated Vice President involves
stigma. Simply put, impeachment in the public mind is essentially
528. See supra Part I.A.2.a.
529. See BERGER, supra note 239, at 189-91.
530. See id. at 59, 190-91; cf. KALT, supra note 16, at 55; Adam R.F. Gustafson, Note,
PresidentialInability and Subjective Meaning, 27 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 459, 468 (2009). The vote
thresholds are different for the two processes which reflect that, while the mechanisms are similar,
they are not interchangeable. For impeachment and removal there must be a majority vote in the
House of Representatives and a two-thirds vote in the Senate. A section 4 process entails a two-thirds
vote in both houses. Cf. KALT, supra note 16, at 13; Gustafson, supra, at 467.
531. See Feerick,supranote 241, at 115; Stephan, supra note 241, at 68.
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reserved for bad behavior. It would likely take a significant "public
education" campaign to persuade American citizens that the mechanism
could or should be used for addressing inability. This effort to convince
the public would no doubt be greatly complicated by the textual
considerations discussed earlier: the phrase "high crimes and
misdemeanors" does not lend itself easily to including incapacity. For
these reasons, removal through the impeachment process typically applies
a stigma to the individual in question.532 The impeachment process clearly
implies impropriety and wrongdoing, and in the case of vice presidential
inability, such opprobrium could very likely be unwarranted. (One could,
of course, imagine a Vice President who is comatose because he
performed some reckless act, which might bring with it a stigma).
During a vice presidential incapacity scenario, public sympathy
toward the family would almost certainly run high. For example, the Vice
President could be kidnapped or have suffered a stroke. For Congress then
to remove the Vice President from office through impeachment and in the
process eliminate his pay and benefits would be a truly jarring prospect
for the public, making Congress's task extraordinarily difficult. This
would be especially true if the Vice President's family opposed the effort
(overtly or otherwise). It seems doubtful that members of Congress would
vote to impeach a hospitalized or kidnapped Vice President and oppose a
tearful Second Family. By contrast, the post hoc statutory approach would
be narrowly tailored to specifically address incapacity without
stigmatizing the Vice President and without eliminating his title, salary,
and benefits.
All things considered, a set of arguments could be marshalled in
favor of using impeachment to resolve a vice presidential incapacity
situation, but these arguments run up against formidable textual,
structural, and practical obstacles. Compared with a post hoc statute,
impeachment comes up short. A statutory approach offers distinct
advantages over impeachment in that: (1) it enjoys a stronger textual basis,
(2) it is more flexible because it does not involve irrevocable removal of
the Vice President, and (3) it lacks stigma. 5 33
532. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 472 (1991); In re Certain Complaints Under
Investigation, 783 F.2d 1488, 1508 n.17 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing with approval 126 Cong. Rec.
S13,859 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini)); The JudicialTenure Act: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Comm. on the Judiciary,95th
Cong. 60 (1977) (statement of Sen. Nunn); Brownell, supra note 69, at 201; Goldstein, supra note 9,
at 91; Thomas, supra note 462, at 387; Winter, supra note 462, at 98; see also Feerick, supra note
241.
533. Impeachment could also prove to be a slower process than an ad hoc statute and its
subsequent implementation. Cf. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.452,472 (1991); KALT, supra note 16,
at 122.
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The previous four Parts have each discussed potential approaches to
handling an immediate case of vice presidential inability: (1) through post
hoc legislation, (2) through a letter arrangement, (3) through the CGOPT,
and (4) through the impeachment process. Each raises concerns. Each
situation poses different constitutional, legitimacy, and logistical
challenges. The post hoc statutory approach, however, comes closest to
satisfying these criteria and, in the end, addresses the dilemma of vice
presidential inability in the least objectionable way.
IV.

CONCLUSION

When it comes to addressing vice presidential incapacity,lawmakers
have long taken the approach of the neighbor in Bob Dylan's song"[i]t's just something we're gonna have to forget."5 3 4 It, therefore, seems
evident that a constitutional amendment or an ex ante statute to address
vice presidential incapacity is unlikely to materialize anytime soon.
Nonetheless, forgetting about the problem does not mean that the problem
goes away. Vice presidential inability poses serious potential dilemmas
for U.S. policymakers. The vice presidency has established itself as a vital
American political institution; 53 5 indeed, the office is essential to the
operation of sections 3 and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. This
indispensable role in the operation of the executive branch means that,
when coupled with the lack of clear constitutional or statutory guidance
on what to do about vice presidential inability, if the officeholder were to
be stricken with an incapacity, his inability could result in paralysis in the
upper reaches of the executive branch.
Without a constitutional amendment or the next best thing-an ex
ante statute-governmental officials will have to make do the best they
can if a vice presidential inability scenario arises. This Article has
attempted to evaluate the various possible ways of addressing vice
presidential incapacity and to provide the least objectionable approach if
federal officials find themselves in this difficult spot. A Cheneyesque
letter arrangement, the CGOPT, and the impeachment process each would
be viable in a pinch, but each also has a number of flaws that make them
less desirable than a post hoc statute.
Given the overriding need for the response to vice presidential
inability to be constitutionally-sound, politically legitimate, and practical,
a post hoc statute would appear to be the least troubling legal "band aid"

534. DYLAN,supra note 5.
535. See, e.g., JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE MODERN VICE PRESIDENCY: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AN AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTION 3 (1982).
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to place over this constitutional wound were such an unfortunate situation
to arise.
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